Expert: Tensions Between PAS and Kyiv Are Set to Rise

Behind the outward appearance of harmony in Moldovan-Ukrainian relations, contradictions are gradually building up and becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. The interests of the two countries do not always coincide, and their main foreign policy disagreement, centered on their prospects for European integration, is gradually taking on a genuinely acute character

Two incidents involving Ukrainian border guards who found themselves on Moldovan territory while pursuing fellow citizens fleeing mobilization have become yet another unwelcome episode in relations between Chisinau and Kyiv. In the first case, which occurred on 15 October near the village of Holosnita, the situation escalated into a confrontation with local residents who intervened to protect the Ukrainian man being pursued. He ended up in hospital, while the Ukrainian security personnel were detained along with their weapons. Two days later, a similar incident occurred near Vasilcau. Moldova’s Prosecutor’s Office was forced to open two criminal cases over the illegal crossing of the state border. The reaction of the official authorities in Chisinau is noteworthy. They appear to have chosen to handle the incident with the utmost caution. Even reports that a note of protest had been sent to Ukraine were subsequently unconfirmed, sparking a minor dispute between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MP who had broken the news. Yet this was a fairly serious precedent. And although the Ukrainian side offered its own explanation of the circumstances surrounding the first incident, the recurrence of a similar situation just two days later can hardly have helped strengthen mutual trust. The incidents at the border are merely one manifestation of a much deeper problem. Over more than four years of war, relations between Moldova and Ukraine have become markedly asymmetrical. Kyiv has grown accustomed to expecting special treatment from its partners, justifying its requests by the need to stand up to Russia. Chisinau, meanwhile, having consistently supported the Ukrainian leadership, has found itself in a position where it is difficult to refuse, even when the proposed measures directly affect its own interests. The situation surrounding the Dniester, which is experiencing a catastrophic shortage of water this year, is particularly telling. In mid-October, Prime Minister Vasile Tofan announced an agreement with Ukraine to increase water releases from the Dnister HES by approximately 20%. In absolute terms, however, this is a largely symbolic measure given the current volumes involved. The water shortage has, of course, affected Ukraine itself, which is forced to preserve its reservoir reserves to supply its population and meet its own economic needs. Nevertheless, this circumstance does not erase the fundamental contradiction: an adequate flow of the Dniester is vital for Moldova, yet Kyiv appears primarily interested in preserving control over its own water resources. In these circumstances, our officials are left having to justify their partners’ actions rather than press more forcefully for a position aligned with Moldova’s interests, all in order to maintain the illusion that interstate relations are proceeding without a hitch. Amid ongoing climate change, disputes over the Dniester risk becoming a permanent source of tension. The economic dimension raises no fewer questions. Since 10 August, Moldova has granted Ukrainian cargo a 50% discount on rail transit, valid until the end of the year. For Kyiv, which has been forced to seek alternative export routes following Russian strikes on Black Sea infrastructure, this is undoubtedly an achievement. For Moldova, however, the economic rationale behind such generous concessions is far less clear-cut, particularly given the national railway’s chronic financial difficulties. At the same time, Ukraine’s requests are gradually extending beyond traditional trade and economic cooperation. In September, it emerged that Kyiv was interested in using warehouse facilities in Moldova to store goods and develop logistics routes. Even more telling is the initiative to relocate certain elements of joint border control onto Moldovan territory. Neighbors explain this proposal as necessary to protect border infrastructure from Russian attacks, and these concerns are by no means unfounded. In early October, a similar strike led to an incident near the Palanca border crossing, where a Moldovan border guard was injured. Another element in this picture is the debate over developing Moldova’s own military production capabilities. The authorities deny that finished products will be supplied to the neighboring country, insisting that the aim is to strengthen Moldova’s own capabilities. But will Moscow, for example, believe this explanation? The overall trend is fairly clear. Ukraine is seeking to offset its own constraints by expanding