Crisis in Relations between Brussels and Chisinau - Window of Opportunities for Moscow

By Dorin Mocanu, RTA Over a week ago, Dmitry Kozak was appointed special representative of the Russian president for trade and economic relations with the Republic of Moldova. It is indicative that Russian experts take it slow to comment on this decision of Moscow and are looking forward to the reaction of Moldovan politicians, journalists and other civil society actors trying to unriddle this personnel castle. Against the backdrop of a rather protracted crisis situation in the relations between Moscow and Chisinau, this appointment suggests that the Kremlin has developed a certain action plan towards Moldova and has great expectations of its implementation with particular officials. Apparently, Moscow intends to launch a counterattack in the Moldovan direction using a scandal in the pro-European “family” which revealed default of longstanding efforts taken by pro-European forces in Moldova, and the growing crisis in the relations between Brussels and Chisinau. Many experts drew attention to the symbolism of this purely Putin-like appointment, “if the West prevented Russia from settling the conflict in 2003, it's not a problem, get ready for our new proposals 15 years later.” However, how realistic are the expectations of Moscow revengeful intentions in Moldova? What exactly will Dmitry Kozak do to this end after a 15-year pause? First. In our opinion, the appointment of the acknowledged crisis manager Dmitry Kozak in charge of Moldovais a forced and even to some extend extreme measure on the part of the Kremlin, conditioned by the virtually lost opportunity in recent years to exert any systemic influence on the processes in this small post-Soviet republic. Evidently, being a special representative of the Russian president on Transnistria during six years, Dmitry Rogozin showed the results that were not expected by the Kremlin. Indeed, the relations between the two countries reached the lowest point and this practice was decided to be ceased. Now, a new team of Russian officials is authorized to deal with the national interests in this region under the general guidance of Deputy Prime Minister Kozak. It includes the Russian Co-Chairman of the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic Cooperation with Moldova, Dmitry Patrushev, the newly appointed Russian Ambassador to Moldova, Oleg Vasnetsov, and heads of other federal ministries and agencies that traditionally oversee specific areas in the Moldovan sector. Second. Strengthening the administrative attention to Chisinau, Moscow can signal about increased ambitions in this rather important region. The previous coordination of efforts has not ensured the proper level of effectiveness according to Moscow's expectations. For example, Kremlin has great expectations with regard to the political potential of the Moldovan president and head of the Socialist party Igor Dodon after his election in late 2016. These expectations have not been converted into tangible practical results so far. This strengthening of Moscow is largely aimed at accumulating and intensifying the use of available resources within Moldova. According to Moldovan experts, Igor Dodon, being a very sophisticated expert in the Moldovan political “jungle”, plays his own pragmatic game in the interests of long-term survival in the unpredictable Moldovan system of power, and often finds unexpected points of contact with various forces and groups of influence. Dmitry Kozak seems to have been tasked with concentrating the efforts of the pro-Russian forces in Moldova aimed at tangible results. Third. The upcoming main task for Moldovan political players, as well as for involved international participants lies with the parliamentary elections in Moldova which shall influence the configuration of power for several years ahead. According to the ongoing political crisis in the relations of the ruling elite of Chisinau with its traditional development partners – Washington and Brussels, the situation on the pro-European flank is very volatile and fraught with many unexpected twists. This situation gives Moscow a unique chance to take advantage of the window of opportunity and sharply score political points on the home stretch ahead of the Moldovan parliamentary elections. Given the political experience, Dmitry Kozak is likely to coordinate with the Russia-oriented political forces in Moldovaboth electoral processes and an even more significant post electoral redistribution within the political field of the Republic of Moldova. In the expert environment, most of analysts agree that Moldova will not be able to avoid formation of a coalition government that has become traditional for many years. This process can be very difficult and tense. Thus, taking into account previous painful experience, it is useful to clear the way for this scenario in advance, now, and the noteworthy “signal” statements of the ruling Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, the US Ambassador to the RM James Pettit or other reference persons bear evidence of this background activities. Later, we will talk about this issue more thoroughly. Fourth. Dmitry Kozak by default makes analysts to draw parallels with the situation back in 2003 and to tie this new appointment with the negotiation process on the Transnistrian settlement, which is inseparably linked with the general political context in Moldova. Despite the fact that the level of Moscow's activity in the dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol today is incomparably lower than the leading positions that Russia held fifteen years ago, we should not exclude the transformation of its behaviour in this most important direction. Moreover, in view of certain positive trends in relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol, success reports by the Italian OSCE chairmanship and other participants to the international “5+2” format, the only sure way to strengthen positions in this process is to quickly seize the initiative while the other participants feel themselves to some extend relaxed and enjoy placidity. It is clear that the mission of Kozak, currently, is called upon to solve several important primary tasks and is unlikely to revive any concrete plans for resolving the conflict. However, we can feel the new approaches of Moscow in this sphere unexpectedly soon. It is also to be expected that Dmitry Kozak's activities in the Transnistrian direction will be seriously different from Dmitry Rogozin's behaviour, concentrating not on political folklore and resonant declarations, but on specific matters that like silence ... until the right time. It very likely caused the demonstrative neutralization of the position of the special representative of the Russian president, without the previous emphasis on relations with Transnistria, having the clear intention to avoid Chisinau's irritation and demonstrate willingness to build pragmatic and mutually beneficial “trade and economic” relations. This approach, in general, is rational and justified. Moreover, there will be more than enough forms of “trade” in these relations. After all, there are good reasons to believe that the Kremlin creates the conditions for a “return” to Moldova favoured by the emerging on-site situation, and the geopolitical context will continue to dominate the political competition in this small post-Soviet republic.