The PAS Machine and Moldova’s Silent Opposition

Anton ŠVEC

Inefficiency and corruption within PAS are directly harming the state’s interests, yet they are not triggering any real political transformation due to the bankruptcy of the parliamentary opposition forces, which are concerned only with fitting into the system imposed by the regime

The political configuration that emerged from the parliamentary elections, with PAS holding a majority and the opposition fragmented, including in terms of its programs and priorities, proved advantageous for the ruling regime from the outset. Reduced representation for the ruling party in the legislature, the failed referendum, and Maia Sandu’s unconvincing result in the presidential election could have created a system of checks and balances and fostered an ongoing dialogue between PAS and the other parliamentary forces. Such engagement would have contributed to a more pragmatic and balanced course for the government and for Moldova as a whole. However, the opposition’s passivity and internal divisions, both among the Socialists, Communists, and Vasile Tarlev, and within the ranks of the now-defunct Alternativa faction, have effectively nullified the possibility of effective governance under the classic model of a parliamentary republic. The opposition has neither been able nor willing to genuinely compete with those in power, whether at the level of political concepts or through active engagement in substantive political struggle. Meanwhile, there is no shortage of reasons for dissatisfaction with the performance of the presidency and the government, which under normal conditions of political competition could have allowed PAS’ opponents to capitalize on the growing protest sentiment. The latest example is natural gas tariffs, which rose by 40% at the beginning of the month. At the same time, the regulator, MPs from the ruling party, and experts have hinted that the current price, already nearly ten times higher than the cost of gas before the so-called “social media revolution”, may not be the ceiling. However, the protests staged outside the National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) by some of the system opposition forces were a one-off affair and quickly fizzled out. Moreover, former Prime Minister Ion Chicu has openly predicted further tariff increases, focusing on mathematical calculations rather than a structural critique of a procurement model dependent on international market conditions and geopolitical factors, and one that leaves little room for strategic economic planning. The situation in the energy sector is also a cause for concern, while the disgraceful failure to commission the so-called “energy independence line” (the Vulcanesti-Chisinau power line) has not elicited any reaction whatsoever from PAS’ formal political competitors. Electricity prices, which unlike gas have no viable alternatives for households, are likely to become the regime’s “Achilles’ heel” in the coming seasons. Donald Trump has announced a mutual agreement by Moscow and Kyiv to refrain from striking energy infrastructure, although neither side has so far confirmed that such a deal exists. Strikes on Russian oil refineries, meanwhile, continue alongside the destruction of Ukraine’s network of filling stations. In Romania and Ukraine, Chisinau’s main partners in electricity supplies and maintaining the energy balance, the situation is steadily deteriorating due to the EU’s “green agenda” and a shortage of hydropower generation. The meeting of the Dniester Commission the day before yesterday highlighted the critical impact of climate factors on the two countries’ efforts to balance the interests of electricity generation with the need to ensure water supplies and protect the river’s environmental security. Unfulfilled campaign promises, including those concerning economic growth, inflation, higher wages and pension indexation; the disaster surrounding the politicized administrative-territorial reform pursued by PAS in a crude and openly electoral manner; corruption scandals in government agencies: none of this has shaken the regime in any meaningful way because the opposition has failed to capitalize on it. Setbacks in Moldova’s integration into the European Union could, in principle, be regarded as a normal part of the process by individual parliamentary forces, were they not being paid for through the radical dismantling of ties with Russia and the CIS, contrary to their stated political objectives as well as the interests of the country’s producers and citizens. As a result, public discontent is mounting, while the government’s ratings are falling alongside living standards, investment attractiveness, and other international assessments of the republic’s prospects. Yet the opposition is doing nothing to capitalize on the situation, either to strengthen its own position or to deliver on the campaign promises it has already made. Ion Ceban has dug in his heels in Chisinau and is not engaging with the broader political agenda, while his MAN party is so passive in parliament that it risks losing its parliamentary representation at the next election. Alexandr Stoianoglo, who delivered an impressive result in the presidential election, demonstrating the strong nationwide potential of his political profile, has recently agreed to take on a limited role. He announced his intention to run for Bashkan of Gagauzia, with elections in the autonomy scheduled for November 15. Stoianoglo’s unprecedented decision to compete for the post of head of the autonomy, rather than seek a nationwide political role, has prompted legitimate suspicions of a deal with PAS. Previously, Bashkans of Gagauzia had run for president, but presidential candidates had never run for Bashkan. These suspicions have been further fueled by the fact that the race is taking place amid changes to the region’s electoral system imposed by the central authorities. The ruling party cannot realistically expect its candidate to win in Gagauzia, but it is quite capable of altering the balance through legal maneuvers and deals with the autonomy’s elites. Why Alexandr Stoianoglo himself would accept what amounts to a demotion to the regional level, one that could further erode both his ratings and the electoral potential he built up in the presidential election, is decidedly unclear, unless, of course, there are indeed some arrangements with the presidency. Igor Dodon, who at times criticizes the authorities for the deterioration of relations with Russia and ineffective governance, acts inconsistently and weakly, seemingly focused solely on preserving his own electoral niche rather than taking responsibility for the country’s development. It is obvious that PAS is keeping the Socialist leader “on a leash” through criminal cases brought against him personally and members of his family. The fact that Moldova’s justice system can unexpectedly revive long-running criminal cases was confirmed once again several days ago, when prosecutors sought a six-year prison sentence for former Prime Minister Iurie Leanca and several other defendants in the case concerning the concession of Chisinau International Airport. Thus, the government’s failures and corruption are not being translated into genuine political competition or the development of a balanced course that would take into account the needs of all voters. In turn, the opposition’s passivity only serves to reinforce the authoritarian tendencies of PAS rule.