Why Is the SIS Director Seeking the Spotlight?

The heads of intelligence and counterintelligence agencies around the world are largely behind-the-scenes figures, so they are reluctant to appear in public and do so only on special occasions with a carefully prepared message. It is therefore rather unusual that Alexandru Musteata, director of the Security and Intelligence Service, has in recent months become one of the most media-visible officials, giving interviews and appearing on podcasts. Such uncharacteristic activity, in our view, is more a sign of a lack of stability within the agency than an excess of energy on the part of the head of a key intelligence service. As practice shows, Musteata’s colleagues make only a handful of public statements throughout their entire term in office, usually in connection with personnel decisions, terrorist attacks, an escalation of the national security situation, or the need to outline a fundamentally new course of action for the state in response to existing threats. They cannot afford to go on the air simply to raise their profile, because every minute on camera provides material for analysis by the enemy. Professional intelligence agencies understand better than anyone that self-promotion is a vulnerability that should be justified only by an urgent operational necessity. However, as we know, anything is possible in Moldova. For the SIS head, such heightened media exposure is clearly a calculated risk – one that, presumably, is outweighed by some benefit. The question is what exactly that benefit might be. In our opinion, the answer lies in the calendar. The current SIS head’s term expires in June of next year. The decision regarding his professional future will be made under circumstances that are significantly different from those of the first half of 2022. Rumors are circulating in the corridors of power that Musteata does not intend to step down from his post. In other words, all of his public appearances are primarily aimed at extending his term in office. The heavy media presence is apparently intended to remind those responsible for personnel and political decisions of his existence, demonstrate his own relevance, and publicly cement his status as an indispensable figure. At the same time, however, this behavior is also seen as a clear indication that the SIS director’s position is beginning to waver noticeably, and he is increasingly feeling the pressure from within the political establishment. A prime example of hasty media positioning is the recent report on Cobasna, which was cobbled together in practically a single day using whatever was at hand. The subject itself is hardly new, as the ammunition depots in the village on the left bank of the Dniester have been the focus of discussion for several decades. But the real question is different: what new information did this presentation actually bring to the public, and what was its practical impact? Apparently, the value of the report was purely demonstrative: to show the involvement of the key security agencies in the main issue of the day, while also claiming for himself the role of the person who is “keeping eyes on the ball”. After all, what most people took away from it was that the report had been presented by Musteata himself and someone else. In reality, however, the effectiveness of intelligence and security services is measured not by public events, but by threats prevented, of which neither bloggers nor journalists should know anything. Such information should be known exclusively to the country’s top political leadership. When the activities of intelligence and security agencies are turned into an open media spectacle, it inevitably reveals a shift in their institutional priorities, with cheap publicity taking center stage instead of discreet work focused on achieving results. Another important factor that will most likely come into play when considering whether or not to extend the current SIS director’s term is his professional background. Musteata’s career developed within a grant system historically linked to Western foundations, which is why he has long been perceived as a protégé of Soros-affiliated organizations. For Moldova’s intelligence community, Musteata’s appointment as director was an anomaly in personnel terms, which is why he will always be perceived as an “outsider” within the system. For this reason, a significant part of our political elite and society is convinced that the SIS is effectively under external control and serves not the interests of the state, but those of a transnational network of non-governmental organizations. In addition, the agency’s reputation inevitably leaves its mark on its leader, especially when failures begin to form a consistent pattern. Over the past year, the SIS has been dogged by an ever-growing trail of professional missteps (the failure of the Moldovan network in the Russian Federation) and high-profile scandals, such as the incident involving the Taliban delegation’s visit. It is now difficult to attribute all of this to isolated mistakes, and the accumulated incidents are creating a certain reputational backdrop that calls into question not only the effectiveness of the service itself but also the quality of its administration. The external factor will be no less important in the struggle for the SIS director’s post. As is well known, the current White House administration is waging a campaign against organizations and individuals that openly or covertly represent Soros-linked networks. As a result, USAID has already been “put on the chopping block”, while at the end of August it was announced that the US Treasury Department was preparing a large-scale review of a number of progressive NGOs, with a particular focus on the Open Society Foundations. This could also affect the NGO ecosystem in which Alexandru Musteata’s career took shape. Incidentally, the new head of the OSCE mission, a career American diplomat aligned with the current White House administration, has already arrived in Moldova. The new U.S. ambassador is expected to arrive in Chisinau shortly. According to reports, U.S. law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, have already requested information on a number of our institutions and individuals associated with them. It is difficult to predict the outcome of these investigations, but it is not at all difficult to discern a certain logic behind these actions. For the head of Moldova’s intelligence service, the stance of foreign partners is one of the key factors in retaining his position. Intelligence cooperation is built on deep trust, and if Washington deems the current director of the SIS to be unreliable, toxic, or simply inconvenient, the likelihood of his reappointment will be virtually zero. In other words, Musteata’s career prospects may depend not so much on a parliamentary majority or the favor of his own political leadership as on the stance of senior partners, without whose support further countering of Russian influence would be significantly more difficult. As an observant and fairly experienced individual, we believe Alexandru Musteata understands this better than most, which is why he is visibly nervous and in a hurry. Even within the ruling team itself, attitudes toward him are far from unanimous. Amid the factional struggle within PAS, which is influenced not least by the intelligence services’ blunders, the SIS head is increasingly viewed as a high-value bargaining chip. If they decide to sacrifice him as part of the next round of personnel reshuffles or a government reboot, doing so under the current circumstances will be much easier. The events unfolding both within and around the country’s main intelligence agency certainly warrant a separate article. But the frequency of failures and the personal conduct of the current head only serve to confirm that the agency has long been in a protracted crisis. In essence, it is increasingly neglecting the core activities assigned to it by law, and the weakness of such agencies is a clear sign that Moldova’s security is at serious risk and under threat.