Tofan’s First 100 Days in Government

As the new cabinet approaches its first 100 days in office, a state of emergency remains in force, further tariff increases loom, and another wave of scandals and failures has hit sectors critical to the country

At the end of last week, exactly 100 days had passed since Vasile Tofan took office as prime minister. His appointment raised expectations to a certain extent, both among the public and in the business community. As someone who had built his career in the private sector, he was expected to bring speed, effective management and, finally, the economic breakthrough that none of his predecessors had managed to deliver. So far, however, those hopes have gone unfulfilled. In essence, the country remains trapped in its familiar pattern of constantly reacting to one crisis after another. The change of prime minister has done nothing to disrupt the inertia that suits the state apparatus so well, including the influence of behind-the-scenes political forces. The formula that “an effective investor will make an effective prime minister” suited the presidency, the ruling party and the business community alike. But it overlooked one crucial factor: in the private sector, a manager has resources at their disposal and a free hand when it comes to staffing decisions. In our country’s political reality, virtually none of this applies. The first 100 days have exposed this divide in the starkest terms. Business-style management methods have run up against resistance from the system and invisible political constraints, ranging from factional interests within PAS to the dependence of certain government agencies on external patrons. As a result, the ambitious prime minister, who had built a reputation as a man who “gets things done”, had become a mere decorative figure in the political system by the end of October, someone who simply “makes promises”. The government program, “European Economy, Efficient State”, looked convincing on paper. It set out to reduce administrative barriers, limit the number of inspections of businesses and cut red tape in dealings between entrepreneurs and the state. So far, however, it has remained little more than a glossy presentation. Its disconnect from the needs of small and medium-sized businesses is particularly apparent. The main focus is on large-scale, long-term investment projects and negotiations with external partners, while traditional industries, from agriculture to light manufacturing, are grappling with a deepening cost crisis and losing markets. The only structural reform on which the Tofan cabinet has placed serious emphasis is the redrawing of the country’s administrative-territorial divisions and the reorganization of second-tier local government. Yet the proposal encountered bureaucratic resistance as early as the stage of discussing the concept. Clearly, an administrative apparatus being asked to reduce its own size and influence will inevitably seek to slow the process as much as possible in order to preserve its powers. So far, Tofan has offered no indication of how he intends to overcome this quiet sabotage. But there is a more important point: a prime minister without an independent party base should be aware that he could easily become a casualty of political maneuvering, with all the attendant social and political discontent conveniently pinned on him. The current cabinet looks even more vulnerable in the energy sector, having failed to put forward a clear social safety net ahead of the winter season. There is neither a clear compensation scheme for vulnerable households nor a forecast of the final tariff that consumers will have to pay. Ministers’ remarks that “winter will hit people’s wallets” and that “we have purchased trial volumes of gas in Ukraine” are understandably fueling public frustration amid rising prices. Meanwhile, the prime minister’s statement that all that remains is to “pray for the war in Iran to end and for winter to be mild” amounted to an admission that the government has run out of options. The choice of date for the report on the government’s first 100 days is also telling. Vasile Tofan postponed it from the end of October to 5 November, immediately after the publication of the European Commission’s EU Enlargement Report, which will assess Moldova’s progress towards European integration. The political logic is easy to read: the government hopes to use a favorable assessment from Brussels as a shield, allowing it to deflect at least some criticism of its domestic socio-economic failures and shift public attention from empty wallets to the promise of a European future. Against this backdrop, the defense agenda of Tofan’s cabinet has been more active than any other. On 26 October, a military-technical agreement was signed in Kyiv providing for the transfer of technology and the possible assembly of drones on Moldovan territory. Today, Defense Minister Anatolie Nosatii signed further agreements on access to the EU’s SAFE instrument and joint military procurement with Romania. This is where the central political message of the government’s first 100 days lies. When convincing socio-economic results are in short supply, the authorities can shift the conversation towards threats, weapons and foreign partnerships. This does not mean the threat is unreal: drones do regularly cross the country’s airspace, and protecting it is essential. But that does not absolve the government of responsibility for the economy. Moreover, a fundamental question arises over how defense spending fits into the overall budget plan when the state cannot even afford compensation for the most vulnerable groups of citizens. The next 100 days are likely to follow a familiar sequence: another inevitable round of tariff increases, a growing need for compensation, mounting pressure on the budget, cuts to other areas of spending, rising business costs and, ultimately, a sharp increase in public discontent. In effect, the government has only become more entrenched in its crisis-management model. If it fails to break this chain, Tofan risks becoming a prime minister whose main role is reduced to distributing losses and explaining yet another deterioration in living conditions. For PAS, such a figure is useful only up to a point, as long as public frustration can be shifted onto him. We judge these first 100 days by one simple criterion: has the country built up a sufficient resilience buffer, especially with a difficult winter approaching? If the government is heading into winter with energy prices still uncertain, social support funding unclear and the usual expectation of help from abroad, this points to a very low level of management capacity within the current cabinet. So, three months on, Tofan may still be a talented investor, but he has certainly yet to prove himself an effective statesman. The government has a limited window of opportunity to move beyond glossy presentations and technocratic slogans and start addressing the basic needs of the population. However, public confidence in the ruling party and Tofan personally is visibly eroding and could be exhausted before the end of the year. For PAS, it is particularly important to get through this winter without further social unrest, since 2027 will mark the beginning of another prolonged electoral cycle. The mood of citizens next spring will largely shape the tone of the upcoming local election campaign. If this winter once again turns into a struggle with unaffordable bills and a wait for assistance that has been promised but never delivered, accumulated frustration will inevitably begin to translate into a political demand for change. At that point, Tofan’s cabinet will have to answer for the electoral consequences of its own management failures, while the ruling party will have to decide whether it is prepared to share responsibility or will once again try to shore up its position by replacing the prime minister. Vasile Tofan is most likely aware that such a political picture could take shape. In two or three months, he will face a choice: remain in office until the end of his term or return to his previous line of work before his reputation suffers irreparable damage. If self-preservation becomes his guiding principle, we may see the prime minister begin desperately searching for the high point of his tenure, the ideal moment to leave the political game with his reputation more or less intact.