Gagauzia and Chisinau: A New Model for Relations?

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Sergiu CEBAN
The first round of the Gagauz governor election has produced two candidates for the run-off, but left almost every major question about the autonomy’s future unanswered
Yesterday’s elections for Bashkan and the People’s Assembly mark a significant turning point in the protracted crisis between Comrat and Chisinau. The standoff has been accompanied by a gradual erosion of the autonomy’s powers and changes to the rules governing its electoral system. According to preliminary results, Alexandr Stoianoglo is in the lead with 38.44% of the vote, followed by Fiodor Gagauz with 24.22%. Both candidates favor dialogue with the central authorities, but differ over how Gagauzia’s interests should be defended. The run-off, scheduled for 29 November, will therefore offer voters a choice between two models of engagement with Chisinau. One relies on direct negotiations, backed by the bashkan’s personal political standing. The other centers on a united regional team with the organizational and political resources of the Party of Socialists behind it. With the picture now clearer, the main choice facing voters in the run-off is already taking shape. Both finalists are establishment politicians who favor working with the central authorities within the existing rules. This is perhaps one of the key takeaways from the first round: after several years of bitter confrontation with Chisinau, Gagauz voters have not turned to a radical alternative. Instead, they have backed candidates prepared to pursue their goals through cooperation with the center. Stoianoglo appears set to rely on his high profile across Moldova, his experience in the prosecution service and his extensive network of contacts beyond the autonomy. Gagauz, by contrast, entered the race not as an independent political figure, but as part of a joint campaign with 23 PSRM candidates running for seats in the People’s Assembly. Another telling indicator was turnout, which stood at just 37.6%. By comparison, it reached 58% in the first round three years ago. Gagauzia’s capacity to mobilize voters has clearly declined since 2023, and the run-off, with its 20% turnout threshold, will take place against an even thinner electoral backdrop. There is also a clear generational divide among those who voted. Voters aged 56-75 accounted for around 45% of those who turned out, while those aged 18-35 made up just over 16%. It would be premature to suggest that Alexandr Stoianoglo’s victory is already a foregone conclusion. According to an IMAS poll conducted in November, 26.5% of respondents intended to vote for him, compared with 17.5% for his rival. But a more telling finding is that almost half of those surveyed could not name a likely winner of the run-off. Such a high level of uncertainty suggests that the outcome remains wide open. Developments over the next couple of weeks, including the redistribution of votes from eliminated candidates and efforts to mobilize undecided voters, could still produce surprises. Cornel Dudnic, who came third with almost 16% of the vote, could become one of the key figures holding the very “golden share” that may determine the outcome of the run-off. The preferences of those who voted for him could tip the balance in favor of either finalist. Dudnic’s political significance is further enhanced by the fact that he is also standing for election to the Gagauz People’s Assembly in one of the constituencies in Vulcanesti. His position could therefore prove important both in shaping the new composition of the local legislature and in determining the political configuration around the autonomy’s future leader. Ivanna Koksal and Oleg Garizan should not be discounted either, as their combined vote represents another sizeable group of voters. It is unlikely that either candidate’s campaign will turn aggressive or confrontational over the coming weeks. Nevertheless, both campaign teams will inevitably look for weaknesses in their opponent’s position in an effort to strengthen their own. For example, the fact that Alexandr Stoianoglo is registered as a resident of Chisinau, which only came to light during yesterday’s vote, could raise some awkward questions among voters. How much time does the prospective bashkan intend to spend in Comrat itself? And who will deal with the region’s day-to-day problems if its leader remains so closely tied to the capital? For Gagauzia, whose relationship with the central authorities is already deeply strained, the image of a “bashkan on secondment” could prove politically damaging. Voters may feel that the autonomy needs not only an influential negotiator in Chisinau, but also a leader who is directly involved in addressing its internal problems. How convincingly Stoianoglo manages to dispel such doubts could therefore matter just as much as the program he is offering to normalize relations with the central authorities. Alongside the head of the autonomy, voters are electing 35 members of the People’s Assembly, and the preliminary results suggest that this race may produce a few surprises of its own. For the incoming bashkan, a crucial question will be whether a parliamentary majority loyal to him emerges in the People’s Assembly, or whether Gagauzia once again finds itself in a state of institutional deadlock, with the executive and legislative branches blocking each other’s work and giving Chisinau a convenient pretext to intervene under the guise of “normalization”. In this respect, Fiodor Gagauz has a certain advantage: he has the backing of a political party that can provide him with additional political and organizational resources to govern the autonomy. Stoianoglo, by contrast, could face a considerably more difficult situation if elected. Without a faction of his own, he would have to build a parliamentary majority almost from scratch, negotiating with individual MPs and fragmented political groups. The weakness of this model is that it would require constant compromise and inevitably involve political concessions, potentially placing significant constraints on the future bashkan’s independence of action. The outcome of this election will do much to determine the region’s future for years to come: whether it retains its political and legal status, succeeds in defending its powers and ensures that the interests of its residents are protected. PAS’ efforts to curtail Comrat’s powers through court rulings and legislative changes, bring local electoral processes under the control of the central authorities and, ultimately, dilute the autonomy’s self-governing status through administrative and territorial reform appear to be part of a single political strategy. In these circumstances, the stakes for Gagauzia are particularly high. Losing its political agency and the practical means of influencing decisions could reduce the autonomy to a merely formal administrative unit, stripped of any meaningful independence. Its future would then depend increasingly on decisions taken in Chisinau, where the needs and expectations of the Gagauz population risk being far from a priority. Judging by the preliminary results, the autonomy’s future political course is likely to focus on defending its powers by restoring working relations with the central authorities. The election itself can be read as a demand for more effective governance and an end to the political isolation in which Gagauzia has found itself since its confrontation with Chisinau. The new bashkan will therefore face an immediate and pragmatic task: to restore functioning channels of communication at various levels. At the same time, dialogue with Chisinau need not be seen as incompatible with maintaining ties with Moscow, Ankara and Brussels, despite their differing interests in the region. On the contrary, this combination of relationships constitutes the autonomy’s political capital.