Why Is Chisinau Seeking New Powers Under Martial Law?

The authorities are continuing their systematic efforts to shape public perceptions of Moldova as a country facing growing military threats and security risks

Russia’s war against Ukraine, changes to the regional security architecture, the growing frequency of drone and missile incidents, and violations of national airspace are all being invoked to justify the need to rethink Moldova’s approach to national defense and expand the state’s capacity to respond to threats. The latest step in this direction is the introduction of a draft law on exceptional legal regimes, intended to replace the legislation that has been in force since 2004. Like previous initiatives, the new draft is striking in its sheer scale and its claims to comprehensiveness. Its numerous chapters, articles and lists of powers, procedures and special measures reflect the authorities’ desire to present themselves as a competent actor, preparing in advance for every possible scenario. The message is addressed both to domestic audiences and to international partners: Moldova is fully aware of the growing risks, has the necessary institutional resolve and intends to adapt its state system to the new realities. But how much have these realities objectively changed since 2004? Does the regional situation really warrant such a sweeping overhaul of the legislation, along with provocative messaging on the international stage? There is no doubt that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has become the largest armed conflict in Europe since the break-up of Yugoslavia. However, it would be wrong to suggest that Europe was a peaceful and friendly environment before then. The armed clashes in the Balkans, the war in Kosovo, NATO’s active eastward expansion and growing political tensions between countries had already exposed the fragility of claims about a “peaceful and democratic 21st century” and pointed to the continent’s growing potential for escalation. Moldova, for its part, has experienced armed conflict first-hand, in 1992. Our political elites should therefore be well placed to understand the logic of political decisions that can inevitably lead to military scenarios. The question, therefore, is not so much why military threats have emerged only in the past three or four years, but why the authorities have chosen this particular moment to regulate in such detail the procedures for imposing a state of siege and declaring a state of war. The public explanation that the 2004 law has become outdated following the adoption of Law No. 248/2025 on crisis management is not entirely convincing. The decision to regulate the state of emergency in a separate law did not, in itself, mean that the two remaining regimes required such a sweeping conceptual overhaul. The authorities could have limited themselves to technical amendments, resolving inconsistencies and clarifying procedures. Instead, they have chosen to make a high-profile announcement about what is, in effect, an entirely new regulatory framework. This raises questions not only about the substance of individual provisions, but also about the institutional model proposed by the draft law. In effect, the draft strengthens the role of the head of state in governing the country under special legal regimes. The president is given more clearly defined strategic command functions in the field of defense, while also serving as chair of both the National Security Council and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. In other words, the current Supreme Defense Council is to be replaced by two separate bodies. The Council, meanwhile, becomes the central mechanism for strategic coordination, including in the field of crisis management. Formally, the decision to impose a state of siege, as before, remains the prerogative of Parliament. However, the new model strengthens the influence of the presidential power structure over the subsequent governance of the country. Under the current political system, in which the key state institutions are controlled by the ruling party, the authors of the draft law evidently consider this concentration of strategic powers to be the only viable option. The greatest concerns arise from the expanded grounds for declaring a state of siege. The current law links its introduction primarily to the inevitability of armed aggression. The draft, however, proposes three separate grounds: “hostile military actions”, “hybrid and subversive actions”, and other “serious threats with an identifiable military component”. Under the new provisions, there would no longer be any need to wait for an armed attack. It would be enough to establish the existence of actions “having a military component and posing a direct and serious threat to state sovereignty, territorial integrity, the constitutional order or defense capabilities”. Moreover, in cases involving hybrid and subversive actions, there would be no requirement to demonstrate that ordinary crisis-management mechanisms were inadequate. Despite the considerable length of the draft, neither the concept of a “military component” nor that of “hybrid threats” is given an exhaustive definition. This leaves considerable room for interpretation when determining which circumstances could serve as grounds for introducing a special legal regime. What would all this mean in the context of Moldova’s own circumstances? Could drone overflights and crashes on Moldovan territory become grounds for declaring a state of siege? Given the authorities’ consistently aggressive rhetoric, the answer, regrettably, seems far from reassuring. We have already been told where the drones that have fallen here came from, that a foreign state harbors hostile intentions, and that its actions are deliberate and targeted. We have also heard allegations of sabotage and systematic attacks. Such incidents could therefore be classified quite explicitly under the new grounds set out in the draft law. Could, for example, the long-standing presence of Russian troops in Transnistria serve as such a justification? The mere fact of a foreign military presence, established over many years, is not in itself equivalent to an act of armed aggression. However, the draft explicitly includes the use of another state’s armed forces stationed on Moldovan territory in breach of an agreement or after its termination among the grounds for declaring a state of siege. The authorities’ position on distinguishing between the Russian military presence in the form of the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF) and the peacekeeping contingent is well known. Nor would the possible denunciation of the agreement signed by Snegur and Yeltsin in July 1992 come as a major surprise. Against this background, the new references to “hybrid” and “subversive” actions give rise to troubling questions about how the existing situation might be reinterpreted in political and legal terms under the new framework. A similar question arises in relation to Transnistria’s military structures. If certain actions by these structures were classified as organized armed activity carried out with the involvement of a foreign state, the relevant provisions of the draft could well be invoked to justify the introduction of a special legal regime, or at the very least to issue public threats of imposing one. It is this breadth of potential interpretation that causes the greatest concern. Under the proposed legislation, the scope could extend beyond situations involving direct military confrontation to include circumstances that have been part of the regional reality for decades. Naturally, the consequences for the population must also be taken into account. The draft sets out in detail mobilization obligations, the requirement to perform tasks in the interests of national defense, the requisitioning of property and restrictions on movement. It also expressly requires Moldovan citizens subject to mobilization requirements who receive the relevant notification to take steps to return from abroad and report to a designated location within the specified time limit. This poses a serious problem for thousands of Moldovans who live permanently in Russia and EU countries. In addition, a state of siege entails the introduction of restrictive measures, while current electoral legislation provides for specific consequences for the organization of elections under such a regime. It is also worth noting that Moldova has several electoral cycles ahead, each likely to present the ruling authorities with a range of difficult dilemmas. What, then, is the opposition proposing in response? So far, its reaction appears to be largely ad hoc. Moreover, the predominantly alarmist political statements made by opposition leaders are only adding to public anxiety, which is precisely what PAS is seeking to achieve. It cannot be ruled out that the authorities view the new law merely as a demonstration of their readiness for a more confrontational stance towards Russia, as part of their commitments to align Moldova’s military legislation and foreign policy with those of the EU. However, the accumulation of a critical mass of mobilization-related factors, combined with bellicose rhetoric, could at some point make a return to peaceful normality impossible.