Opinion: “Moldova’s Ruling Regime Is Steering the Country Towards War”

Semyon ALBU, RTA: While our citizens are shamefully preoccupied with mundane everyday concerns, such as “Will there be water in the taps anytime soon?” or “Where am I supposed to find the money to pay utility bills that have skyrocketed?”, the authorities are trying to fill the airwaves with far loftier and more important matters, at least in their own eyes: geopolitics and security. Yes, the war hysteria, with its drone-inflected undertones, is not only showing no signs of abating but is gathering momentum by the day, having already given rise to the phenomenon of “air-defense-centrism” in Moldovan politics. Judging by the actions and statements of the ruling regime’s talking heads, from the president herself down to the most junior of its well-fed pundits, one gets the impression that protecting the country’s airspace is the state’s foremost problem and number-one priority. After all, it is hardly as though the authorities should be concerning themselves with the economy or, for that matter, demographics. That said, there has long been little doubt that militarization remains the ruling leadership’s favorite toy. They are more than happy to talk about this process at length and with evident relish, extolling the “colossal achievements” made in strengthening the country’s defense capabilities. No, I will not dispute that the military reforms of recent years have been markedly more far-reaching than anything undertaken in this field before. But is this really what PAS voters were expecting? American Humvees and German-donated Swiss Piranha armored personnel carriers may look impressive in military parades, but, as the saying goes, “they don’t pay the rent”. With the population growing steadily poorer under the current regime, there is little reason to feel proud of all these new military acquisitions. But the issue is not even that scarce budgetary resources and dwindling foreign assistance are being diverted away from social welfare and the economy and channeled into the military sphere. The real question is this: what, exactly, is the ultimate goal of all these military efforts? Ultimately, any process undertaken by the state should serve some practical purpose. No matter how hard the authorities have tried to paint Russia as a threat, they have still failed to “sell” that narrative to the public. Vague statements that “even neutral countries must strengthen their armed forces” or that “our military spending is the lowest, and this needs to be corrected” do not constitute a justification either. They are nothing more than informational noise. Such arguments would make sense if we had money to spare and had therefore decided to take additional measures to protect ourselves. But when the economy is in crisis and there is sometimes not even enough money for scheduled pay rises for public-sector employees or pension indexation, in other words, to meet basic (!) social obligations, the sudden diversion of resources towards the urgent modernization of the army looks, to say the least, suspicious. Now let us look at the situation from the perspective of what is known as real politic. What military threats does Moldova actually face at present? If we look at its neighbors, there should hardly be any problems at all. Romania is our closest ally and big brother. If it wanted to seize our republic, Maia Sandu and her circle, who constantly regale us with their wet dreams of unification, would simply roll out the red carpet. Ukraine? Relations between us are not exactly smooth sailing, but there are no serious contradictions that could be resolved through military means. And imagining two EU candidate countries suddenly exchanging gunfire is something straight out of science fiction. Let us then turn our attention inward, to the territory not controlled by the constitutional authorities. One potential challenge comes from the local armed formations, whose size and combat effectiveness are difficult to assess. However, their capabilities are unlikely to be significant, given the objective lack of opportunities to build them up. Moreover, it is clear that there are virtually no plausible scenarios in which Transnistria would launch an attack on the right-bank part of the country on its own initiative. Its “army” could therefore be considered a security threat only if the authorities decided to force reintegration through military means. Yet we are almost daily assured that no such plans exist. Finally, there is the Operational Group of Russian Forces stationed on the left bank of the Dniester. It is small and, judging by publicly available information, lacks offensive capabilities. Here again, it could pose a threat only if it were attacked itself. In other words, Moldova faces no clear and immediate military threats. Most of our citizens understand this perfectly well, as they are reasonably familiar with the geographical and geopolitical realities in which the republic finds itself. This is precisely why PAS’ “five-year militarization drive” looks so suspicious. After all, if Russia is our main enemy, as the doctrinal documents revised under PAS now declare, then it is an adversary of such a vastly different caliber that Moldova would have little chance of countering it in a direct confrontation. However willing we might be, we simply could not inflict enough damage on Russia to make an attack prohibitively costly and deter it from launching one, should it ever decide to do so. However much the ruling party and its hangers-on may boast about the much-touted August parade, I think even they have enough sense to understand this fact. So, the real issue lies elsewhere. It is not about some hypothetical conflict with Russia, but about equipping our army to carry out very specific tasks on the eastern flank of the EU and NATO. But what tasks, exactly? A look at the practical measures is enough to get a rough idea of the logic behind the planning. The first was the approval of a new headcount and organizational structure for the National Army, carried out in complete secrecy. Needless to say, the changes were aimed at increasing its size and expanding its structure. This was necessary to establish a numerical advantage over the military formations on the other bank of the Dniester, which collectively outnumber Moldova’s armed forces in this respect at present. The logic is clear: when going on the offensive, it is better to have more manpower at your disposal, even if you already enjoy a technological and military advantage. Second, the excessive fuss surrounding air defense is also entirely understandable. And, of course, it has nothing to do with the drones of unknown origin that periodically fly over the country. There are grounds to doubt that they all come from Russia, given a number of incidents that appear to have been staged. For Moldova, these “uninvited guests” pose no real danger beyond the risk of isolated incidents. Yet they provide a convenient pretext for justifying investment in extremely expensive air-defense systems, using both Moldova’s own money and that of its partners. Moldova’s authorities do indeed need air-defense systems, but for different reasons. Moldova has long been integrating itself into the military-logistics rear of a Ukraine at war. The airfield at Marculesti, which was supposed to be converted for civilian use, now regularly receives military cargo aircraft, including Ukrainian ones. Rail transit of goods is also proceeding steadily, and only recently we granted a substantial discount on it. Drones are being tested on our territory, and plans to manufacture them have now been announced as well. I doubt there is any need to name the intended recipient of the finished products. It is obvious, whatever the official statements may say. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine is entering a new phase of escalation. Russia has already issued direct threats against countries that are directly involved in supporting Ukraine. As one might expect, we are among them. In this situation, we find ourselves particularly vulnerable and an easy target. After all, since we are de jure members of neither the EU nor NATO, we have no robust security guarantees. And the familiar pats on the back and warm words from European bureaucrats will do nothing to shoot down drones and missiles. Even recognizing the risks, the ruling regime can no longer turn back from its perilous course of drawing Moldova into the conflict. At the very least, however, it is demanding protective equipment from its partners. Unlike farm subsidies or compensation for households facing higher tariffs, this is an area where there is a willingness to provide assistance, with as much as €120 million earmarked exclusively for the purchase of air-defense systems. This would presumably give PAS greater confidence in the safety of its chosen course, especially since the possibility of Russia gaining land access to Moldova is clearly not being considered in Chisinau. I sincerely hope that my speculations will remain nothing more than idle musings, and that all the weapons being purchased and supplied will spend their entire service lives peacefully in storage, never to be used. One thing our people certainly do not need is war. But as long as the “yellow gang” remains in power, the risks I have described will, unfortunately, remain ever-present. Maia Sandu and PAS have long taught us that even when presented with three options, a good one, a mediocre one and a bad one, they will somehow always manage to find and choose the worst possible course.