Impeachment as a Tool for Reshaping Regional Politics

Talk of early presidential departures has become an objective reality in our region, exerting an increasing influence on the politics of individual countries, including Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine

Romania’s political establishment was rocked by a scandal involving a recorded conversation between Greece’s energy minister and the US ambassador in Athens, who directly threatened the Greek official with a coup, citing the situation in Romania as an example. In Bucharest, the presidential seat under Nicusor Dan has indeed begun to wobble. On Monday, the two largest parliamentary parties, the Social Democrats and the Alliance for the Union of Romanians, held talks and decided to reject the nomination of Siegfried Muresan for prime minister, put forward by the head of state. It is difficult to say to what extent the acceleration of the parliamentary reshuffle was carried out at Washington’s behest, or whether George Simion and Sorin Grindeanu simply picked up on the signal. Either way, they have already announced that they are beginning discussions on a coalition, with the aim of putting forward their own version of a government, and have openly warned that Nicusor Dan could face impeachment if he refuses to support an AUR-PSD candidate for prime minister. The Ukrainian president is also facing substantial pressure from anticorruption agencies. In this case, the message is coming directly from the US administration, which is demanding that corruption be reduced and that Kyiv make certain adjustments to its tactical approach to the military conflict with Russia. On Tuesday, an initiative group within Moldova’s parliamentary opposition launched proceedings to seek a vote of no confidence in Maia Sandu. The process was led by former prime minister Ion Chicu, who pointed to a “significant deterioration in the overall situation in the country, in the social, economic, and political spheres”. The petition submitted to the parliamentary secretariat was signed by all 46 MPs who do not belong to the PAS party. Since 67 votes from elected lawmakers are required to put the issue to a nationwide referendum, the prospects of removing Maia Sandu through the constitutional procedure are minimal. However, the issue of the legitimacy of the current rulers in the region is a contentious one, fraught with doubts and capable, over time, of undermining the stability of these countries’ political regimes. Nicusor Dan came to power amid the Constitutional Court’s annulment of the results of the first round of the presidential election, which was won by Calin Georgescu, objectively the most popular Romanian politician today. Moreover, the formal grounds for overturning the results of the popular vote, namely alleged interference by Russia and China, were never substantiated by the country’s intelligence services. By contrast, indirect evidence of French and European Commission influence on Romania’s elections has repeatedly found confirmation. The same can be said of Washington’s deep frustration over the fact that a right-wing, anti-establishment populist candidate who made no secret of his admiration for the Donald Trump administration was barred from running for office and continues to face what his supporters describe as politically motivated persecution. Volodymyr Zelensky won the presidential election in a legitimate contest against Petro Poroshenko. However, his term in office expired back in spring 2024, and no new vote has taken place amid martial law. This, naturally, is gradually eroding both domestic and international perceptions of the Ukrainian leader’s legitimacy. Maia Sandu was able to mobilize her own electorate only through a questionable political tactic: a highly unusual referendum held in parallel with the election, ostensibly aimed at enshrining Moldova’s course toward accession to the European Union in the Constitution. Moreover, among the country’s permanent residents, Alexandr Stoianoglo won a majority. Sandu retained the presidency only thanks to the diaspora vote and a vote-counting methodology employed by the Central Electoral Commission, which was under the control of the presidency and has raised serious questions. In this sense, all three are legitimate targets for political pressure, which, however, does not automatically translate into a loss of power. For the first time, the entire opposition has come together in a concerted challenge to Maia Sandu (it is worth recalling that Ion Chicu had already initiated a no-confidence motion against her previously). The president is facing intense criticism from non-parliamentary parties, civil society activists, and individual journalists, while her approval ratings have fallen to an all-time low. The opposition can also point to the catastrophic decline in living standards, driven above all by the runaway rise in utility tariffs and prices for essential goods, as well as PAS’ inability to communicate effectively with society or demonstrate the political flexibility needed to serve the public interest. At the same time, the impeachment procedure in Moldova is extremely difficult: it requires a constitutional majority in parliament as well as a nationwide referendum. Securing enough votes in the legislature, even if the crisis within PAS intensifies, which is entirely possible given the party’s growing difficulties in accessing shrinking resources, is virtually impossible. If the opposition’s strategy is based on the assumption that the constitutional procedure is merely a media and legal prelude to a transition to mass protests, then there is undoubtedly a domestic base for such action, even under conditions of PAS’ political control over all law-enforcement institutions and most of the media. However, such a scenario would require substantial external backing, and at present, no one is prepared to provide it. Volodymyr Zelensky’s situation is somewhat more complicated. The external high and mighties are already forcing figures out of his entourage while also boosting the ratings of his main opponents. The confrontation itself cannot simply be confined to a constitutional framework that has already been violated. We see a struggle for power, deals between competing groups of influence and external actors, all unfolding against the backdrop of a high-intensity military conflict. However, with winter approaching, it is unlikely that any serious player would be prepared to bet everything against Zelensky at this stage and assume responsibility for governing amid a budget deficit, continuing Russian strikes, and the need to negotiate extremely difficult compromises with Moscow. Nicusor Dan’s case is the most precarious. George Simion, whom he defeated in the election, has long surpassed the incumbent president in approval ratings. The party he founded, the Save Romania Union, has suffered a setback as a result of legal action against its current leader, Dominic Fritz, who was removed from his post as mayor of Timisoara. A possible coalition between the Social Democrats and the sovereigntists poses a direct threat. Dan will have to approve their coalition government or agree to early parliamentary elections, the outcome of which could only further reduce liberal representation. Thus, in the best-case scenario for him, he would become a president opposed to parliament and the government, something that has already happened in both Romania and Moldova. If, however, he shows unexpected unwillingness to compromise with the opposition, he could even face a vote of no confidence and lose office, an outcome that a significant portion of the population is already prepared to support. The bottom line is that none of the three presidents faces an immediate and realistic threat of impeachment. However, the legitimacy, political standing, and approval ratings of all three have taken a serious hit. If any external forces were to make it their objective to launch a scenario of managed chaos aimed at reshaping the region’s political landscape, the fact that all three are politically vulnerable would work to the advantage of both the opposition and the architects of such a scenario. That is precisely why the regimes in Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania will pursue any possible deals with external partners, even those that may be disadvantageous, in order to demonstrate loyalty, while also resorting to pressure and efforts to contain the opposition. Here, this will most likely translate into further restrictions on media freedom, politically motivated criminal proceedings (Igor Dodon should brace himself), as well as further militarization against Russia at the behest of the EU and NATO.