Rearming Moldova Along the Romanian Route

Chisinau is gradually moving beyond simply receiving foreign military aid towards participating in joint defense procurement with European partners, with Romania’s support

The agreement signed in Bucharest on 2 November for the acquisition of 62 IVECO military trucks did not attract much attention amid the regular deliveries of various types of military equipment to Moldova. Nevertheless, the significance of this deal goes far beyond renewing the National Army’s vehicle fleet. For the first time, Moldova has officially joined a joint military procurement project with Romania linked to the European financial instrument SAFE. In essence, this marks the emergence of a new channel for equipping Moldova’s armed forces, one that could eventually become a key instrument in their modernization. Significantly, Chisinau did not negotiate a separate large-scale contract with the manufacturer, but instead joined an existing framework agreement concluded in 2019 between Romania’s Ministry of Defense and the Italian company IDV Defense Vehicles. The agreement provides for the delivery of 2,909 multi-purpose transport platforms, more than 2,000 of which have already been handed over to the Romanian Army. Moldova has now become part of this arrangement and is acquiring 62 vehicles in three configurations. This approach is convenient because it allows the country to make use of existing contractual terms, established production chains and technical solutions. At the same time, it means that equipment selection and subsequent maintenance will be closely tied to Romania’s already established military procurement system. In Bucharest, the deal is seen as a natural continuation of a partnership built over many years. Romanian Defense Minister Stefan-Radu Oprea stressed the importance of ensuring interoperability between the armed forces of the two countries, while Prime Minister Luca Niculescu also linked the project to the development of Romania’s domestic defense industry. Clearly, the two sides have noticeably different interests in this agreement. For Moldova, the main benefit is tactical: it gains access to modern equipment and a simpler procurement process. Romania, by contrast, is pursuing a strategic agenda. Alongside strengthening military and political cooperation, it is securing additional orders for companies involved in the production, integration and testing of IVECO trucks on Romanian territory. Thus, Chisinau is being integrated into the defense-industrial infrastructure that Romania has already established. Over time, this format could be extended to other categories of military equipment. In any case, the defense ministers’ talks on 2 November went beyond transport vehicles. They also covered further cooperation in logistics, military training, the development of defense capabilities and engagement in European security initiatives. Romania also signaled its interest in promoting its own defense products, including small arms and air defense systems. The European SAFE program plays a particularly important role in this arrangement. It provides up to €150 billion in loan financing to support the development of the defense industry and joint procurement by EU member states. Bucharest is among the beneficiaries of this mechanism, while Moldova, as a candidate country, can participate in procurement projects with European partners. However, there is a significant detail here that has received little publicity. Anatolie Nosatii’s ministry has confirmed that all 62 trucks will be purchased using funds from Moldova’s state budget. It would therefore be wrong to assume that access to Europe’s joint procurement infrastructure automatically means receiving military equipment free of charge. Given the government’s stated plans to raise defense spending to 1% of GDP, roughly double its current level, this approach, involving increasingly direct financial contributions from Chisinau to its own militarization, is likely to become more widespread. This would mark a gradual departure from a model in which external, grant-based military assistance played the leading role. It is worth recalling that, through the European Peace Facility alone, €317 million was earmarked for support to the Moldovan army over the 2021-2026 period. This includes €120 million approved this summer for medium-range air defense systems. In the specific case of the IVECO deal, however, many questions remain unanswered. The total value of Moldova’s order, the price per vehicle, the precise delivery schedule and the full range of associated services have not been disclosed. The purchase of the vehicles will account for only the initial part of the expenditure. Further costs will arise from spare parts, maintenance, repairs, personnel training and infrastructure upgrades. Standardization with the Romanian Army may make some of these tasks easier, but it also means tying Moldova’s armed forces to a particular supplier and set of technical standards for the long term. Alongside its efforts to make use of foreign procurement mechanisms, the authorities also intend to develop Moldova’s own defense industry. At the end of October, Anatolie Nosatii announced that work was under way on a legislative framework allowing private companies to manufacture drones and other military products. Parliament Speaker Igor Grosu suggested that the relevant law could be adopted before the end of the year. The government expects the emergence of this sector to attract investment, create jobs and generate additional tax revenue. However, these ambitious plans could easily run up against the realities on the ground. Moldova has virtually no fully fledged modern defense-industrial base, while its domestic market is far too small to sustain demand for a broad range of military products. Developing the sector will require skilled specialists, technology, investment, production capacity and foreign customers. Even the relatively accessible field of unmanned systems requires a sophisticated component supply chain and compliance with export restrictions. These difficulties are unlikely to deter the authorities from trying to carve out a niche for Moldova in Europe’s rapidly expanding defense sector. Romania’s role is particularly important in this regard. Moldova’s western neighbor has the necessary experience of working with EU defense institutions, is already involved in major procurement programs and is itself seeking to expand its production capacity. Moldova may well be invited to make further use of existing mechanisms, gradually adapting its national defense planning system to fit into them. The move towards joint procurement will give Moldova-Romania defense relations, which already encompass joint exercises, personnel training and the exchange of experience, a deeper institutional dimension. The armed forces of the two countries will acquire similar equipment, apply compatible standards and establish stable channels for logistical support. On the other hand, this trend inevitably brings us back to the question of what Moldovan neutrality actually means in practice. Although its enshrinement in the Constitution does not preclude the development of the country’s own armed forces, the gradual expansion of military-technical integration with NATO member states means that Chisinau needs to explain more clearly the limits of such cooperation, at the very least to its own population. Ideally, it should also provide that clarity to external actors, above all Russia, for which any further expansion of the Alliance’s presence in the post-Soviet space is a highly sensitive issue. This will become particularly important if cooperation extends beyond military vehicles to air defense systems, military infrastructure or other projects involving close operational interoperability with foreign armed forces. For now, it is fair to say that PAS is making an initial attempt to change the very model on which the army’s equipment and supplies are based. Rather than relying primarily on individual deliveries and international assistance, the authorities are building a more complex system combining European funding mechanisms, joint procurement, cooperation with foreign manufacturers and plans to develop a domestic defense industry. Romania is gradually assuming a central role in this process, becoming one of Chisinau’s main gateways into Europe’s defense-industrial sector. The question remains whether Moldova’s financial and institutional capacity at this stage is sufficient to match its new ambitions. Modernizing the armed forces requires long-term funding, transparent management and the ability to set defense priorities independently. Otherwise, the country will simply continue accumulating costly commitments, the consequences of which will be felt before long. But there is an even more important question: does the emphasis on strengthening the country’s defense capabilities really reflect public expectations, given that Moldova’s main challenges extend far beyond the security sphere? In any case, over the coming years, citizens will have an opportunity to make their views known at local and national elections.