Gagauzia’s Electoral Battle: Who Will Shape the Autonomy’s Future?

The outcome of the upcoming elections in Gagauzia could prove decisive not only for local political forces, but also for the very model of autonomy that has taken shape since 1994

In just over a month, on 15 November, the Gagauz people will elect a new bashkan and members of the People’s Assembly. This time, the region will go to the polls without its incumbent leader, as Evghenia Gutul, who won the 2023 election, has been sidelined from the electoral process following a criminal conviction. In addition, for the first time, elections in the autonomy are being administered from outside Comrat. In August, following amendments to the legislation, the Gagauz Electoral Council was effectively placed under the direct control of Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission. Official Chisinau describes both developments as “putting things in order”. A more accurate way to characterize what is happening, however, is as a referendum on whether Gagauzia has the right to express its own political will and retain its special status. In recent years, Chisinau has twice failed to secure control over Gagauzia at the ballot box. Three years ago, pro-government forces failed to get any candidate they could call their own into the second round, and Gutul ultimately won, having ties to Ilan Sor’s network. Just a year later, the region delivered its verdict in the referendum on European integration, with around 95% voting against it, a result that significantly undermined the unity of Moldova’s European integration agenda at the national level. PAS, of course, pretended that the region’s opinion had no bearing on anything. At the same time, however, the party began preparing to contain what it saw as the “Gagauz problem”. A response to this crisis could have taken the form of negotiations, a reassessment of relations between the central authorities and Comrat, and a compromise on powers, language and budgetary matters. Instead, the authorities chose to reach for the Criminal Code. Criminal proceedings were brought against Gutul over alleged illegal party financing, followed by her arrest, trial and conviction, which removed her from office. At the same time, the speaker of the autonomy’s People’s Assembly also came under criminal pressure. The culmination of this hard-line approach came in August, with amendments to the legislation stipulating that the Electoral Council, a body explicitly provided for under Gagauzia’s Statute, would be placed under the supervision of Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission. From that point on, the central authorities could determine the conduct of elections and the ballot paper in the region as they saw fit, leaving the autonomy with little more than an observer’s role in its own elections. Today, around 150,000 people live in Gagauzia, one of Moldova’s poorest regions. Its population speaks a Turkic language and is predominantly Orthodox Christian. Since the conflict was settled in 1994, Comrat has spent more than three decades balancing its relations with Chisinau, Moscow and Ankara. Politically, three loosely defined camps have emerged in the region by this autumn. Significantly, none of them identifies with the ruling party. The first represents the conservative-patriotic majority, rooted in sentiments long prevalent in the region. It is represented by influential local figures and political leaders whose rhetoric centers on protecting Gagauz identity, economic pragmatism, maintaining special relations with Russia, and resisting aggressive Romanianisation. The second camp consists of regional pragmatists and groups linked to local businesses and the mayors of major settlements, primarily Comrat and Copceac. Their strategy involves balancing the defense of autonomy against the need to secure budgetary funds from Chisinau and grants from Western foundations. By and large, this group represents not so much a political force as a means of survival for local economic elites. Judging by certain indicators, it is precisely these groups that the capital is placing a degree of reliance on. The third segment comprises radical protest constituencies that have been driven underground by judicial persecution. At first glance, these groups appear disorganized and lack any clearly defined political representation. Yet their loyal electorate has not disappeared. By the end of the first ten days of October, eight candidates had filed their applications to run for bashkan, suggesting that the election campaign will be highly competitive and hard-fought. The leading heavyweight is widely considered to be Alexandr Stoianoglo, Moldova’s former Prosecutor General, who was removed from office at the height of his conflict with the authorities. For residents of the autonomy, Stoianoglo is seen as a symbol of legal resistance to Chisinau’s arbitrary rule. He is also remembered as the candidate who won around 45% of the nationwide vote in the second round of the presidential election two years ago, while securing more than nine out of ten votes in Gagauzia itself. His existing standing gives him the political capital to unite both moderate voters and the protest electorate. Fiodor Gagauz, an experienced politician and public figure, can also be counted among the frontrunners. His core campaign narrative centers on defending the autonomy’s legal status and restoring Comrat’s role as a negotiating partner, rather than leaving it in a defensive position in its dialogue with Chisinau. Corneliu Dudnic, a former MP, represents the more ambitious wing of the local Gagauz elites. The mayors of Comrat and Copceac, Sergei Anastasov and Oleg Garizan, respectively, are running on a platform focused on local governance and practical issues, backed by tangible support on the ground. Evghenia Gutul remains in the background for now, but retains considerable electoral and moral capital, along with the loyalty of certain groups of voters. Her call to support a particular candidate, most likely in the second round, could therefore prove decisive in determining the outcome of the vote. Finally, and most importantly, there is no candidate representing the ruling party in the race. PAS did not field a candidate in 2023 and is not doing so now, aware of how humiliating the final result would be for its openly backed contender. In Gagauzia, the ruling party’s image is so toxic that openly endorsing any candidate would destroy their chances before the campaign even began. This, presumably, is why the authorities are pursuing a strategy of indirect influence over the autonomy’s elections, seeking to secure at least a partially compliant bashkan without being able to support their preferred candidate openly. The main intrigue surrounding the election lies not in the personal identity of the eventual winner, since virtually all the frontrunners, albeit to varying degrees, oppose Chisinau. Everything hinges on two key questions. The first is whether Chisinau will recognize the election results. If a candidate committed to restoring Comrat’s powers and preserving its special ties with Russia wins, and Gagauzia appears unlikely to vote any other way, the central authorities will have to either live with that agenda or once again attempt to force the Gagauz people to accept a choice imposed from above. The second factor is voter turnout. When elections are administered from Chisinau, turnout is the one variable the Central Electoral Commission cannot directly control. High participation would demonstrate that the autonomy retains the ability to make its own electoral choices. Low turnout, by contrast, would amount to a victory for Chisinau through administrative attrition, voter fatigue and electoral pessimism among the Gagauz population. If one of the “big wigs”, Stoianoglo or Gagauz, ultimately wins, Comrat will most likely pursue a course aimed at restoring its autonomous powers under the 1994 law and strengthening ties with external partners, primarily Russia and Turkey. Relations between the central authorities and the autonomy could then enter a new phase of acute tension, marked by cuts to budgetary transfers, on which the region relies for a substantial share of its budget, systematic economic strangulation, and a political boycott of Chisinau’s initiatives by Comrat. If a candidate from the pragmatic camp, such as Anastasov or Garizan, wins, the political conflict could be put on hold. The main focus would likely shift to economic survival, infrastructure and the search for foreign donors. Chisinau would seek to present such a bashkan to Brussels and its domestic audience as evidence of the “successful” resolution of the crisis and the integration of local political elites into the national political agenda. In reality, however, even with a moderate figure in the bashkan’s office, the underlying contradictions between Gagauzia and PAS over language, foreign policy orientation and the distribution of powers would remain unresolved. Sooner or later, given the right circumstances, they would resurface. The experience of PAS rule has reinforced one simple lesson for Comrat: there is, in principle, no way to reach an agreement with Chisinau. One can only lose or resist. The 15 November elections may bring the current crisis of representation to an end, but they will not, in themselves, reverse the policy of mutual alienation. Unfortunately, the central authorities have yet to demonstrate the European political maturity and the ability to accept an inconvenient electoral verdict and negotiate within the bounds of the law. As a result, further attempts to maintain control through the systematic weakening of the autonomy will inevitably produce the opposite effect, turning a regional dispute into a persistent source of instability for Moldova as a whole.