Maia Sandu and PAS: Is a Clash of Interests Emerging?

Sergiu CEBAN

As the end of her term approaches, Maia Sandu’s personal interests in pursuing a future career abroad and the political prospects of the PAS she created will increasingly diverge, and this very contradiction risks becoming the key factor shaping the upcoming transfer of power

Today marks exactly two years since Maia Sandu secured a new term in office. At this point, however, there is little point in asking what her own achievements have been during her second term. Instead of the period of reforms and transformation that many citizens had associated with the incumbent president, we are witnessing an accelerated process of controlled transition of power, with Sandu increasingly focused on the next role in her professional career. It is worth recalling that Sandu’s re-election was far from an easy win. In 2024, she lost to Alexandr Stoianoglo in the domestic vote, with the diaspora securing her overall victory. In other words, this narrow victory was from the outset more of a vote of confidence granted in advance, driven by electoral fear of an unknown political alternative, than an endorsement of her first-term record. Voters who gave her the benefit of the doubt expected Sandu’s second term to deliver on the promises made during her first term – an independent judiciary, an end to emigration and rising prices, improved living standards, and so on. Yet over the past two years, the gap between expectations and reality has only widened. During her first term, Sandu achieved a number of tangible results she could showcase to both supporters and opponents. These included Moldova obtaining EU candidate status, the subsequent formal opening of accession negotiations, her anti-corruption agenda, and the neutralisation of the threat posed by the war in neighbouring Ukraine. Her second term, so far, has produced no comparable milestones. As she gradually approaches the halfway point of her mandate, the president has yet to secure any major political gain that she can claim as her own success. On the contrary, these two years have become a chronicle of failures and missed opportunities, as evidenced by the replacement of three prime ministers, each presented as a “reset”. Throughout this process, the president herself seemingly remained unscathed, as responsibility for a series of systemic failures could always conveniently be shifted onto the newly appointed premier. The justice reform, once the flagship initiative of the ruling establishment, has become bogged down in vetting and pre-vetting, while selection procedures for key prosecutorial and judicial positions continue to generate scandals and erode public trust in a system that has only been partially “cleaned up”. The socio-economic situation, meanwhile, speaks for itself. The government’s personnel policy – often seen as a measure of the authorities’ ability to distinguish between competent and compliant candidates – was ultimately discredited by a scandal surrounding MoldATSA, dubbed “Verișoara-gate”. The affair dealt the final blow to Maia Sandu’s record on appointments. The involvement of a presidential relative in the case clearly demonstrated that loyalty is valued more highly than competence within this system, and that Sandu is no stranger to the very controversial political practices she once criticised her predecessors for resorting to. The explanation lies in the fact that the president appears to be operating within a “sterile bubble”, insulated from the political realities that have taken shape in Moldova under her leadership. Over the past two years, her focus has shifted markedly towards international representation, forums and awards. For form’s sake, she still convenes meetings of the Supreme Security Council from time to time, but the body’s activity has done little to improve the quality of governance in the country. Her approach to the media has also become more selective: interviews are now conducted in formats that minimise the risk of uncomfortable questions, while engagement with the critical press is increasingly replaced by carefully crafted social media posts. As a result, polling data show that public trust in the presidency has fallen from 44.4% to 39.4% over the past year. The figure is hardly catastrophic, of course, and Sandu still retains considerable personal political capital. Nevertheless, a clear downward trend is beginning to emerge. The main reason is that citizens are finding it increasingly difficult to distinguish the head of state from the ruling PAS. Within the ruling class itself, however, the distribution of responsibility appears remarkably asymmetrical. The country’s European prospects, international recognition and external support are associated with the president, while tariffs, taxes, deficits and the socio-economic crisis are laid at the government’s door. For this reason, many analysts argue that Sandu is simply serving out the remainder of her term. The Constitution bars her from seeking a third term, while her Romanian citizenship provides a potential pathway into the upper echelons of European and international institutions. It is therefore possible that she will spend the second half of her mandate polishing her CV in preparation for a future career abroad. Of course, Sandu herself dismisses speculation about leaving the country. But, as the saying goes, politicians are judged not by their words but by their actions. And Sandu’s conduct in recent months fits a pattern of minimising her personal involvement in domestic affairs that could tarnish her image as an “impeccable European technocrat”. The problem is that this approach is increasingly at odds with the interests of the ruling party, which will apparently be left to pay the political price. Undoubtedly, Sandu has given PAS public visibility, personal credibility and access to international support. She was the party’s founder, driving force and political engine. Yet even with all the negative ratings she faces, Sandu remains more popular than any of the party’s own political figures. Under these circumstances, transferring electoral support from the president to the party once she leaves office will be an exceptionally difficult task: PAS simply has no successor of comparable stature within its ranks. As a result, the ruling regime may face several risks over the next two years, which could become acute. The first is the struggle between party factions for the right to determine the next president. The closer Maia Sandu’s term of office draws to a close, the fiercer the internal competition will become, threatening to escalate into a public split. The second challenge concerns the shifting of responsibility between the presidency, the government and the party leadership. Further shielding Sandu from inevitable crises will fuel discontent within PAS, which will have to sacrifice its own image to preserve the President’s personal reputation. The third, and most important, factor relates to the gradual divergence of interests between PAS and Sandu, who will become increasingly reluctant to take any responsibility or carry any political burden. In any case, Maia Sandu is likely to do everything possible to leave office with an impeccable image in the eyes of an external audience – namely, potential future employers. The opening of new EU accession clusters, the completion of negotiations with the European Union, possible agreements and ceremonial visits could all help create a favourable track record for her next professional role. Domestically, however, the incumbent president risks leaving behind an electoral wasteland. By the end of 2028, just a year before the next parliamentary elections, PAS may find itself in a situation where its foremost political figure has successfully moved on to the next stage of her career, while the party itself is left to deal with a backlog of unresolved problems. While the ruling party continues to shape its strategy around the president’s personal plans, two years after Sandu’s re-election we are increasingly asking not what she has achieved during this period but what will happen to the political system as the upcoming transfer of power unfolds. Sandu’s importance in ensuring stability of Moldovan politics should not be overstated, but neither should her role as a key pillar of the ruling establishment be underestimated. In any case, as the end of her mandate approaches, it will set in motion an irreversible process of disintegration of the existing power structure, with all the consequences that would follow – an intensification of intra-party and inter-clan struggles, the breakdown of the existing balance between influential groups, and a growing risk of losing control of the country’s political landscape.