Moldova and Romania: Caught in a Geopolitical Triangle

Sergiu CEBAN

Moldova marked the 35th anniversary of its statehood with yet another step away from neutrality. The agreements reached at Maia Sandu’s meeting with the presidents of Ukraine and Romania on joint airspace monitoring, air defense, and logistics mark a new stage in the transformation of our country into an element of a regional security framework directly linked to the Russian-Ukrainian war

Our authorities marked the 35th anniversary of statehood in an atmosphere strikingly different from the pro-European integration euphoria that prevailed a year earlier. Back then, on the eve of the decisive parliamentary elections, we welcomed high-ranking European guests who arrived with pompous statements and sweeping promises of support. But apparently, European politicians were driven at the time solely by a pragmatic electoral calculus, since their strategic objective was to keep Maia Sandu and PAS in power at any cost. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that once this goal had been achieved, interest in our country waned considerably. So, this year’s milestone anniversary was marked by a much more modest gathering. The only high-level guests to visit us were the presidents of the neighboring countries, Volodymyr Zelensky and Nicusor Dan. At the same time, the geopolitical processes unfolding around us are becoming increasingly alarming. This includes the outcome of the meeting between the three leaders in the format of the “Odessa Triangle”. The event was clearly not a friendly get-together to mark the holiday. Instead, it concluded with an ambitious declaration on nothing less than the creation of a new security architecture in the Black Sea-Danube region. Behind the common rhetoric of the heads of state about protection from “hybrid threats” lies an extremely dangerous game for regional stability, compounded by the fact that each participant has its own interests, which do not always align with those of its neighbors. The main outcome of the trilateral consultations was a decision to strengthen coordination on security, energy, and logistics in the face of common threats from Russia. The context behind this rapprochement is obvious: in recent weeks, Moscow has been employing increasingly harsh military measures in the Odesa oblast and Southern Bessarabia, primarily with the aim of disrupting logistics. This is precisely the strategic area where the borders of the three countries converge. At the same time, Russian tactics have focused primarily on the naval blockade and destruction of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure. In response, Chisinau, Bucharest, and Kyiv have announced unprecedented steps toward integration across several key areas, effectively erasing the distinction between a sovereign, non-involved state and a front-line zone. First, they have announced the synchronization of monitoring systems and the real-time exchange of radar data across the entire information chain, in order to respond more quickly to Russian missiles and drones flying through the border area. For us, this effectively means the further inclusion of the military structures of Ukraine and Romania, and consequently NATO, into Moldova’s information and airspace environment, even though the country formally continues to present itself as a neutral state. The second measure looks even more alarming: joint response mechanisms. This concerns legal frameworks that would allow the air-defense forces of Romania and Ukraine to intercept aerial targets more effectively over border areas, allegedly minimizing risks to Moldovan and Romanian territory. In this way, our authorities are planning to transfer sovereignty over the country’s airspace to foreign military forces and legitimize the transformation of our skies into an air-defense buffer zone. Third, projects are planned to create a unified logistics chain and introduce common border procedures. Essentially, at a time when the Russian army is destroying infrastructure at Ukrainian border crossing points, these common border and customs procedures are intended to stitch together three separate bureaucratic systems into a single end-to-end corridor. Bucharest and Chisinau need to understand that when Russia is deliberately striking transport hubs in Odesa and along the Danube, integration into Ukraine’s military supply system will inevitably make Moldovan and Romanian infrastructure a priority target. The plans are undoubtedly ambitious and serious. But this immediately raises a legitimate question: will the three countries actually be able to withstand attacks from Moscow if, at some point, Russia begins to perceive Moldova and Romania as a single military-logistical conglomerate alongside Ukraine? Moreover, if we strip away the wrapping of “European solidarity”, it becomes clear that the main and, in fact, the only real beneficiary of this trilateral format is Kyiv. Ukraine is engaged in an extremely difficult war of attrition, making it vital for Kyiv to expand the conflict, find new logistical corridors, and secure its rear, particularly Odesa and the south of the country, by leveraging neighboring borders. Most importantly, Ukraine needs to tie its neighbors to itself as closely as possible, so that any Russian action against Ukraine would automatically inflict a blow on Romania or Moldova as well. The logic is extremely pragmatic and cynical. If Bucharest and Chisinau continue on a course of shielding Ukraine and assisting it at the expense of their own security and national interests, they may ultimately find themselves drawn into a major regional crisis. Paradoxically, this is precisely Kyiv’s direct strategic calculation: the more countries become directly affected by the conflict, the broader the theatre of military operations will become, and the more difficult it will be for Moscow to conduct an isolated operation confined exclusively to Ukrainian territory. As a NATO member, Romania naturally enjoys the security guarantees provided under Article 5, but those guarantees remain effective only so long as Bucharest does not become directly involved in the confrontation. By providing its airspace, radar systems, and logistics to support the Ukrainian front, Bucharest is effectively stepping beyond the protection of the “NATO umbrella” and risks turning the Danube Delta and its Black Sea coast into an active theatre of hostilities. As for Moldova, our participation in this “triumvirate” borders on outright suicide should the country become drawn into active hostilities. It cannot be ruled out that the current increase in coordination is merely a prelude to something more serious. For example, it could pave the way for the creation of some form of regional military-political alliance between the three states, united by a common border and a common adversary. The stance of the ruling regimes in all three countries clearly lends itself to such a scenario. On the one hand, Bucharest genuinely seeks to weaken Russia in the Black Sea, which would allow it to pursue its own geopolitical ambitions in the region. On the other hand, the provision of its military and operational resources would, in the eyes of the Russian military, be unequivocally interpreted as direct involvement in the hostilities, with all the consequences that would entail. The Moldovan authorities, meanwhile, are placing all of us in the position of a defenseless victim. Unlike our Romanian neighbors, we have neither air defense nor a fully-fledged army, nor the diplomatic weight to match. The Kremlin, which is currently focusing its military and political attention on the Black Sea coast, will make no allowances, especially if it sees Moldova moving away from its neutral status. Thus, in an attempt to please Kyiv and demonstrate to the West its usefulness in the fight against “imperial evil”, Maia Sandu is effectively turning Moldova into an integral part of the theatre of hostilities and a front-line zone. At the same time, neither Kyiv nor Bucharest is capable of providing us with absolute guarantees commensurate with the scale of the risks involved. This means that, should the situation escalate, it will be you and I who have to pay the price for the decisions of our commander-in-chief. Although the detailed content of the trilateral agreements remains unknown for now, the summit held in Chisinau nevertheless marks an important turning point. Even indirect signs make it clear that Moldova and Romania are moving from declarative support for Ukraine toward practical involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian theatre of hostilities. However hard the leaders of the three countries may try to present this as a “defensive shield”, the essence of the consolidation process is that it does not prevent the conflict, but merely expands its geographical scope.