“Reintegration Without a Roadmap”

Judging by its public statements, Chisinau has an ambitious goal: to resolve the Transnistrian issue within the foreseeable future. However, the picture is far less clear when it comes to understanding exactly how the authorities intend to achieve this

By mid-October, the Transnistrian issue had returned to the list of matters that can no longer be brushed aside by pointing to Russia’s presence and an unfavorable international environment. Statements and visits are becoming more frequent, and the measures under discussion are taking on a more concrete shape. Yet this has done little to clarify where exactly the authorities are leading the conflict settlement process. Moreover, some of their public explanations work, to put it mildly, against their stated goal of reintegration, giving Tiraspol convenient grounds to accuse Chisinau of economic and administrative coercion. As a result, despite the opportunities that have emerged, Chisinau still lacks a unified and consistent communications strategy that would allow it to engage simultaneously with residents on both the right and left banks of the Dniester and, just as importantly, with international partners. For now, no one seems to know how to resolve this disconnect. And that would perhaps be the most honest answer the officials responsible could give, because, as the saying goes, acknowledging that a problem exists is the first step towards fixing it. Given the overall trajectory of events and the regional context, it is highly likely that active discussions are taking place behind closed government doors about changes to the state’s policy on the Transnistrian issue. Only some of these efforts have come to light, such as the paper “The Strategic Dilemma of the Republic of Moldova: Accession to the European Union, Territorial Reintegration, and Lessons from Cyprus”. The title itself, along with its public presentation, suggests that experts are seriously weighing whether Moldova may soon have to choose between the country’s territorial integrity and its European future. In one of her most recent interviews, Maia Sandu did not explicitly endorse the “Cyprus model”, but acknowledged that new opportunities could emerge during peace negotiations on Ukraine. She also said she hoped to agree on a formula with the EU that would not delay European integration. All this creates the impression that the authorities themselves are not yet ready to state their final answer out loud. However, we believe that the republic’s leadership is indeed rethinking its strategy, and that this process is accompanied by concrete decisions that are changing the model of coexistence between the two banks through new tax regulations, the Convergence Fund, and other measures. Clearly, a fundamental overhaul of the existing arrangements requires not only legal and economic groundwork, but also a communications strategy to support it: convincing explanations of what is being done, why, and for whose benefit. Yet the authorities’ public position is becoming less and less clear. Meanwhile, the increasingly frequent statements by experts and our minister responsible for the Transnistrian settlement are creating reputational problems for Chisinau rather than strengthening confidence in the authorities’ intentions. For example, following the meeting of the political representatives on 24 September, Valeriu Chiveri said that approaches needed to change and described Tiraspol as having become “more brazen”. A dispute then erupted over alleged “blacklists”, which Tiraspol and Chisinau began tossing back and forth like a “hot potato”. No one has established whether any such lists exist, let alone what they contain. The main problem, however, is that when our official negotiator carelessly makes a remark that has to be clarified several days later, he loses twice. First, he allows an interpretation unfavourable to Chisinau to take hold. Then, by attempting to justify his words, he only deepens doubts about the consistency of his own position. The same occurred on 14 October during a broadcast on Moldova 1, when Chiveri explained the tax measures as an effort to weaken the economic foundations of the current regime on the left bank of the Dniester. Tiraspol immediately amplified the narrative that these remarks amounted to an admission of economic warfare and called on participants in the “5+2” format to respond. The problem with this latest communications crisis is that just two weeks earlier, on 29 September, at the presentation of a study by IDIS Viitorul and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Chiveri himself had spoken about gradually bringing people, communities and systems closer together, taking socioeconomic realities into account. As long as promises to support residents sit alongside statements about weakening the region’s economy, the authorities’ approach will look less like a considered strategy and more like a collection of contradictory signals, delivered according to the subject of each particular event. The way the Convergence Fund is being presented as a gesture towards residents of the left bank is equally puzzling. On 5 October, Chiveri named the potential beneficiaries of its assistance, including vulnerable groups, pensioners, people with disabilities, families with newborns, victims of human rights violations, school pupils and university students. At the same time, tax revenue collected from businesses operating in the region has been identified as the source of the fund’s financing. In other words, the money is to come from the very businesses owned by oligarchic structures whose revenue streams Chisinau intends to significantly weaken. This is compounded by the tumult within the authorities themselves. Igor Grosu has questioned the need to preserve Dubasari District as part of the administrative reform, even though certain NGOs, and Promo-LEX in particular, have warned that abolishing the district council could weaken the presence of the constitutional authorities in the Security Zone. Prime Minister Tofan, explaining why the Transnistrian region has been excluded from the practical implementation of the reform, cited Chisinau’s lack of effective control over the territory and argued that now is not the time to force the pace of events. Sandu, for her part, draws a distinction between economic and political reintegration, acknowledging that the latter is considerably more difficult. Chiveri, as noted above, has set out his own views. The result is that the four main political spokespeople are setting entirely different tones, defining different approaches and prescribing different paces for the reintegration process. In this cacophony, Tiraspol need only quote any one of them, cherry-picking the most resonant remarks and presenting them to both domestic and international audiences. Communications on the international front are no more coherent. At the beginning of the month, Kaja Kallas sought to reassure Moldova that the Transnistrian issue would not become an obstacle to its European path. Later, EU Ambassador Iwona Piorko reiterated that the region would have no veto power over Moldova’s accession. This was most likely exactly what Chisinau wanted to hear from Brussels. The problem is that the very next day, the Russian Embassy interpreted Kallas’s remarks as Brussels’s acceptance of the possibility of a Russian military presence on what would eventually become EU territory. Chiveri was then forced to scramble to catch up with the news cycle and insert the demand for the withdrawal of Russian troops into the discussion. It is understandable that the authorities want to demonstrate the seriousness of their intentions and highlight new opportunities, including economic ones, that were previously unavailable. Yet by mid-October, Chisinau’s position appears less convincing to domestic audiences on both banks. On the right bank, voters see utility tariffs rising and hear talk of confrontation. On the left bank, businesses, jobs and social benefits are being linked to what is described as “Chisinau’s destructive actions”. Most troubling of all, this lack of credibility is also apparent to international partners. They hear our authorities declare the ambitious goal of resolving the Transnistrian issue within the next few years, yet see a fragmented picture from the very outset. It is only natural that they should ask whether Chisinau is capable of managing the consequences of its own decisions, and where the line lies between controlled destabilization and uncontrolled escalation. In principle, effective public communication on the Transnistrian issue should reinforce Chisinau’s strategic line. Instead, in recent months, it has become that line’s main vulnerability. Correcting this obvious failure should begin with the authorities’ representatives agreeing among themselves on what exactly they want to achieve and by what means. Otherwise, the promise to reunite the country will increasingly clash with a practice that deepens mutual distrust and alienation between the two banks of the Dniester.