Two Reforms, One Electoral Cycle

Christian RUSSU

Administrative reform, together with the extension of vetting to first-instance judges, is intended to secure the desired election result for PAS, despite the damage this would inflict on democratic principles and even the EU’s own stated expectations

The government’s much-discussed concept for a new administrative reform has exposed a range of problems and potential threats to the state’s ability to function effectively. Nevertheless, the authorities are once again asking the public to trust them and embark on a risky venture whose substance and rules will be determined along the way.There are no clear answers to questions about the eventual outcome of each of the proposal’s weak points, whether concerning the powers of the new regional units or the status of the Left Bank of the Dniester, Gagauzia, and Taraclia. This makes it easier to impose an underdeveloped reform proposal on the public, using the widely acknowledged shortcomings of the current administrative-territorial structure as justification. Take the fundamental criteria, for example. For many years, the core of European recommendations to Moldova has been the need to decentralize governance. Strong, empowered local authorities are a cornerstone of business development and citizens’ prosperity. Numerous public opinion polls have consistently shown that trust in local authorities is an order of magnitude higher than in central government. Citizens know whom they are electing to lead their villages, towns, and districts, and place greater trust in them because they have mechanisms to hold them accountable. For the ruling party, however, further decentralization has become a major problem. Efforts to defend local interests, whether in Chisinau, Comrat, Orhei, or Balti; the need to negotiate with Tiraspol; the numerous conflicts; and the exposure of central government’s failures have all confronted the party with a dilemma: how can it ensure its own political continuity? The solution was simple: reverse the process and pursue centralization across the board, stripping local authorities of their independent role and, with it, any capacity to resist. Fewer powers for district authorities? Then why have districts at all? The prolonged crisis of governance in the ATU of Gagauzia, the region’s lengthy absence of representation in the government, and the termination of dialogue with Tiraspol have all fueled troubling conclusions within society about the supposed necessity and value of institutions and arrangements that were once regarded as achievements. Judge for yourselves: the main argument in favor of the reform is that new regional public administration structures would be created to replace the existing ones, modelled on the administrative-territorial units found in EU member states. This, in particular, is supposed to provide more effective tools for attracting and utilizing European funding for regional development. One might get the impression that the creation of three regions would give Moldova access to specific EU structural funds that are supposedly unavailable under the current system. However, a look at the reform plans drawn up under the Communist Party government reveals that a functional regional tier for strategic planning and the implementation of regional development policies, designed in part to align with European approaches and funding mechanisms, was established twenty years ago under the straightforward name of “development regions”. These have the same administrative boundaries as the three main regions now being proposed, along with an undefined status for Transnistria. Regional agencies, strategies, programs, and funding mechanisms were all developed around them. What the existing “development regions” lacked was the status of public administration bodies. The new regions will have that status, but fewer powers than the districts they are intended to replace. Thus, stripped down to its essentials, the current administrative-territorial reform amounts to little more than the abolition of 32 districts, with the aim of preventing a repeat of the 2023 situation, when opposition parties secured broad local support ahead of crucial presidential and parliamentary elections. Moreover, in an effort to make next year’s electoral process fully predictable and controllable, the authorities have expanded their “reform” of the justice system by extending vetting to all first-instance judges, without exception. The reform itself has long served as a clear example of how convenient levers of pressure over the judiciary can be established. External partners initially identified the key objective as creating effective and independent self-governing bodies for the judiciary and the prosecution service, namely the Superior Council of Magistracy and the Superior Council of Prosecutors. Yet even after new members were elected to both bodies from among candidates who had passed the vetting and pre-vetting procedures, the ruling party continued to have reservations about these institutions. Above all, its concerns centered on their willingness to express independent opinions and take positions on issues the authorities considered settled. If PAS decided to apply the external evaluation mechanism to judges of the courts of appeal, judges and candidates for the Supreme Court of Justice, as well as the leadership of first-instance courts, then the SCM and the SCP were expected to support the process unconditionally, even at the expense of their core responsibilities for ensuring the effective functioning of the institutions under their supervision. Their attempts to streamline the evaluation process to prevent a mass exodus of personnel, or to challenge decisions by the evaluation commissions, which were often used to put pressure on judges deemed undesirable, met with open public disapproval and criticism from Maia Sandu and Igor Grosu. Statements by politicians from the ruling party increasingly began to suggest that deadlines for completing judicial reform were of little importance, given that “pockets of sabotage” remained. In other words, the process would continue for as long as necessary, with the authorities themselves serving as the sole decision-making body. Nothing more, nothing less. The idea of subjecting all first-instance judges, who will be responsible for validating the results of next year’s local elections, to external evaluation is straightforward and clear to anyone familiar with these commissions. Applying this screening mechanism to appellate court judges resulted in two-thirds of them leaving their posts. Their vacancies were filled by judges from the courts of first instance. Now that the machinery of a new purge has been set in motion, this time in regional rather than district courts, the only judges left in office will be politically loyal individuals willing to rubber-stamp rulings in the interests of the authorities, who intend to secure a favorable position for themselves in the upcoming elections. One may, of course, wonder what the external partners think and what the autumn report on Moldova’s fulfilment of its commitments under the fundamental chapter on the rule of law will say. The answer is simple: it has all been written already. Progress is being recorded despite public criticism of shortcomings, while further tranches of funding are being disbursed in exchange for laws that have been formally adopted. The EU’s new strategy for preparing for enlargement, complete with a specific “roadmap” for each candidate country, including Moldova, is intended to give the public the impression that Brussels retains oversight of everything that is happening and that certain guarantees remain in place for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.