Who Runs Romania: Bucharest or Brussels?

Romania’s domestic political crisis appears to be the least of the EU’s concerns. Its bureaucracy is wielding considerable influence over Bucharest’s internal political processes while demanding loyalty and obedience from all political elites

The current phase of the political crisis in the neighboring country has been dragging on for five months already. The previous stage of the confrontation, with the leader of the National Liberal Party serving as the formally empowered prime minister, lasted twice as long. It ended with the Social Democratic Party, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians, and the PACE (“Prioritate România”) party forcing Ilie Bolojan out of office. By every principle and logic of the struggle for power, the minority government of the National Liberal Party and the Save Romania Union should have retreated into the opposition, given that the no-confidence motion was backed by 281 of the 402 lawmakers present, or 70%. For the country, this opened the way for a transfer of power to the largest political force, the Social Democratic Party, either through the standard mechanism of appointing its leader as prime minister or by calling early parliamentary elections. The latter option, besides benefiting the PSD, would also have promised a significant strengthening of the position of the sovereigntists from AUR. Instead of pursuing the most obvious ways out of the crisis as quickly as possible, however, the officials currently in power in Bucharest, who can hardly be described as anything other than de facto proxies of the Brussels bureaucracy, opted to deliberately prolong the political turmoil. The president is the only legitimate political figure in the country, and it was the weak-willed and EU-directed Nicusor Dan who was left to engage in activities rather undignified for a politician of his stature. A month after the no-confidence vote against Bolojan’s government, the Romanian president nominated his adviser, Eugen Tomac, for the post. Allow me a touch of irony, but Dan’s adviser had no better chance of getting through than the president’s chef or janitor. It therefore became clear from the outset that Brussels had demanded that the situation remain under control. Bolojan and his ministers, albeit serving in an acting capacity, could have continued running the country, buying time to find better solutions. Ten days later, Tomac surrendered his mandate, and it was time for the next candidate. This time, however, the head of state stopped putting forward technical candidates. His choice fell exclusively on members of the National Liberal Party, his allies in the interim government. This was an open demonstration of his readiness to ignore both the balance of political forces in the country and the will of the people. The Social Democratic Party was shown that, with Brussels’ backing, the authorities would cling to power to the very end and seek to undermine their opponents if the latter pushed the country toward early elections. European officials had already gained successful experience in removing sovereigntist forces from power in Hungary, but new threats emerged in the form of the growing strength of right-wing radical parties in other EU member states. All this called for tighter control by Brussels institutions over the bloc’s periphery, including Romania. The Romanian president himself effectively acknowledged as much by ruling out both early elections and the possibility of cooperation with the right. The direction was clear: “a new pro-Western government within a reasonable timeframe”. First, Nicusor Dan nominated Adrian Vestea, a member of the National Liberal Party and MEP who serves as president of the Brasov County Council, for the post of prime minister. After his expected failure, he put forward another MEP from the same PNL, Siegfried Muresan. The latter decision, taken on September 18, is an extremely symbolic act. Despite his background, Muresan cannot be described as a Romanian politician in the direct sense of the word, since he has never worked in the country for even a single day. He is a classic “product of the European institutions”, where he has spent the past twenty years. For half of that time, he served as an adviser to Eurocrats, before becoming an ardent champion of the very institutions that had nurtured his career. It was only in 2018 that he officially joined the ranks of the National Liberal Party. From Brussels’ perspective, it would be hard to find a more suitable candidate for the post of prime minister of Romania. Fully controllable, compliant, ideologically trained, and ambitious at the same time. For most of Bucharest’s political elites, this is a clear and unambiguous signal that the European institutions have no intention of taking either the elites’ or the public’s opinion into account and intend to take the reins of Romania once and for all with the help of their proxies and emissaries. The situation itself is also telling: the neighboring country has reached the point of prolonging its political crisis in violation of even constitutional norms. Bolojan and his ministers cannot legally remain in a caretaker capacity for more than 45 days. That deadline expired long ago, yet his government, lacking a clear legal mandate, continues to operate, invoking the “principle of continuity of state authority”. The loyalty of Bucharest’s Constitutional Court, which has twice blocked Calin Georgescu’s election bid, is obvious to everyone. For this reason, the opposition majority represented by the PSD and AUR is not even attempting to seek justice through that institution. For their part, the officials clinging to power, with Brussels’ full backing, continue their offensive, seeking to prevent any transfer of power. Protests by Romanian shepherds erupted a week ago after attempts, in line with European directives, to restrict centuries-old traditions of freely raising sheep and goats. The protests were backed by sovereigntist forces. In response, the caretaker government staged a demonstrative act of intimidation against the opposition by arresting Calin Georgescu, the leader of the failed Romanian revolution. The symbolism is hard to miss: the arrest was carried out by DIICOT, the agency tasked with investigating organized crime and terrorism, on charges of forming an organized criminal group and fraud with particularly serious consequences. At the same time, prime ministerial candidate Muresan has been making statements about the need for democracies to unite in order to confront authoritarian regimes seeking to influence domestic political processes in Romania and other EU countries. All these highly demonstrative messages about the institutions’ readiness to exercise what is effectively external governance over Romania have clearly defined objectives and a specific audience. As has already become clear, one of the primary goals is to keep right-wing and sovereigntist forces out of power and to develop the corresponding tools for countering them: political, legal, and, last but not least, coercive measures. This is particularly relevant against the backdrop of what is happening in Germany itself, at the very heart of the EU. As for the target audience, in Romania’s case it is not so much the right-wing parties as the country’s main political force, the Social Democratic Party. The latter is being given an unmistakable hint that it needs to return to the longstanding format of coalition government, one that would remain under the control of the European Union’s institutions. PSD leader Sorin Grindeanu has already stated that his party will not support Siegfried Muresan’s candidacy. There had previously been indications that even the loyal Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania considers the venture of bringing Muresan into the government to be futile, since he is unlikely to secure the required number of votes. However, it appears that the compliant Muresan is prepared to play his role to the very end, even at the cost of sacrificing his own image. Even if this emissary from the EU institutions fails to secure the post, pressure on Bucharest’s political elite will not let up. Against the backdrop of mounting economic problems that require emergency measures and the resumption of European funding, the country needs a functioning government, not early elections. I believe that arguments of this kind will increasingly be voiced in the near future by leaders of the political force that, until recently, had shown a willingness to forge an alliance with the sovereigntist forces in order to defend Romania’s genuine national interests.