“Praised by Brussels, Stuck at Home”: Why EU Approval Changes Little for Moldova

Brussels continues to praise Moldova for its progress on the path to Europe. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to discern concrete prospects for the country’s accession to the EU behind the European Commission’s optimistic assessments

The European Commission’s report on Moldova’s progress toward EU membership contains largely positive assessments of the government’s recent efforts. The country is once again regarded as a “star performer in European integration”, with which the EU bureaucracy has developed the most comfortable relationship. Unlike Kyiv, Chisinau is relatively inexpensive to run, does not attempt to impose its will on Brussels through proactive diplomacy, and does not clash with individual member states. Unlike Tbilisi, Chisinau does not attempt to protect its own economy and society, nor does it speak of national and religious values and identity, although it bans certain political parties and projects just as vigorously as Georgia is planning to do. Unlike the Western Balkan states, Chisinau does not belong to the European Union by geographical default and is located in a region that remains the scene of ongoing geopolitical struggle. As a bonus, it has a completely compliant leadership, groomed by the European establishment and brought to power by it. In short, Moldova is the ideal candidate to be held up as a “front-runner” in the EU accession process. As a result, the praise in progress reports and statements by European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos is becoming increasingly effusive, while at the same time growing ever more detached from the realities of present-day Moldova, whether in the fields of justice, the fight against corruption, political and media pluralism, economic development or human rights. In this respect, Brussels bureaucrats and our former NGO activists have clearly found common ground in prioritizing form over substance, promises over clear objectives, and rhetoric over tangible prospects. Few of them seem particularly concerned about what will happen after 2028, when Marta Kos will certainly no longer be in office and Maia Sandu will quite possibly have left her post as well, unless martial law or a state of siege is introduced. Chisinau has clearly been encouraged by the latest words of support from the European Commission. The authorities have decided to play along actively on the very terrain where the PAS regime is most adept and which resonates most strongly with the current crop of EU bureaucrats. They timed the opening of the “Vulcanesti-Chisinau” power line to coincide with Marta Kos’ visit; this line allows them to import Romanian electricity bypassing the infrastructure of the MGRES, which is under Russian jurisdiction and located in Transnistria. The fact that Bucharest itself has a chronic deficit and is a net importer of electricity, as well as the fact that maintaining the stability of the power grid is impossible without the MGRES, did nothing to alter this public relations stunt. What mattered was the political symbolism of the message – “liberation” from energy dependence on Russia, which the EU member states themselves are actively feigning by switching from Russian pipeline gas to liquefied natural gas. Among the other notable ideological gestures, alongside the withdrawal from yet more CIS agreements, something that features on virtually every agenda of Vasile Tofan’s government meetings, are renewed calls for visa restrictions and anti-Russian sanctions. On visas, the Prime Minister, citing Montenegro’s experience, acknowledged that imposing them on Russian citizens would be inevitable as Moldova moves towards EU membership. Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Mihai Popsoi promised to secure the application of the full range of EU sanctions against Moscow. According to the European Commission’s report, Moldova currently applies 91% of them. Chisinau had presumably hoped for more generous EU budgetary support over the winter, particularly given the funding allocated to Moldova’s military capabilities through the European Peace Facility. However, the amount Marta Kos “brought” for Moldova’s most vulnerable citizens was just €30 million, several times less than in previous years. The sum announced by the European Commissioner is equivalent to less than a week’s worth of consumption under the existing contracts. An equivalent amount could also be spent on purchasing between 10 million and 50 million cubic meters of natural gas from Ukraine. It is not enough to provide full compensation, and the allocation itself amounts to little more than a symbolic gesture that changes nothing of substance. After exchanging some propaganda-driven pleasantries, Chisinau and Brussels will nevertheless be forced to return to reality. The remaining two negotiation clusters have not yet been opened. The last chance to make progress this year is the EU ministerial meeting in Dublin in the second half of November. For now, Hungary’s negative stance remains unchanged. Furthermore, even if successful, a far more complex stage lies ahead: negotiations within the clusters. Chisinau will need to prove that it has not only transposed European Union legislation but also possesses the human resources, expertise, and budget to implement it, including the existence of appropriate functional executive bodies with staff, staffing levels, and job descriptions. Even with a high degree of political goodwill towards PAS in Brussels, such a project is beyond Moldova’s capacity. Concealing and downplaying the existing shortcomings would require a great deal of time, as well as a succession of collective symbolic gestures of loyalty, such as introducing visa restrictions and sanctions against Russia, accepting migrants and so on. Ultimately, however, the decision will still rest with the EU member states themselves. Major countries have already expressed support for enlargement with limited powers for new members, while several Eastern European states continue to clash with Kyiv. The issue of a “tandem” with Ukraine is a separate matter in this regard. Coinciding with Marta Kos’ visit, Ukraine’s ambassador, Paun Rohovei, appeared in the media. Kyiv’s envoy recalled that Moldova had been able to submit its application and obtain candidate status at the same time as Ukraine, largely thanks to the latter. He therefore argued that the two countries would have to continue moving forward together. Several PAS MPs have already endorsed this approach. Meanwhile, the prospects for resolving the conflict surrounding Ukraine are unlikely to be clarified following the trilateral meeting in Abu Dhabi. However, hints are already emerging from the White House regarding a transformation of Ukraine’s geography, which is tantamount to perpetuating the territorial conflict there. Whether Russia will allow Ukraine to join the EU, and whether Brussels will admit a fragmented Ukraine into the EU, are serious questions. Both are relevant, to varying degrees, to Moldova as well, given that the Transnistrian factor remains unresolved and it is still unclear whether Transnistria will or will not be included in a deal on Ukraine.