Moldova’s Irreversible Slide into the Grey Zone of Regional Security

Sergiu CEBAN

The gap between war and peacetime that has become the norm for Moldova in recent years appears to be rapidly shrinking

Yesterday, drones violated the country’s airspace twice within half an hour. The first, near Palanca, penetrated 500 meters into our territory and returned to Ukrainian airspace a minute later. The second, in the Cioburciu-Pervomaisc area, circled over the eastern regions for nearly ten minutes. Just two years ago, any such report would have led to an emergency meeting of the Supreme Security Council and loud promises to take action. Yesterday, we saw only a few brief news items. This means that Moldova has finally come to view these incidents as routine and, along with them, has shifted from a peripheral perception of a foreign war to becoming its de facto rear area. Therefore, in our opinion, the question posed in the headline has long since had an affirmative answer. The first instances of rocket and drone debris in 2022-2023 were considered national emergencies. At that time, the authorities issued statements, the public discussed the risks, and television stations broadcast live coverage. Now, however, we are witnessing a kind of “psychological normalization”, in which a critical security threat has almost become the “new normal” for the population. Society’s adaptation to war in the neighborhood can be seen as a natural defense mechanism. But the worst thing is when the state begins to quietly exploit this fatigue, drawing itself into the maelstrom of war. Recent incidents are telling not only in terms of their frequency but also their variety: ranging from brief “incursions” across the state border to prolonged hovering over the country’s territory, which led to the closure of an airport and disruption in civil aviation. The typology of threats is no less important. Relevant agencies are detecting over our territory not only combat kamikaze drones of the “Shahed”/“Geran” type, capable of carrying warheads, but also reconnaissance UAVs, as well as decoys without warheads, which are used to overload Ukrainian air defense systems. This means that Moldovan airspace is no longer a neutral corridor but has, in essence, become a functional part of the air war over southern Ukraine. As a result, foreign decoys, foreign reconnaissance aircraft, and foreign combat platforms are patrolling above us, carrying out their combat missions, while our authorities, lacking any real means of influence, watch helplessly as this unfolds. Another worrying indicator is the geographic drift of these incidents, as the focus of the threats has shifted from the northern districts, where, frankly, there is no major concentration of strategically or logistically significant assets, toward areas bordering the Odesa oblast. The reason is obvious: Ukraine’s Danube ports have remained Kyiv’s key export gateway, which means this is precisely where Russian strikes are being concentrated. As a result, Moldova’s southern regions have found themselves virtually adjacent to targets that are coming under systematic attack. The situation in our skies is first and foremost a test of the state’s ability to perform its basic function of protecting the country’s airspace. And so far, to put it mildly, that test has not been passed. There are objective reasons for this. Our capabilities for detecting, let alone intercepting, small and low-flying aerial targets are extremely limited. The Ground Master 200 radar we have acquired allows us, in real time, to put only one thing on the screen: our own helplessness. Against this backdrop, official statements about a “situation under control” and the intention to “significantly strengthen air defense” unfortunately seem unrealistic. There is neither the budget nor the spare production capacity within the European defense industry, nor is Kyiv willing to divert specific orders to meet Moldova’s needs, despite the recent incident involving Volodymyr Zelensky’s plane. In reality, even potential deliveries from partners would only partially expand detection capabilities and provide cover for specific facilities, but they certainly would not create a full-fledged protective dome over the entire country. One might think that under such circumstances it would be more sensible to distance ourselves from the rapidly heating regional situation. Yet our authorities, with some inexplicable persistence, are becoming increasingly drawn into the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. As became known yesterday, having failed to protect its own infrastructure and logistics hubs, Kyiv is reportedly looking with growing interest at storing its supplies on the territory of neighboring countries, including Moldova. Officially, of course, these may be grain storage facilities and commercial warehouses, but unfortunately, the logic of war dictates its own rules. And, as practice has shown, military equipment has not infrequently been found under the roof of Ukrainian logistics centers. Consequently, the likelihood that our warehouses, grain elevators, and logistics hubs will become targets for Russian strikes is set to increase exponentially. Another milestone in this process is the decision to conduct joint customs and border control with Ukraine at Moldovan border crossing points. This measure is a direct consequence of Russia’s destruction of Ukrainian border crossing points. In order to keep the border crossings operational, control is being shifted to the safer Moldovan side of the border. However, in this way Chisinau is, in effect, undermining the country’s constitutional neutrality. The deeper this cooperation becomes, the more difficult it will be for the authorities to convince our society that the republic remains merely a neutral observer of the conflict. At the same time, while the country’s airspace is periodically closed due to drone incidents, Moldovan officials, led by Prime Minister Vasile Tofan, are desperately urging foreign investors to invest in the country. According to the prime minister, Moldova is set to become the most business-friendly country in Europe in the coming years. As they say, no comment. The gap between the government’s presentation slides and the reality on the ground is becoming too obvious to be hidden behind such an optimistic picture. Serious foreign capital always carefully weighs the risks, logistics costs, the likelihood of supply and energy disruptions, as well as potential losses resulting from further escalation. A country that is increasingly being drawn into the military-logistical architecture of the conflict and gradually turning into a rear area for the fighting will inevitably be placed by rating agencies in the category of higher-risk jurisdictions. Major capital is extremely reluctant to invest in economies of this kind, no matter how many investment forums are held or how many attractive promises are made from the highest political platforms. Voters can be misled, and even those in power can deceive themselves for a while, but international capital cannot be fooled. Another worrying sign of the weakness of the strategic forecasts being made about our country is the fact that, in early September, the United States conducted a military tabletop exercise involving sitting members of Congress, former US military personnel, diplomats, and intelligence officials. The exercise simulated a 2028 scenario in which Russia occupies Moldova and launches a pre-emptive strike against Romania. Ultimately, the simulation highlighted a decision-making crisis in the United States and NATO, which could effectively be limited to diplomatic condemnation and economic sanctions. Thus, our country is becoming increasingly entrenched in the grey zone of instability and permanent vulnerability. While this is not yet an area of active hostilities, the familiar distance that has separated war from peaceful life in recent years appears to be shrinking rapidly for us. Under these circumstances, it seems to us that the authorities should stop concealing reality behind empty statements and openly acknowledge that they have made a political decision to steadily expand Moldova’s role in supporting Ukraine’s rear. At the same time, they should explain to the public the limits of such dangerous involvement and the potential consequences for the country’s security.