Andrey Devyatkov: “When I read what they think about Russia in Moldova, I have a semi-preinfarction angina”

In the opinion of the Russian expert, the mission of Dmitry Kozak is “to maintain stability in the region from the perspective of Russia’s interests” Some Moldovan analysts and representatives of the opposition believe that the appointment of Dmitry Kozak as Russia’s special representative for trade and economic relations with the Republic of Moldova is an attempt to drive Moldova into the next federalization plan. Speaker of the Parliament Andrian Candu said that this is the “extended hand” of Russia to the official Chisinau. Correspondent of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Liliana Barbarosie asked the opinion of the Russian analyst Andrey Devyatkov about the mission and strategy of the new Kremlin appointee. Free Europe: Is Dmitry Kozak’s appointment yet another step towards federalization, which he promoted fifteen years ago? Andrey Devyatkov: No. I believe that Kozak is rather a crisis manager. As far as we have seen, even according to the Kommersant, which published a very interesting publication, according to the reaction to the appointment from people in the Kozak’s office, in fact, there is no great enthusiasm about the fact that he was sent there. That is, a professional is just needed who knows the topic and can manage the crisis. Free Europe: What kind of crisis should he manage? Andrey Devyatkov: First of all, a crisis connected with the Transdniestrian region. Now there is a certain status quo, but there are actors who are trying to change this status quo. I mean the status quo in the Transdniestrian issue. In particular, this concerns the ousting of the Operational Group of Russian Troops (OGRT), and peacekeepers with them. Because, of course, no matter how many Moldovan diplomats say that these are different issues – OGRT and peacekeepers, nevertheless, they immediately declare that they are in favor of replacing peacekeepers with an international police contingent in which Russia will no longer play any role, maybe at the level of one or two policemen. Free Europe: And Chisinau, going to the UN platform, is trying to turn the tide – are you saying this? Andrey Devyatkov: Now we see how a united front is being formed against the OGRT, the resolutions are constantly adopted in the US Congress, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, on the UN platform. That is – yes, it’s kind of a declaration, but, nevertheless, the question takes on a certain political weight. Free Europe: So, those who believe that Kozak’s appointment is, first of all, a response to the UN resolution are right? Andrey Devyatkov: I will say that I think this was the main reason. We have seen that Rogozin’s successor was not determined for a long time, but as soon as this situation occurred with the resolution, Kozak was immediately named. That is, the question is not that he came to promote big plans. Free Europe: Should he maintain the status quo? Andrey Devyatkov: Let’s just say: the status quo is still changing, regardless of whether we want it or not – Russia, the European Union – it is changing objectively in the region because of many processes. The question is about the management of these changes.... That is, the question is that if we see that today Transdniestria is subject to more and more Moldovan jurisdiction in the sphere of foreign trade and the movement of individuals, I mean individuals across the border – that these processes occur smoothly so that there is no crisis, politicization of the issue of border control. Because today the situation goes the way that Chisinau and Ukraine simply change the rules of the game, presenting Transdniestria with a fait. This, of course, creates a certain, let’s say, unstable atmosphere in the region. Free Europe: Speaker Andrian Candu is inclined to see in this appointment an “extended hand” of Moscow to Chisinau. Andrey Devyatkov: Yes, I think this is so, because many saw in this appointment that he was appointed specifically as a special representative for Moldova, and not for Transdniestria, a signal that, allegedly, Russia wants federalization. In fact, there, I think, is another signal. It is that Rogozin still epitomized this policy, that after all, Transdniestria is the first, right? That Chisinau is a kind of pro-Western player, which is a priori anti-Russian. Today the signal is slightly different. The signal is as follows: Transdniestria is nevertheless considered in the context of Moldova, no matter, we are not talking about federalization, confederalization, in general, this is not the case. Earlier, the Moldovan authorities said that Rogozin was appointed for Transdniestria – and that this is a violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova. Now, Russia removed this point diplomatically. In fact, it was such an irritant, and, in principle, as Candu said, we got this message. And this is good. This is not a fundamental change in policy, but a style change. It is very important, when foreign policy respects all style restrictions and some norms and principles that exist. Free Europe: How can this appointment affect Moscow’s relations with the ruling party in Moldova, which has been in odds with Europe? Andrey Devyatkov: We must understand that the main player in the Republic of Moldova – such a shadow player – is the United States. And nothing has changed with the United States, in principle. Yes, the European Union gives money, yes, there is a certain spat between Brussels and Chisinau, but nothing has changed between Washington and Chisinau, we do not see a big change, and the Democratic