Is 2018 a defining year for Ukraine?

Ukraine exists as an independent state for 27 years. During this period, the country went through political protests of a revolutionary nature three times by mass, and at then in fact society claimed the same from the ruling state elite: justice, freedom and social peace. In each case, the next protest had both external symbolic aspects – change of power and policy of country’s development, and diagnosed the internal situation in the state, pointing to the accumulated contradictions between the ‘tops’ and ‘bottoms’, which weaken domestic institutions of civil statehood and strengthen institutions of state violence (administrative, fiscal, military and repressive). Compared with the revolutionary protests in 1993, and so-called ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2004, the ‘Revolution of Dignity’ of 2013-2014 became a truly crucial test for Ukrainian statehood. 2014 will be remembered by a surge of separatism in the regions and formation of the unrecognized ‘LNR’ and ‘DPR’, annexation of the Crimea and the military conflict in the Donbass. Moreover, after the change of power and beginning of active economic and political rapprochement with the European Union, Ukrainian society was expecting progressive changes – but increasingly plunged into a state of shock due to a long series of economic, social and humanitarian shocks. War in the east, annexation of the Crimea continued to exhaust the country’s economy and the psychological conditions of society. Created in order to resolve the armed conflict, the Normandy format allowed to sign the Minsk agreements, but their implementation is openly stalled due to Ukraine’s reluctance to comply with the political agreements. At the same time, Ukrainian authorities adopted a ‘de-occupation law’, which actually declared Russia an aggressor and made it senseless to conduct further negotiations in the Normandy format. Attempts of various international players to form a set of mutually acceptable arrangements to introduce UN Peacekeeping Forces into the Donbass also remain unsuccessful, not least because of Russia’s tough stance on this issue.

Instability Symptoms

At the level of state policy, Ukraine is waging an information war with the Russian Federation and the Soviet legacy, considering the era of the USSR as an occupation. Instead Kiev rehabilitates and heroes radically right-wing Ukrainian organizations that embrace nationalist ideals. Ultra-right organizations and paramilitary battalions created on their basis in the hands of the authorities became not only a punitive tool in the fight against ideological and political dissent, but also gave rise to crime on the street. Ultra-right organizations and paramilitary battalions created on their basis became not only a punitive tool in the hands of the authorities in the fight against ideological and political dissent, but also gave rise to crime in the streets. In general, since outbreak of the armed conflict in the Donbas, the level of the crime situation has significantly increased in Ukraine, primarily because of uncontrolled militarization of Ukrainian society and volunteer battalions that are not integrated into official government structures. Economic situation in the country is also marked by a number of systemic problems. During 2014, the national currency of Ukraine depreciated 3 times, which seriously affected welfare of citizens and caused overall increase in poverty. Growing social tension was also caused by inability of the new government to solve existing problems, and to ensure the level of wages and social security that was customary until 2014. Prices for food, utilities, education and medicine kept rising systematically. The main obstacle to positive state and social transformations remains corruption at all levels of government. Thus, according to the corruption perception index calculated by Transparency International, in 2017 Ukraine ranked 131st out of 176 countries surveyed compared to the 118th place in 2007. Absence of large-scale economic projects and government investments in main spheres of the economy, infrastructure projects, programs for the development and support of young and older generations contributed to economic stagnation, and, as a result, unfulfilled needs of society in most areas. Thus, the situation of economic stagnation inevitably dooms social institutions to degradation and further liquidation. A clear example is health care reform, which has entered an active phase since the beginning of 2018. For primary health care, citizens need to come not to medical institutions, but to a personal family doctor who will run private medical practice. Because of such unpopular steps, the country’s leadership is seen as corrupted and incapable of solving pressing problems, which ultimately creates mistrust in public institutions and an unfavorable environment for living. As a result, outflow of human capital from the country has increased – from unskilled labor to high-quality specialists. Moreover, in June 2017, a visa-free regime with the EU entered into force, which gave birth to a wave of large-scale travel abroad for young and employable Ukrainians, not only singly in search of employment, but more often with families for permanent residence. So, as of 2018, the number of Ukrainian labor migrants by approximate estimates is about 10 million people, 4.5 of which are in Russia, about 2 million are in Poland, 1.5 are in Hungary, and the remaining 2 million – in other countries of Europe and the world. According to rough estimates, by 2020, the number of Ukrainian labor migrants in Poland alone can amount to about 5 million people, and the total number of those who left the country will approach 15-18 million. It is worth noting that, in contrast to labor migrants from Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, Ukrainians are close to European culture, consistent with the generally accepted level of education, skills set and tolerance in Europe. This is a factor in the successful assimilation of emigrants from Ukraine and steady growth of their number.

