Opinion: “Chisinau Should Restore Contacts with Moscow”

As winter approaches, the conflict in Ukraine has once again reached a crossroads: either a serious escalation or a diplomatic de-escalation. Whatever the scenario, Moldova would be well advised to hold back from any further rupture with Russia and at least partially restore bilateral contacts

The conflict in Ukraine and, more broadly, the Russian-Western confrontation have reached an obvious crossroads: either the escalation spiral continues, with both sides seeking to inflict critical damage on each other during the coming winter period, or three- or even four-party negotiations are relaunched, paving the way for decisions aimed at containing the conflict and, in the longer term, even suspending hostilities. The war in the neighboring country, which temporarily slipped out of the global spotlight amid the events in Iran, is once again reclaiming its status as “Problem No. 1”, with repercussions extending far beyond the region. For example, the reciprocal strikes by Russia and Ukraine are contributing to keeping global oil prices high, threatening the world with dangerous grain shortages, and producing a range of other negative consequences. The risks of new participants becoming involved in the conflict and of the most destructive types of weaponry being deployed, including nuclear weapons, also remain. One of the key factors behind the onset of what is effectively a new phase of the war has been the significant expansion of the long-range strike capabilities of both sides. Ukraine has managed to carry out sustained launches involving a record number of drones, reaching as many as 1,000 per day. Kyiv is also developing its missile capabilities: the use of Flamingo cruise missiles has become routine, while ballistic missile systems are already undergoing testing and will undoubtedly cause the Russians considerable trouble. Russia, for its part, is likewise expanding its long-range strike potential, scaling up production of both its traditional range of missiles and its drone technologies. The jet-powered Geran drones, against which effective interceptors have yet to be developed, have become a major problem for the Ukrainians, as have the Banderol drone-missiles. These technological advances in military terms have marked a qualitatively new level in the targeting of the rear. Both sides are now capable of conducting strategic campaigns aimed at shutting down entire sectors of each other’s economies. For Russia, this primarily means oil refining, which has triggered a persistent fuel crisis, the disruption of warehousing capacity used by major online marketplaces, and significant restrictions on maritime exports. For Ukraine, the targets include petrol station infrastructure, retail chains, distribution centers, and the blockade of the Greater Odesa ports. The war is not only further depleting the economic potential of the parties involved, but is also becoming significantly more costly for them. In Ukraine, the military budget deficit has exceeded $20 billion, while Russia is also coming under considerable strain. The number of military incidents beyond the immediate conflict zone is increasing. Drone incursions into the airspace of Moldova, Romania, the Baltic states, and Poland have become almost routine. Moreover, acts of sabotage on the territory of European Union member states are on the rise. The EU remains Kyiv’s main sponsor, as well as its principal rear base. This increasingly alarming situation, in my view, lies behind the new round of diplomatic activity being launched by the United States. This time, the traditional envoys of the US president, Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, held shuttle diplomacy in both capitals. According to reports, they brought with them some fresh ideas for the settlement process. The details were not officially disclosed, but judging by leaks in the Western and Ukrainian press, the terms put forward by the American envoys for Ukraine turned out to be worse than those that had been on the table last year. This is a rather interesting point. During the summer, the pro-Ukrainian camp was largely dominated by expectations of an impending turning point in the war, driven by a number of factors: the aforementioned campaigns aimed at destroying Russia’s economic potential; the establishment of fire control over a strategically important highway running through the so-called “new Russian regions”; the slowdown in the pace of Russia’s offensive; and the successful counteroffensive operations carried out by Ukraine itself. Yet, as we can see, the United States assesses the current situation somewhat differently and apparently believes that Kyiv remains on a downward trajectory. As a result, the terms of any hypothetical peace agreement have to be revised to Ukraine’s disadvantage. Precisely determining whose assessment of the situation is closest to reality is almost impossible. Nevertheless, we can see that the dynamics surrounding the war in the neighboring country are gathering momentum, forcing every player to adapt to new realities and make its own moves. Against this