Moldova: A Growing Foothold for Foreign Security Services

The authorities are giving the green light to the deployment of Ukrainian security forces in Moldova, as Kyiv seeks to reduce the costs of its military operations at Moldova’s expense

Christian RUSSU, RTA: Amid the public outcry over incidents of Ukrainian border guards taking matters into their own hands on Moldovan territory, it has unexpectedly emerged that the Moldovan authorities have already agreed to allow Ukrainian security structures to establish a full presence in the country. “If it weren’t for the war, they wouldn’t be here!” This catch-all argument can be used to justify virtually any decision or action that effectively draws neutral Moldova into a military confrontation, from the presence of armed Ukrainian border guards on Moldovan constitutional territory to the production of weapons or their transit to a neighboring country at war. The most regrettable aspect of this entire situation is that citizens are the last to learn that their country is being drawn into ventures that raise serious security concerns. Incidents involving drone strikes on Ukrainian border crossing infrastructure have reignited political debate over the full relocation of border control procedures to Moldovan territory. It is worth recalling that the legal framework for such an arrangement was established long before the conflict in Ukraine began. Joint control agreements were even put into practice along the Transnistrian section of the border. Since 2022, the Ukrainian authorities have been negotiating with the EU and neighboring countries on relocating their border control infrastructure to adjacent states. At the time, however, Moldova apparently was not among Kyiv’s priority logistical routes, despite the existence of a legal framework that was already in place. The situation changed this year, when transit through Moldova unexpectedly became of interest to Kyiv. The increased activity along the border between the two countries predictably attracted the attention of the Russian military, leading to the incidents in question. Over the past several weeks, not a single Moldovan official even mentioned the possible relocation of Ukrainian infrastructure. The only issue raised was the evacuation of Moldovan personnel from Ukrainian territory for security reasons. This concerned customs officers. On 12 September, for example, the withdrawal of Moldovan staff from the Ukrainian checkpoints at “Giurgiulesti-Reni”, “Bricen-Rossosany” and “Criva-Mamaliga” was announced. Following the incident on 5 October, Moldovan personnel were moved farther away from the Ukrainian border and deeper into Moldova. Interior Minister Daniella Misail-Nichitin made the following statement on the matter: “They have already been withdrawn from the ‘Palanca’ and ‘Criva’ crossing points, but we will also withdraw them from the other joint checkpoints on Ukrainian territory”. However, it has now emerged that the process affects not only Moldovan personnel, but also their Ukrainian counterparts and the infrastructure they use. Moreover, negotiations on this issue have been under way for quite some time. As early as 1 October, Ukrainian official Serhiy Derkach stated that the Ukrainian authorities were developing a plan to relocate border checkpoints to Moldovan territory and that the process would be implemented before the end of this year. Letters had been exchanged, and there was “a clear plan for preparing the Moldovan side” so that Ukrainian security forces could move to Moldova and operate there. It is reasonable to assume that Moldovan officials had no clear position on such an unexpected proposal and even cited the lack of adequate facilities and infrastructure. Under normal circumstances, a decision on an issue of this kind could be delayed for months or even years. Kyiv, however, had arguments ready, solutions prepared and the backing of European institutions. Consider the following: this is a pilot project that could serve as a model for further discussions on the future of Ukrainian border control infrastructure on the territory of EU countries, particularly Poland and Romania. For Ukraine, this is a matter of strategic importance. In addition, the pilot phase will make it possible to assess both organizational issues and security risks over a certain period of time. After all, an attack on Moldovan territory is not equivalent to an attack on an EU and NATO member state. No one would need to activate security and response protocols. There are ways to move Ukrainian security personnel to Moldova quickly. Ukraine proposed simply transferring its modular units to Moldovan territory, equipping them with communications systems, and leaving it at that. Only recently, our Interior Minister admitted that Chisinau was negotiating the transfer of Ukrainian Border Guard Service personnel to Moldovan territory, and that agreements had already been reached on two crossing points, with practical implementation under way. At the “Criva-Mamaliga” crossing point, border guards from both countries have moved onto Moldovan soil, and Ukrainian personnel are already working on the exit side of the republic. The only remaining step is to establish Ukrainian border control on entry. It is worth noting that international donors are also prepared to contribute financially to the reconfiguration of border control mechanisms between Moldova and Ukraine. Just days ago, the European Investment Bank announced a €60 million loan to modernize Ukraine’s border infrastructure, including at crossing points with Moldova. The loan is accompanied by a €6 million European grant and €2.5 million in technical assistance. For officials in Chisinau, such compensation for the potential costs associated with an expanded presence of Ukrainian security personnel is more than acceptable. Ukraine’s intentions are perfectly clear. Recent incidents in which Ukrainian security personnel attempted to detain fugitives at any cost, including by killing them, only reinforce the conclusion that violating Moldova’s border is no obstacle to carrying out their assigned tasks. A perception has already taken hold in Moldovan society that the country’s Border Police do little to impede operations by their Ukrainian counterparts, preferring to turn a blind eye to their actions on Moldovan territory. Clearly, it was only the involvement of concerned citizens that prevented another tragedy and forced the authorities to respond, however inadequately, and offer justifications. These included opening criminal cases over illegal border crossings after handing the Ukrainian border guards over to Ukraine, as well as activating diplomatic channels. In the end, however, Moldovan officials had to endure a public display of contempt from Ukrainian Ambassador Paun Rohovei, directed at MP Lilian Carp, who had dared to announce that Moldova had sent Ukraine a note of protest. From Kyiv’s perspective, everything is quite straightforward, and Ukrainian officials themselves acknowledge this. They operate solely on the basis of Ukrainian law, which does not allow them to detain their own citizens on foreign territory under the laws and procedures of the host country. This is one of the legal reasons why the so-called “coordinated control” at four crossing points on Polish territory was not extended further. Under the rules of the Schengen Area, representatives of “third countries” (Ukraine in this case) are not authorized to carry out border and customs checks independently on the territory of an EU member state. In practice, if Ukrainian border guards need to detain someone and the detention takes place on EU territory, it must be carried out in accordance with EU rules. In other words, the detention becomes impossible. In the case of our joint control agreement with Ukraine, there are no such strict restrictions. The “one-stop” principle at our joint control checkpoints rules out the possibility of evading the Ukrainian state, even after a person has already entered another country. If Ukrainian security structures were to establish a full presence in Moldova, it would be much easier for them to conduct mobile patrols as well, including to prevent concerned Moldovan residents from helping fugitives escape. Ever since the abduction of Judge Chaus, it has been no secret to Moldovan citizens that Ukraine’s security services and special forces enjoy considerable freedom of action in Moldova. Nor is it new to see the Moldovan authorities repeatedly display weakness, responding feebly to each new demand from their neighboring country’s government. The latest developments once again confirm that the ruling party is unable to uphold such principles as Moldova’s sovereignty and neutrality in its relations with its neighbors.