A Real Plan or a Bargaining Chip: Why Chișinău Is Pushing for Unification

Sergiu CEBAN

After years of political dominance, with most of the levers of power at its disposal, the ruling regime is now, for some reason, proposing that the way forward lies in giving up independence and placing the country in the hands of external partners

At the Security Forum in Chișinău, Maia Sandu reiterated that unification with Romania would strengthen Moldova’s security, while acknowledging that public support for such a move has yet to reach a majority. The very next day, however, the President reaffirmed that unification remains on the ruling party’s political agenda. In January, Sandu spoke openly about the possibility of unification for the first time, discussing a hypothetical referendum with British journalists. She explained her position by pointing to the challenges a small sovereign state faces in ensuring its survival. In the autumn, Sandu voiced the same idea at a prestigious international event. The repeated and increasingly frequent references to unification are turning the president’s personal preference into a clear political signal. Yet for now, it seems that citizens are expected simply to get used to the idea, with no clear indication of how the plan would be put into practice. This framing directly contradicts the ruling regime’s promise to build a viable state. In the president’s current line of argument, however, Moldova’s very independence appears to be a source of vulnerability that could be overcome by merging with a larger neighbouring state. Such a shift looks like an admission of its own weakness. After years of political dominance, with PAS holding most of the levers of power, the party is now seemingly proposing that the way forward lies in giving up independence and placing the country in the hands of external partners. Moldova is hardly the only country unable to provide for every aspect of its own security. The need for allies, external support and international guarantees is nothing unusual for countries with a similar capacity. Russia’s war against Ukraine and threats to critical infrastructure make such cooperation all the more essential. But the need for strong partners does not in itself mean that a country has to change the way it’s organized. Against the backdrop of energy and hydrological emergencies, strategic discussions are once again shifting towards the prospect of outside help. Yet it is the authorities themselves who should be ensuring infrastructure development, coordination between government agencies and predictable decision-making. Instead, the accumulated problems are being presented not as a sign of the ruling government’s shortcomings, but as the result of insufficient geopolitical integration which, incidentally, offers no guarantee that citizens will actually become any safer. On the international front, the renewed rhetoric on unification with Romania may, in some respects, serve as a bargaining tool, and the message appears to have at least three audiences. Brussels is being reminded that delays in EU integration make the alternative scenario more appealing. Bucharest is being urged to give the “Moldovan question” greater priority and back historical ties with practical commitments. Washington, meanwhile, is being signalled that, despite its focus on its own affairs, the region still needs American geopolitical engagement. The problem is that this kind of bargaining is relatively easy to discern – and just as easy to dismiss. Using sovereignty as a bargaining chip is a sure way to turn oneself from a credible candidate into a source of concern. As a result, instead of strengthening the case for speeding up EU accession, Moldova risks facing questions about whether its plans adequately account for the implications for its neighbours. Of the key audiences, Bucharest was the first to respond, and the response appears to have been prepared in advance. Romanian Defence Minister Radu Miruță, who attended the Security Forum in Chișinău, was asked about the prospect of unification. He stressed that the decision rests with the citizens of the Republic of Moldova, while noting that cooperation between the two countries is already expanding across many areas “as if the border does not exist”. The similarity between Sandu’s and Miruță’s positions suggests the possibility of coordinated public messaging, with unification presented as a potential response to external threats and Bucharest signalling its readiness to respond politically, while leaving the decision itself and responsibility for its consequences to Moldova. The argument presents unification as little more than a way to strengthen regional security. Yet any discussion of NATO in this context calls for the utmost caution, given the circumstances. Romania, of course, enjoys collective defence guarantees, but any potential territorial realignment would require clarity on the boundaries of NATO and its members’ commitments to defending any new borders. Simply pointing to a neighbouring country’s membership in the military alliance, as is often done in Chișinău, reflects, to put it mildly, a superficial grasp of the issue among our political circles. In particular, Maia Sandu needs to clarify a number of issues, including the costs of the transition period, the restructuring of state institutions, the future of local self-government, the terms on which Moldova’s economy would be integrated into Romania’s, and more. Even under the most favourable circumstances, these processes would take time and money. Instead, the potential benefits of unification are presented in vague and idealistic terms, while answers to awkward questions are kept out of the public debate. The role of Ukraine is also important in this discussion. In public, Kyiv is likely to maintain its customary commitment to respecting Moldova’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its recognition of the right of the country’s citizens to determine their own future. However, such diplomatic courtesy should not be mistaken for approval of a scenario that raises legitimate concerns in Kyiv. Ukraine is unlikely to welcome regional precedents for changing borders that could fuel revisionist sentiments, including those directed against Ukraine itself. Moscow, in turn, would have an opportunity to portray the developments as a “forced annexation” and use the issue of “Romanianisation” to mobilise support in certain regions of Moldova. In Gagauzia, discussions of unification are closely tied to the future of the region’s autonomous status, language rights and political representation. In this context, Comrat would demand guarantees. However, given Bucharest’s complicated relations with Hungary’s ethnic minority, Romania is unlikely to be willing to offer such guarantees in full, as preserving Gagauzia’s autonomy in its current form could set an unwelcome precedent for other national groups within Romania. The Transnistrian issue presents no fewer pitfalls, which the Moldovan authorities have been careful to sidestep as they ramp up the debate on unification. Russia’s military presence, the security of the population and the terms of a settlement would clearly require separate decisions and concessions from both sides. Yet it is difficult to see how Chișinău expects Tiraspol to discuss reintegration while simultaneously allowing for the loss of Moldovan statehood. For the administration on the left bank of the Dniester, this duality in Moldova’s official position provides a convenient argument against any long-term compromises. Perhaps the president is right after all, and unification should no longer be discussed in vague terms but through clear proposals setting out an implementation mechanism, a timeline and a nationwide referendum. If not, each such remark undermines the authority of the state and of the government that is supposedly entrusted with protecting it. Sooner or later, voters will ask themselves: if security is best guaranteed beyond the bounds of our own statehood, what exactly are the authorities asking us to protect when we go to the polls? The moves made by the ruling authorities in recent months have raised growing doubts, and their flirtation with unification is just one example. By modelling different scenarios, Sandu and PAS appear to be seeking to shift responsibility for them onto the public. Yet, following this logic, a referendum could also be held on a whole range of other fundamental questions facing the country, from its foreign policy course and relations with key international partners to language policy and the settlement of relations with Comrat and Tiraspol.