backdrop, official Chisinau still prefers to remain within the narrow framework of maintaining no contacts whatsoever and gradually shedding the remaining ties with Russia. Such an approach is not only devoid of pragmatism, but is also becoming increasingly disconnected from the republic’s objective interests and needs. It is common knowledge that, much like in the case of the European Union, the artificially engineered rupture in relations with Russia has resulted in enormous problems, above all in the economic sphere. Moldova is now reaping the full consequences of losing its previous channels for obtaining energy resources, a development that is literally draining the budget and the national economy; a significant decline in trade with the eastern markets, with the prospect of losing access to the CIS market altogether once it leaves the organization; and the transition to a new model of electricity supply that is less reliable and considerably more expensive. As economic difficulties mount, so too do the security risks. Even information available from open sources points to a serious intensification of espionage and sabotage activities, both by Russian operatives in our country and in the opposite direction, providing a clear indication that bilateral relations are sliding toward a state bordering on hostility. Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that Russia feels no compunction about striking Ukrainian infrastructure that is also important to Moldova, including border crossing points, or violating our country’s airspace. In addition, Moscow is clearly shifting the center of gravity of its policy toward Moldova to the Transnistrian region, which is receiving multifaceted support. The visit of Ambassador-designate Ozerov to Tiraspol, where, against the backdrop of the symbols of the unrecognized PMR, he handed out Russian passports to local residents, was a highly demonstrative move, as are the continuing threats directed at Chisinau over a hypothetical escalation around the left bank. The Moldovan authorities, for their part, are maintaining the level of escalation through a variety of means. The process is a comprehensive one, unfolding along a number of different tracks: formally designating Russia in strategic doctrine as a threat and adversary; purging any elements of Russian influence in Moldova, from political forces to cultural centers; increasing pressure on the “pro-Russian regions”; making a demonstrative withdrawal from the CIS; adopting an extremely tough rhetoric toward the Kremlin; and more. It is also significant that Moldova is becoming integrated into the rear support network for Ukraine, including through the development and testing of drones, as well as the transit of various goods. It is difficult to say at this stage exactly where Chisinau wants to “settle” in its relations with Moscow, but the current trajectory is clearly leading toward the final destruction of what remains of the previous status quo, including the expulsion of the Russian ambassador and withdrawal from the foundational agreements, including the 1992 agreement. I do not believe that the course chosen is a reasonable one, if only because of the factors I have outlined above. Moldova still has a window of opportunity, albeit a very narrow one, to draw on its constitutional neutrality as well as public sentiment and reverse the negative trend in relations with Russia by beginning to restore contacts. This could at least help mitigate the growing security risks to some extent. But I am no idealist, and I fully realize that returning to the pre-war situation is practically impossible, at least in the short term. Energy and trade ties have been lost, most likely irreversibly. On the other hand, I find it difficult to understand the rather stubbornly rigid stance of our leadership at a time when the rest of the world continues to conduct business and maintain dealings with Russia. And this is not limited to the countries of the Global South, which never severed such cooperation in the first place, but also includes Moldova’s own partners. The United States, as we can see, has no qualms about engaging with Russia, arranging periodic calls between the leaders, discussing economic cooperation, and inviting a Russian delegation to the G20 summit on its own territory. The European Union, despite a prevailing commitment to continued unconditional support for Kyiv, is still looking for candidates to serve as interlocutors with the Kremlin, occasionally initiates communication at various levels, and continues cooperation in the energy sector as well: Russia remains one of the EU’s leading suppliers of liquefied natural gas. Even Ukraine maintains certain channels of communication with its adversary, at least for the exchange of bodies and prisoners, and does not rule out participation in trilateral negotiations. Moldova’s course of self-isolation from Russia therefore clearly runs counter to the pragmatic behavior of other actors and requires prompt adjustment. Ultimately, the inability to think and act rationally in such a turbulent historical era may prove very costly for our republic.