cooperation with neighboring countries. In wartime, this diplomatic approach is entirely understandable. For Moldova’s leadership, however, it creates an awkward predicament: refusing such requests could be perceived as a lack of solidarity, with potential repercussions and a negative response, while agreeing to them entails either missed economic opportunities or even military risks. Nevertheless, the most serious challenge to relations between the two countries lies in European integration. For a long time, pursuing EU accession alongside Ukraine appeared to Chisinau to be a politically advantageous arrangement. It should not be forgotten that Ukraine’s resilience during the first months of Russia’s attack was what made Moldova’s own integration breakthrough possible in the first place. Moreover, the ongoing conflict in the neighboring country ensured a steady flow of additional attention from Brussels, expressed politically through supportive rhetoric and high-profile visits, and in practical terms through substantial financial assistance. However, as accession negotiations progress, the advantages of this joint approach are gradually diminishing. According to European officials, Moldova has made greater progress than Ukraine in meeting the necessary requirements, and Chisinau’s authorities therefore expect to move on to the next stages of negotiations sooner. Kyiv, by contrast, faces a more complex set of reforms and the consequences of the war. More importantly, the prospect of Moldova joining the European Union provokes far less resistance among certain member states than the prospect of admitting Ukraine, a much larger and more problematic candidate. As a result, Ukraine has repeatedly encountered obstacles in recent years that have slowed its progress in accession negotiations. A recent example is Hungary’s unexpected blocking of the opening of the final two negotiating clusters for both Ukraine and Moldova. The reasons behind this decision clearly lie in the disputes between Hungary and Ukraine, with Moldova suffering the consequences simply because it is part of the same accession tandem as Kyiv. Nevertheless, our eastern neighbor strongly opposes any proposals to separate Moldova’s and Ukraine’s EU integration tracks. Speaking to European leaders on 15 October, Volodymyr Zelensky explicitly called such a move “morally wrong”, citing, among other things, Ukraine’s role in ensuring Moldova’s security. In effect, Kyiv is increasingly seeking to turn military and political solidarity into an argument against Chisinau pursuing its own path towards EU membership. This creates an uncomfortable dilemma for PAS. The ruling party has made accelerated EU integration the central plank of its political program, yet maintaining a rigid link with Ukraine could constrain its room for maneuver. At the same time, publicly supporting separate accession tracks would inevitably provoke irritation in Ukraine, whose leaders have come to regard Moldova as one of their most reliable allies. And the closer Moldova comes to completing individual stages of the accession negotiations, the more pressing the question will become of whether it is reasonable to keep waiting for a partner that is lagging behind. To be sure, this does not yet amount to a full-blown crisis in Moldovan-Ukrainian relations, but the differences in the two countries’ strategic priorities are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Ukraine needs additional resources, infrastructure, political support and guarantees that it will retain its place on the European agenda. Moldova, by contrast, needs predictable conditions for development, economically viable agreements and the freedom to determine the pace of its own integration. The situation is further complicated by uncertainty over Ukraine’s own future, which may ultimately be decided without its participation. The duration of the war, prospects for a peaceful settlement, changes in external support and the country’s post-war needs remain factors that Moldova has virtually no ability to control. Meanwhile, any new commitments to Kyiv could easily become long-term obligations, even if they were originally made in response to temporary circumstances. As a result, a reassessment of the established model of engagement with Moldova’s eastern neighbor will inevitably resurface when future foreign policy decisions are being made, even if the issue is not particularly welcome to anyone within the ruling party. The problem is not cooperation with Ukraine itself, but Kyiv’s reluctance to build that cooperation on a clearer balance of interests. Chisinau appears to be heading into a difficult period in which it will have to navigate between maintaining good relations with Kyiv, which is demanding increasingly tangible concessions, and attempting to defend its own interests at the risk of provoking its neighbor’s displeasure. Whether PAS is preparing for such a scenario remains an open question.