Party will try in every possible way to demonstrate geopolitical loyalty to Washington through different methods. In fact, the most terrible thing for the ruling party is to lose even not the support of the European Union, these so-called European bureaucrats, which do not seem to have any influence whatsoever, generally speaking... Most importantly is not to lose the support of Washington, the Washington elites – Republican, Democratic Party. Free Europe: But following this logic Chisinau had to reject Kozak’s candidature, do not you think? Andrey Devyatkov: No, I do not think so. Kozak did not show himself, at least, I think, from the point of view of even Western partners, personally – Kozak did not show any negative side. It is necessary to understand the situation he was in in 2003 and that he acted as the situation compelled. Kozak simply followed the political line that was at that time. Free Europe: What may be on his agenda now? Andrey Devyatkov: To be frankly, I do not know whether there is understanding how to address the accumulated problems and challenges for the Russian policy in the region. And for the regional security in general. So, there is a certain number of problems, which I mentioned, but there are no ready solutions on the table.  That’s why, strictly speaking, I think that Kozak was appointed as a person who in general will try to establish normal relations, moreover very active relations with local authorities and with Chisinau – you see there are a regional security agenda and election campaign agenda, don’t you? So, some believe that Kozak will promote the alliance of the Democrats and Socialists. My opinion is that, in principle, this alliance – even if it appears, it will emerge by itself – and exclusively in the intra-Moldovan environment. I do not think that it is possible, relatively speaking, with some external pressure. I think that the alliance is impossible, because, as I said already, especially in Washington they do not trust the Socialist Party and Igor Dodon structurally, fundamentally. And they will consider the alliance of Democrats with the Socialists as, let’s say, drive towards Moscow and away from the West and, accordingly, the events of 2009 will repeat. This is if we generalize this logic... Free Europe: Maybe the strategy is different: to come between the Democrats and the Americans, so that Russia will get a more flexible dialogue partner represented by the Moldovan authorities? Andrey Devyatkov: If Russia is ready to assume the financial burden of 300-400 million dollars annually, which are poured into the Republic of Moldova in the form of grants and loans – this is the official statistics of the OECD, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – then maybe I can agree theoretically with you. Plus, it seems to me that Russia is pursuing a fairly realistic policy, she understands that there are very powerful influence groups here: Ukraine and its politics, the Moldova’s right-wingers, which, in principle, are much stronger even than they were in 2003, a very powerful expert community, I will not call it civil society, it is the expert community, let’s say, or individual groups of people who can bring to the Great National Assembly Square at least 100 thousand people against such things. I think that this is a very risky plan that would unite all those who hate each other against Russia. In fact, when here I am, as a Russian citizen, a Russian expert, reading what they think of Russia in Moldova, I have, you know, a semi-preinfarction angina. Conspiracy theories, constant speculation... Of course, Russia pursued different policies in the region, including tough, including emotional, different in form and content. But it, this policy, is changing in accordance with regional patterns, with available resources, with the existing influence and influence of other players, internal and external. That is, the question is that today there is some pressure on Transdniestria, because Transdniestria today is forced to actually participate in DCFTA. In fact, today Transdniestria is controlled in terms of borders by Ukraine and Moldova. And the only window of normal dialogue is confidence-building measures. It is important for Russia to preserve at least some level of stability for Transdniestria, for Russian citizens, for business. As I said already, it seems to me that there are a number of accumulated problems associated with the politicization of the Transdniestrian issue at various international venues and narrowing of the external communications of Transdniestria. I do not know how important the pre-election situation is here, but, it seems to me, since Igor Dodon constantly travels to Moscow and meets, naturally, the pre-election context also has some significance. But it seems to me that there is as yet no ready answer to how to solve these problems, that is, it seems to me that now Kozak is appointed just to establish some substantive dialogue. Because it did not work with Rogozin, Rogozin was another person, he did a lot, let’s say, at a symbolic level against the Association Agreement, etc. He was not considered in Chisinau as counterparty to the dialogue. Kozak is seen as a substantive person with whom one can conduct a dialogue and negotiate, which, let’s say, prefers cabinet diplomacy, closed diplomacy, rather than diplomacy to the public. Therefore, in principle, I think that first of all it is to establish relations with all the main partners and players and to maintain a certain level of stability in the region. Given the views on Russian interests, which exist in Moscow, but without any major plans. Source: Europa Libera