Moldova’s Gas Gamble: Can Romania Deliver?

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Christian RUSSU
To reassure the public and investors, weary of the endless turmoil in the energy sector, the authorities have launched another crisis-management campaign, promising that cheap Romanian gas from the promising Neptun Deep field in the Black Sea will be supplied as early as next year. However, everything surrounding this project gives reason to doubt whether our government’s plans are realistic  
As the heating season approaches and market conditions once again turn against Chisinau, the authorities reach for their favorite tool: the tried-and-tested classic of crisis management, the “anti-crisis” campaign. Once again, the public sphere is flooded with the reassuring specter of future energy stability and prosperity. Experts and observers have long grown weary of these endless reassuring reports. Yet the public, hooked on the government’s aggressive and professionally crafted PR, continues to listen in silence to stories of an imminent and definitive victory over energy dependence. No one has mastered the art of crafting attractive headlines and trading in hope quite like the current regime. Fortunately, it is not difficult to find suitable material in the daily news flow. But when it comes to judging the authorities by their actual deeds, there is precious little to boast about. Tofan’s Phantom Gas This time, the occasion for the grand announcements was a visit by Romania’s new prime minister. Vasile Tofan solemnly declared that Moldova expects to begin importing gas from Romania’s deep-water Neptun Deep field as early as autumn 2027. It sounds fresh and promising, provided one forgets that, right here and now, the country continues to rely on emergency supplies from entirely different sources. Strip away the rhetoric and look at the facts, and the prime minister has said nothing fundamentally new. It has been a year and a half since reports first emerged that the state-owned company Energocom had signed a long-term, three-year contract with the Austrian-Romanian consortium OMV Petrom to supply gas from the Neptun Deep project. All the supposedly “new” information cited by Tofan amounts to little more than a retelling of technical press releases issued by the consortium’s operators themselves. It is true that recent weeks have brought news from Romania of progress against the project schedule: drilling has been completed on seven of the ten production wells, the giant Neptun Alpha platform has been delivered to the offshore site and installed, and the project as a whole is now nearly 90% complete. But these are achievements by Romanian engineers and Austrian managers, to which we have not contributed in the slightest. The Moldovan authorities have simply repackaged someone else’s production reports in their own anti-crisis wrapping. It is also noteworthy that Tofan’s Romanian counterpart made no mention whatsoever of cooperation on gas supplies from the Neptun Deep project during their joint press conference, limiting himself to the usual statements about Romania’s “unwavering support for Moldova”. Who Will Cash In on Neptun Deep? The expected production capacity of Neptun Deep is around 8 billion cubic meters of gas per year. That works out at approximately 22 million cubic meters per day. At first glance, these figures look impressive. But, as always, the devil is in the details. At present, Romania itself produces around 23-24 million cubic meters of gas per day. Yet during the heating season, it still has to import a further 7 million cubic meters a day to meet domestic demand. Bucharest’s domestic supply shortfall has not gone away. Moreover, there is already intense competition for Romanian gas, and the key question is who will actually control its allocation. On the one hand, Austria’s OMV is a key player in the project, controlling the lion’s share of Romania’s energy assets. Plans are already in place to redirect Black Sea gas to its Central European hubs and to Austria itself. Austrian officials and business figures have repeatedly argued that Bucharest has a moral obligation to allocate part of the gas extracted from Neptun Deep to Austria and its citizens, since Vienna, as the owner of a 31.5% stake in OMV, has invested billions in developing Romania’s gas production. On the other hand, Romania has placed strict bureaucratic constraints on extraction. Its stringent offshore legislation includes a progressive tax on windfall profits, as well as direct regulatory requirements obliging producers to sell a substantial share of their gas at a specially reduced tariff to Romanian households for heating. Who will get any surplus gas under this tightly controlled allocation system, and whether any will be left for Moldova by the end of 2027, is a rhetorical question. There are also fundamental doubts about whether the project will be commissioned on schedule. In global practice, the development of deepwater offshore fields, particularly at depths of up to 1,000 meters, as is the case with Neptun Deep, almost never reaches the commissioning stage and first commercial gas production within the original timeframe. Any storm in the Black Sea, delay in testing sophisticated subsea equipment or malfunction in the digital control systems of the unmanned Neptun Alpha platform could automatically push the schedule back by several months. OMV Petrom is telling investors and shareholders that first gas will be produced in 2027 in order to sustain the value of its shares. But the commercial launch of production and the physical flow of gas to a neighboring country through interconnectors that have yet to be completed are two very different things. Offshore Pitfalls: Why American Energy Giants Are Leaving the Black Sea The main challenge facing Neptun Deep is that it is a deepwater offshore project requiring enormous technological expertise and a stable investment climate. Historically, Romania’s market has offered little of either to private foreign companies. And foreign investors have little appetite for excessive state interference or unpredictable rules of the game. The most striking example is the departure of the American energy giant ExxonMobil. The company had all the technology needed to operate at depths of up to one kilometer, but ultimately could not withstand Romania’s constantly changing legislation, export restrictions and fiscal pressure. As a result, ExxonMobil withdrew from Romania entirely, selling its stake to the state-owned company Romgaz for one billion dollars. What had begun as a high-tech international venture has since turned into a protracted local European project, hostage to the whims of the Romanian bureaucracy. A fresh example confirming this trend emerged just days ago. The American investment group Carlyle, together with the EBRD, has made a complete exit from Romania’s offshore assets, selling Black Sea Oil & Gas (BSOG). The Midia project, in which they held a stake, is considerably smaller than Neptun Deep, but it is already producing gas. The fact that American investors chose to cash out and leave, selling the business to a private investor from the Netherlands, is a warning sign. Carlyle’s departure is a direct response to the stifling regulatory environment imposed by the EU and Romania, as well as a sober assessment of sharply rising military risks. The Black Sea is no longer a safe place. Between August and October this year alone, incidents involving drifting sea mines and unidentified combat drones were reported repeatedly in the vicinity of Romanian offshore platforms. Adding fuel to the fire was a bombshell statement by Romania’s Chief of Defense Staff, Gheorghita Vlad. He acknowledged what politicians had preferred to keep quiet about: NATO’s famous Article 5 on collective defense does not extend to Romania’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea. In other words, Bucharest will have to defend these facilities on its own. The bottom line is that Neptun Deep is surrounded by too many uncertainties: rising military and political risks, fierce competition within Romania itself for every cubic meter of gas produced, and no guarantee that any volumes will be available for export. The latest anti-crisis publicity stunt, rolled out by our authorities amid the fanfare surrounding the Romanian prime minister’s visit, proves to be nothing but hot air when examined more closely. Meanwhile, during this PR campaign, two former favorites in the government’s energy narrative have somehow quietly disappeared from official rhetoric: Azerbaijani gas and American LNG. It seems the authorities are now ready to sell the public a new illusion, this time under the name Neptun Deep. It looks impressive and promises a great deal, but, crucially, it remains just as far removed from the harsh reality facing Moldovan consumers.