Russia and the EU

Ukraine’s integration into the European economic space is expressed, in particular, in liberalization of its economy through mutual access to the markets of goods and services. At the same time, Ukraine’s economy looks largely unprotected against a stronger European, which, in turn, retains duties and quotas for certain types of Ukrainian goods. Liberalization of the Ukrainian market will inevitably lead to gradual absorption of remaining production assets in the country by the European economy. So, in March 2018, the Law on Privatization of State Property came into force, aimed at accelerating privatization of about 100 large-scale privatization enterprises (major plants and factories). Privatization of state property is likely to affect the most valuable Ukrainian asset, which was still banned for sale – agricultural land. In the public space, the President of Ukraine is in favor of maintaining a moratorium on sale of these lands, but in the media there are also his statements regarding cancellation of the moratorium in accordance with objectively existing economic efficiency. In order to obtain new loans, the President, in the framework of negotiations with the IMF, expressed his readiness to cancel the moratorium and to adopt a law regulating land commerce in 2018. However, in May this year the Parliament of Ukraine extended the moratorium until January 1, 2019, in all likelihood, to avoid reputational costs of the incumbent head of state before the forthcoming presidential elections. Reorientation of Ukrainian foreign trade (traditionally tied with Russia) to the European Union is accompanied by economic losses and is a direct consequence of Ukraine’s economic war with Russia at the state level made through a policy of sanctions and break-up of economic ties. It is quite indicative that Russia in fact still remains one of the main trade partners of Ukraine. So, in 2017 the trade turnover between these countries increased by 28% compared to 2016, exceeding the turnover with the EU, which is 27%. Foreign trade turnover with Russia in January-March 2018 compared with the same period in 2017 show an increase of 12%. Russian investments in Ukraine in early 2018 amounted to 11%. Relations between the countries in the field of transit of Russian gas to Europe through the Ukrainian gas transportation system also remain rather complicated. The Russian side stated about the planned 10 times reduction of transit through Ukraine after launch of the Nord Stream-2. For Ukraine, this could be another shock related to its budget revenues. On the other hand, Russia is not economically interested in reducing transit of gas through Ukrainian territory, and most likely will use this issue as an additional instrument of political influence on Ukraine and the EU.

Defining elections?

In the meantime, a little less than a year left until the presidential elections in Ukraine, but certain political events show that the pre-election campaign in Ukraine has already begun. Thus, the arrest of MP Nadezhda Savchenko in March this year, as one of the main candidates in the presidential race, predetermined her political destiny in this election campaign and was a good example for other opponents. Against the background of created image of the external and internal struggle against the aggressor in the name of Russia, there are clearances within domestic political space. Thus, political opponents of the current government, using the allowed procedure for presence in the media landscape, which is strictly regulated by the new legislation with foreign policy and domestic policy guidelines, are able to influence only current sentiments due to the lack of organizational, personnel and institutional opportunities to manage electoral attitudes and expectations of the population. The regional elites, in their turn, temporarily strengthened after the local elections of 2015 and in a way fell victim to ‘decentralization’, which came to nurturing by current authorities of well-behaving political leaders represented by leaders of the united territorial communities (UTO). In this regard, the UTO heads acquire a new role of an administrative and political ‘headquarter’ of the current government for the forthcoming presidential elections in March 2019 and subsequent elections of people’s deputies, as well as personnel replenishment loyal to the regime of regional power bases. The information campaign of the Ukrainian intelligence services about murder of Russian journalist Arkady Babchenko staged by Russian intelligence services in May this year, which evoked a new product of the political struggle called ‘the list of potential victims’, was also a sign of the pre-election cleansing of the media landscape. It consisted of prominent figures of the Ukrainian journalistic environment, whom the FSB allegedly wants to destroy, and was officially published by the Ukrainian intelligence services, as stated, to prevent an assassination attempt on them, as well as proposals for protection and cooperation. As expected, the information effect of the special operation resulted in intimidation of some representatives of the journalistic environment, as well as demoralization and disunity of others. Thus, the pre-election campaign that has begun does not inspire hopes for competition of political ideas and programs, as the current model of governing is autocratic authority of the President, the military power repressive machine (army, intelligence services, prosecutor’s office, anticorruption court) and the Parliament, which is loyal to the Head of State. Because of the war, social upheavals and economic recession, society is tired and apathetic to the political life, expressed in lack of confidence in state institutions and elected bodies. Undoubtedly, this state of affairs plays into the hands of the current Ukrainian government. The upcoming elections, however, are another challenge for Ukrainian political and intellectual elites in seeking a national idea, goals and projects that can lead the country to qualitatively new conditions. Thus, the next presidential election in a certain sense can be defining for Ukraine – their results in the future may either predetermine further decline of the Ukrainian statehood, or serve as a trigger for significant changes in the country’s social and political policy.