A Transnistrian Deal for Moldova: Who Is Behind It?

While the world’s media remain focused on the front line of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the outlines of a future European settlement are already taking shape behind closed doors at the highest levels. At first glance, this process may seem far removed from Moldova. Yet the consequences of any forthcoming agreements are bound to affect our country as well. The reason is that, in these negotiations, the Transnistrian issue is increasingly being viewed not simply as a matter between the two banks of the Dniester, but as one element of a potentially far-reaching deal between Russia and the West. Events in and around Ukraine are triggering a reassessment of the rules of the game across the entire continent. History offers numerous examples of major conflicts redrawing borders and reshaping the broader geopolitical order. Yalta and Helsinki are cases in point, with their decisions shaping the international landscape for decades to come. The current situation is moving towards its own major turning point. Whatever its outcome, the post-war settlement will require new agreements, primarily between Russia and the United States. The key question today is no longer whether this reassessment will take place, but who will shape it and on what terms. It is clear that any grand agreement is unlikely to be confined to a single issue. Rather, it would form a complex architecture comprising separate packages of agreements on key points of contention, stretching from the Baltic region to the South Caucasus. This approach could, in theory, give smaller countries an opportunity to get their concerns onto the agenda at an early stage and resolve long-standing problems. At the same time, however, the major powers may well be tempted to settle an inconvenient issue behind the backs of those directly involved. The Black Sea region is likely to occupy a particularly important place in any future deal. It is one of the most sensitive points of contact between the post-Soviet space and NATO, where maritime routes, energy corridors and military infrastructure intersect. Moreover, it is home to two countries with unresolved territorial conflicts, Moldova and Georgia, which cannot remain on the sidelines if the broader security architecture is reshaped. It is telling that Tbilisi recognized the scale of the coming changes well in advance. The Georgian authorities, which for years had refused to engage in direct contacts with Moscow, appear to have realized that Russia’s voice in future negotiations over the status of regions bordering its territory will carry considerably more weight than before. It was against this backdrop that, in late October, Georgia appointed its First Deputy Foreign Minister as its representative for relations with Russia. This decision should hardly be seen as a sign of a change in political course. Rather, it reflects the pragmatic logic of a small country seeking to negotiate the most favorable terms it can directly, instead of relying exclusively on intermediaries. From a foreign policy perspective, such a move appears entirely rational. Having its own channel of communication allows a country not only to influence discussions on issues that will determine its future, but also to assert its status as an actor with at least some influence over a process in which decisions of existential importance to it may be made. Moldova, too, is presumably feeling the intensifying geopolitical tremors, but for now it appears to be moving in the opposite direction from Moscow. The authorities seem to be relying exclusively on their Western allies, as illustrated by the recent visits to London and Berlin by Reintegration Deputy Prime Minister Valeriu Chiveri. He was presumably seeking to secure the support of European capitals ahead of the main diplomatic contest. The problem, however, is that if a settlement formula is ultimately negotiated within a broader framework involving the United States, the EU and Russia, visits to friendly capitals offer no guarantee that the interests and demands put forward by Chisinau will withstand the pressure of a grand compromise. For now, we are witnessing the first phase, as the diplomatic wheels gradually begin to turn. Visits by the permanent representatives of key EU countries and the United States to both banks of the Dniester confirm that external actors are “testing the waters”. Such shuttle diplomacy is a classic sign that preparations are under way for the launch of negotiations. The key point for both Chisinau and Tiraspol is to recognize that, if the process resumes, its structure and mechanics may look very different from those to which they have grown accustomed over the past decades. While Western capitals are still working towards a consolidated assessment, the Kremlin is taking the initiative and seeking to get ahead of developments, sending signals in the clearest and most public manner possible. Its highly visible participation in the formal ceremony, the presentation of an award, and the subsequent delivery by the leader of the left-bank administration of a statement that was probably drafted by Kremlin speechwriters should be seen as a direct message to Chisinau and European decision-making centers about the terms on which Russia is prepared to discuss the future status of the Transnistrian region. European partners have yet to state their positions openly. In its recent report on Moldova’s progress towards EU integration, the European Commission refers to the Transnistrian issue only in general terms. This suggests a degree of caution on Brussels’ part, as it appears unwilling to reveal its hand prematurely. Nevertheless, it will become increasingly difficult for the EU to ignore the unresolved conflict. Without a settlement on the left bank of the Dniester, neither Moldova’s full integration into the EU nor lasting security along the Union’s eastern borders will be possible. Meanwhile, there is growing uncertainty in Chisinau. One telling example is a recent interview with Vasile Tofan, in which he acknowledged that the major powers would discuss the Transnistrian issue without Chisinau’s participation. In other words, he did not rule out the possibility that Moldova could be presented with a settlement model devised elsewhere. It is entirely possible that, ultimately, the issue will become a separate component of a broader agreement under which Moscow and Washington will negotiate a formula for Transnistria’s political status, a system of international guarantees and a phased implementation mechanism. Under such a scenario, Chisinau and Tiraspol could find themselves presented with a formula for coexistence agreed by external actors, with very limited scope to amend it. For many years, PAS and Maia Sandu presented themselves domestically as the political force firmly in control of the reintegration file. Now, however, their ability to retain the initiative and preserve their claim to the decisive voice in the process appears likely to diminish. A potential grand geopolitical deal could undermine the gradual, step-by-step reintegration strategy pursued over the years. That strategy envisaged gradually bringing the left bank into Moldova on terms and at a pace convenient to Chisinau, while postponing the most difficult question of political status indefinitely. As a result, Moldova risks finding itself in a situation where the final settlement is shaped according to someone else’s priorities. Despite the risk that our leadership may be the last to learn where the limits of a possible compromise lie, this is not a foregone conclusion. Rather, it is a development that calls for calm and pragmatic consideration. The authorities need to take a clear-eyed look at the emerging reality and realistically determine which concessions Moldova is prepared to make, which guarantees it will insist on as a matter of principle, and which issues could already be negotiated with Tiraspol and Moscow. If the authorities continue along their current course, we may well reach a point where Moldova has no choice but to work out how to implement, with the least possible damage, terms whose formulation it had no part in.