Anton ŠVEC
Moldova is holding its security forum for the third consecutive year, with NATO leadership listed among the expected participants. Kyiv is hosting NATO’s Military Committee. Should Chisinau be preparing for an escalation?
In the middle of the week, Ukraine hosted military representatives from all 32 NATO member states, as well as the Alliance’s strategic commands. The delegation was led by Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, who reaffirmed NATO’s “unwavering support for Ukraine”. Officially, the talks with Ukraine’s leadership focused on military assistance, the armed forces’ priorities, and lessons learned from modern warfare, including the use of drones, long-range weapons, and electronic warfare systems. However, this was the first time in eight years that NATO’s military leadership had sent such a high-level delegation to Ukraine. Against the backdrop of the ongoing direct military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the visit is therefore an extraordinary event.
The urgent arrival in Kyiv of German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who pledged military and financial assistance, together with the visit by NATO’s largest delegation, may indicate that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s office miscalculated in stepping up attacks on Russia, primarily targeting oil refineries, civilian shipping, and marketplace warehouses. Retaliatory strikes by Russian forces, authorized by Vladimir Putin, have significantly worsened the situation in Ukraine’s energy sector, maritime, rail, and bridge logistics, steel industry, and the supply of consumer goods and medicines to its cities.
Ukraine has lost a significant share of its export revenues and risks facing shortages of electricity, fuel, and essential goods during the winter campaign. Meanwhile, proposals from the United States, India, and Turkey for a temporary ceasefire, such as an agreement to halt strikes on oil refineries, ports, and civilian vessels, have failed to gain traction in the Kremlin following the painful exchange of missile and drone strikes. Russian authorities have categorically rejected all of Kyiv’s requests for a respite, as major cities continue to experience power outages, water shortages, and traffic congestion.
Russia is intensifying the pressure, but continue to suffer painful Ukrainian strikes on a regular basis, including the recent destruction of an oil tanker off the coast of Sochi. Russia’s stepped-up offensive operations in the air are also being felt by neighboring countries, Moldova and Romania, where official figures indicate a significant increase in reported incidents involving drones flying into their airspace or crashing on their territory.
In the near term, despite Donald Trump’s calls to consider the interests of global energy trade, the parties will inevitably continue to escalate the conflict, potentially suffering devastating losses as a result. Kyiv urgently needs to hedge its risks by diverting Moscow’s attention away from its own vulnerabilities. The disruption of rear-area logistics and supply lines, coupled with growing public discontent in major cities, could make it increasingly difficult for Ukraine to hold the front line in Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and other areas of military confrontation.
In this context, Moldova, with its openly pro-Ukrainian political leadership, appears to be a priority option for diverting Russia’s attention. Maia Sandu’s administration has already become deeply embedded in the broader confrontation between Ukraine and the EU member states, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, providing Kyiv with logistical, informational, diplomatic, and rear-area support. The high-level Moldova Security Forum 2026, taking place today and tomorrow, is intended to firmly establish Chisinau as a vanguard of the EU and NATO’s eastern flank in the confrontation with Russia.
In addition to Moldovan officials, including Maia Sandu, who had already used her morning address to level a series of accusations against the Kremlin, the event’s program includes speeches by NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska, European Commissioner for Defense Andrius Kubilius, Ukraine’s Deputy Foreign Minister, the ambassadors of the United States, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as various experts from countries heavily involved in provoking military escalation against Russia, including Germany and the Baltic states. Themed sessions, several of them closed to the public, are devoted to discussing how Moldova can be integrated into the West’s security system at the doctrinal, infrastructure, and military-political levels. Chisinau is also to be considered an additional instrument for countering Russia and a logistics hub for supplying Ukraine with military and civilian cargo, as well as facilitating Ukrainian exports.
Significantly, a separate parliamentary meeting was also held today entirely behind closed doors to discuss the National Army, particularly its structure and personnel strength, which is apparently set to be increased.
Under PAS, Moldova is thus finally agreeing to transform its neutral status, effectively moving towards abandoning it, while facing the uncertain prospect of becoming a target and a “bargaining chip” in a high-intensity conflict for a number of reasons. First, Maia Sandu’s administration intends to demonstrate absolute loyalty to the West, above all to the European Union, in order to secure membership regardless of the pace of reforms. The problem, however, is that policymakers in key EU member states and even within the European Commission are already discussing a possible accession arrangement for 2030 that would be strictly limited: no voting rights, no access to EU funds, no agricultural subsidies, and the possibility of restrictions on trade and citizens’ freedom of movement. In other words, Chisinau could end up with a regime similar to the one already established under its Association Agreement, but with the added obligation to implement all of Brussels’ sanctions, budgetary, migration, political, and military requirements.
Second, Maia Sandu is under pressure from Kyiv, which has a wide range of tools at its disposal to exert such pressure. For example, Ukraine could quickly reconsider its decision to restrict water releases from the Novodnistrovsk Hydroelectric Power Plant, a measure driven exclusively by the needs of Ukraine’s energy sector and one that threatens to leave Chisinau and several other settlements without water supplies. The reservoir has sufficient reserves to allow greater water releases, but Kyiv’s conditions remain undisclosed. It is easy to imagine Ukraine demanding increased rail transit through Moldova, including shipments of dual-use goods, or the establishment of Ukrainian storage facilities on Moldovan territory.
The third and most critical problem is that Maia Sandu and her party have failed to govern Moldova effectively. The country has found itself in a systemic socio-economic and financial crisis, trapped in a “debt pit”. Against this backdrop, intensifying the perceived military threat, regardless of who actually provokes it, is a standard way of “writing off” debts and shifting blame for more than five years of failed governance. The actions of Moldova’s leadership, together with the latest developments in Kyiv and Chisinau, clearly indicate that escalation is a deliberate choice on the part of these countries’ leaders and their partners, and is therefore likely to continue. Moldova’s involvement in these processes has already had a negative impact on living standards. But the stakes are now shifting towards direct threats to people’s physical safety, a prospect that clearly runs counter to the outlook of the majority of the population.