Will Moldova Build a “Visa Wall”?

Sergiu CEBAN

The introduction of visa restrictions announced by Vasile Tofan, like most other policy decisions, is being pursued by the government without broad public debate or any assessment of the costs and risks for citizens

A few days ago, during a televised interview, Vasile Tofan explicitly confirmed for the first time that the introduction of a visa regime with Russia, Belarus and several other countries was inevitable, despite the authorities having denied such a possibility just a year ago. We, however, had already predicted at the time that the ruling party was moving towards tighter visa and migration procedures, primarily with regard to Russia, and that, in effect, the process is becoming irreversible. No specific dates have been announced yet, but the changes are likely to come in the not-too-distant future, as Moldova aims to conclude its EU accession negotiations by early 2028. Montenegro has already set a telling precedent. On November 1, its authorities introduced visa restrictions for citizens of Russia, Belarus, China, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. The decision was driven specifically by the need to align national policy with EU requirements in order to meet the conditions for closing the relevant negotiating chapter. Moldova is following the same path, gradually falling in line with the logic of its EU integration commitments. Tofan’s signal came just a day after the publication of the European Commission’s annual Enlargement Report. The document explicitly points to the need for Moldova to further align its visa policy with Schengen standards, and this will affect not only its policy towards Russia. According to experts, Chisinau will have to align its entry requirements for citizens of eleven countries with the EU visa regime, under which nationals of these countries are required to obtain visas to enter the EU. The list includes eight post-Soviet states: Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as Turkey, Qatar and Vanuatu. Preparations for this have, in fact, been underway for some time. In December last year, Moldova’s parliament denounced the multilateral agreement on visa-free travel within the CIS, a move Brussels viewed as a preparatory step. At the time, Foreign Minister Mihai Popșoi, presenting the bill, explained that terminating the agreement had automatically ended visa-free travel only with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, with which Moldova had no separate agreements. Visa-free entry for Russia and the other CIS countries remained in place under bilateral agreements. Popșoi also assured everyone at the time that this was a purely technical, rather than political, move, consistent with Moldova’s gradual withdrawal from the CIS. Less than a year later, however, it is becoming clear that the decision did have an entirely political motive. The next step, as one might expect, will be to terminate these bilateral agreements as well in order to meet EU requirements. Introducing visa requirements for Russian citizens is highly likely to prompt retaliatory measures from Moscow. This can be inferred from the Russian Foreign Ministry’s reaction to Montenegro’s similar decision, in response to which Russia will introduce reciprocal restrictions on Montenegrin citizens starting December 30. For Moldova, however, the cost of such a tit-for-tat response would be of an entirely different magnitude. According to various estimates, several hundred thousand Moldovans live in Russia. Moreover, relations between the two countries are based not only on labour migration but also on extensive family, social and humanitarian ties that have developed over more than three decades. As a result, the political costs of Moldova’s EU integration course could translate into very tangible financial and social losses for the population. Remittances from abroad have traditionally accounted for a significant share of Moldova’s GDP. Although the share of remittances from Russia has been declining year after year, any additional hurdles for migrant workers directly affect the volume of these inflows. Compounding the problem are the logistical challenges facing Moldovan businesses operating in post-Soviet markets. Visa restrictions will mean more time, additional costs and, consequently, a loss of competitiveness. The caution with which our officials gradually adjust their public rhetoric as the country approaches each critical milestone, beyond which a fundamental decision must be made, is by no means accidental. They are aware of the risk of an ambiguous public reaction in a society where support for European integration stands at around half the population and has long ceased to be unconditional. Behind the façade of amplified Euro-optimism lies the pragmatic centrism of a significant segment of Moldovan society. These citizens support European modernisation and the achievement of EU living standards, of course, but not at the expense of relations with other countries with which Moldova shares historical ties and a longstanding partnership. While some see the introduction of a visa regime as the final break with Russia and the post-Soviet space, for another, considerably less ideologically driven segment of the electorate, visa restrictions mean a very concrete set of practical difficulties. Convincing these people why they should accept a deterioration in their accustomed living conditions in exchange for yet another step towards Brussels will be extremely difficult. This is precisely where the fundamental contradiction emerges between the political logic of Moldova’s EU integration course and the expectations of a significant segment of society, for whom a European future does not necessarily mean having to sever all ties with their own past. PAS appears to understand perfectly well that decisions of this kind could not only trigger public discontent but also further narrow its own electoral base. Strong reactions are likely to emerge not only in certain parts of the country but also in regions where attitudes towards Russia have traditionally been more favourable, such as Gagauzia. Pro-Russian sentiment has historically been strong in the autonomous region, and many families have direct family and economic ties with Russia. The introduction of visa requirements could be perceived in Comrat as a move against the interests of the region’s residents. The issue is further complicated by the inclusion of Turkey, a key cultural and economic partner of the autonomy, on the list of eleven countries. The need to align Moldova’s visa regime with Ankara’s requirements at the EU’s insistence could cause just as much controversy in Comrat as the introduction of visa requirements for Russian citizens. There is little doubt that regional authorities and the opposition will use the visa restrictions as grounds for further deepening the political confrontation with Chisinau. The Transnistrian factor adds to the complexity of the situation. Tiraspol is almost certain to view the visa regime as an additional tool for imposing a blockade and restricting the freedom of movement of the region’s residents. Transnistrian settlement talks, already virtually frozen, will face further complications as the left bank seeks exemptions and visa concessions. The chances of Chisinau agreeing to such demands are close to zero. Local propaganda is therefore likely to exploit the issue to mobilise the population and portray it as evidence of a further deterioration in the “state of siege”. The erection of the visa wall announced by Tofan, like most other government decisions, is taking place without broad public debate or any assessment of the costs and risks for citizens, including those who are compelled to remain in Russia. Essentially, the measure is being presented to the public as yet another necessity imposed by Brussels’ strict requirements, which supposedly leave no room for compromise. However, as the experience of previous years suggests, aligning visa policy with Schengen standards does not necessarily require an immediate and abrupt termination of existing visa-free arrangements. More likely, it allows for transitional periods, a phased approach and negotiations on special arrangements. But framing the issue in these terms requires political resolve and genuine determination to defend national interests in dialogue with European partners, rather than treating every EU requirement as a final and non-negotiable verdict.