Russia’s Positions in Europe: Reflections Before Putin-Trump Meeting

Nikolay Tkachev, Mikhail Bezhenev Today, the anticipated bilateral Russian-American summit is held in Helsinki. It is known that the dialogue will take place in the tet-a-tete format with the subsequent joining the discussions of the parties’ delegations during the working breakfast. The dialogue between the leaders of the heir countries of the world order bipolar system that collapsed at the end of the last century naturally attracts experts, journalists and politicians from all over the globe. The climate in the dialogue between Washington and Moscow directly or indirectly affects all states more or less involved in world politics. The main but hardly determinative intrigue of the meeting is the presence or absence of the so-called “big deal” that could stop, or at least, “systematize” the political confrontation between the United States and Russia over the last years. It is clear that for both countries geopolitical rivalry is a powerful resource of domestic policy inherited from the Cold War - in this sense, one have to expect  at least establishing of some “rules of the game” in mutual confrontation. And given the fact that the very idea of ​​a “big deal” is a very strong simplification, supported by journalists and aimed at a common man, Putin and Trump’s possible “gentlemen's arrangements”, can hardly have limited tactical features if any. Besides, no global bargaining between the United States and Russia is possible because of the serious differences in the quality of the current foreign policy of the countries: the United States since the end of the last century has been networking consistently and continuously. As for Russia, Moscow seems to be increasingly gravitating towards foreign policy adventurism. Let us note right away – we take into account the fact that the strategy of conduct of Moscow in the international arena has become as it is today because of a whole range of objective and subjective circumstances. The role and significance of each of them is a topic for another article, and probably for a big study that will become possible after a change in the configuration of power elites in Russia. We will only try to subjectively describe some features of Russian foreign policy, based on the trends of its development in the European direction. In the end, the great minds of the past said that the possession of the Heartland was the key to success for the world’s power centers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the foreign policy of Moscow was a heady brew of the legacy of the past, the impotence of the present and misunderstanding of the future. On the one hand, the Kremlin went to the length of certain tactical projects like supporting unrecognized Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria, on the other hand it played a submissive friendship with the conditional West, awkwardly and desperately trying to get into the circle of respectable democratic powers. After Vladimir Putin came to power, the situation has changed significantly: Russia bit by bit ended with sad legacy of the 1990s, toughly brought the Chechen matter to a close, established a steadily functioning vertical power structure (including at the federal level) and became an independent player in the international arena. By that time, relations between the leading CIS countries – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – could be called allied in general. The inertial exploitation of economic relations inherited from the USSR, the proximity of elites and world outlooks ensured a more or less normal dialogue of capitals, especially Minsk and Moscow, which formed the Union State by the beginning of the 2000s. As years passed the situation changed. Russia faced with the task of developing and implementing a global foreign policy that could meet the country’s increased ambitions. The European Union stepped up efforts to draw the former Soviet republics into its orbit. Moscow, Minsk and Astana gradually developed the concept of the Eurasian integration – on the one hand, obvious and necessary for the largest countries of the region, on the other – acting as a “mirror” of European integration. The first color revolutions took place in Ukraine and Georgia, which back then could serve as a weighty reason for Moscow to think of the need for systematic work with neighbors in the non-governmental sector, as the US and European countries did. Kremlin made certain conclusions, but, as we learned later, it was not enough. In 2008 the closest associate of Putin Dmitry Medvedev came to power. Despite that the former president headed the government, Medvedev’s team was presented way more liberal and open to the dialogue with the West. Russia, led by Medvedev, has been quite close to the EU, even despite the events in South Ossetia and Moscow severe suppression of Georgian aggression. There was an actively developing discourse on the future visa-free regime between the EU and the Russian Federation, and the concept of “Eurasianism” got a new interpretation as “united Eurasia from Vladivostok to Lisbon”. The second cadence of Vladimir Putin as president was marked by a revision of Medvedev’s legacy and a clear pragmatization of relations with the EU. The processes of rapprochement with Brussels slowed down, the idea of Eurasian integration again became the “sovereign” fiefdom of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and the future Eurasian Union again was interpreted as an alternative to the European Union. Propagandists and experts breathed new life into the concepts of “The Russian World” and “USSR 2.0”, the essence of which is not really clear till the present day. Taking into account intensification of the Eurasian integration processes, the Kremlin nevertheless found Western practices necessary to work with the civil sector and launched a number of its own projects in the area of cooperation with compatriots and pro-Russian activists abroad. Nevertheless, the first two decades of post-Soviet Russia implanted one significant and extremely significant deficiency in Moscow’s foreign policy – the lack of consistency and clear strategic understanding of the development course. In the 1990s there were more important things to think about, in 2000s the active growth of the economy and welfare, which allowed to generously ‘feed’ the allies, formed the illusion that things would come right in themselves. As a result, no serious work was done at the level of the elites and the civil sector, while the European states and the United States have not stopped this activity up to now. Moreover, the main thing was missed: Russia did not try to create a real, thoughtful and attractive image of the future reality that would be expected by the states of Europe if loyal to Moscow. In other words, Russia did not create such a model of social structure that would attract the broad masses of neighboring states. Under these circumstances Russia became vulnerable, as it ensured the loyalty of the allies only by direct financial injections and the remnants of the former “friendship of nations”. That played a cruel joke with Russia in 2014 in terms of Ukraine, which became for the whole Russian foreign policy both “the moment of truth” and a verdict at the same time. Today, over the years, we can confidently say that Moscow was completely unready for the Ukrainian crisis. Whatever brilliant was the annexation of Crimea, as asserts the pool of Moscow propagandists, the peninsula itself is hardly worthy the total loss of influence on the largest state of Europe, and in the past – one of its main trade and economic partners. Moreover, the Russian risky undertaking in the Donbass, which has not been brought to its logical completion and moreover is still far from it – has become a clear indicator of both the real potential and Moscow’s determination to confrontation.  It is not a coincidence that the Ukrainian crisis has become an inhibitor of the integration processes in Eurasia, to the present day stalled so much that only the lazy one does not criticize the Eurasian integration concept as ill-considered and obviously superficial. It is telling that even the Ukrainian crisis has changed absolutely nothing in regards to constituency in Russian foreign policy. There has not been created a more or less positive agenda for Ukraine so far and Russian state media keeps discussing a topic about the imminent ‘death’ of the regime in Kiev and the country as a whole for some years in succession. It is not surprising that under such conditions the only thing that has been happening in real politics is the continuing rupture of Russian-Ukrainian ties in all areas. This can only indicate that Moscow gave up the Ukrainian direction as irrevocably failed. At the same time, Moscow does not make any distinct efforts to maintain its positive reputation in a dialogue with other its traditionally close capitals. The situation with Belarus has deteriorated year by year though at a subdued pace. The Russian leadership, in fact, ceases to perceive Minsk as a global, civilizational ally, drastically pragmatizing its relations with Belarus and limiting it to specific economic indicators. This is seen through the crises of Russian and Belarusian relations in recent years, in particular, related to energy prices and food supplies. According to the estimates by many experts, the recent meeting between Putin and Lukashenko was in an obviously tense atmosphere – this explains why after it the permanent leader of Belarus was frankly out of sorts and spoke about the possible loss of the sovereignty of his country. Interestingly that Minsk is increasingly seeking favor from Brussels and Washington, which may also indicate absence of any coherent guarantees of the country’s stability that Russia could provide. Interaction between Russia and Kazakhstan has completely disappeared from the agenda of the Russian federal media – the last bright surge of attention (again, in a conflict way) to Astana was the situation with the Kazakhstan’s transition to the Latin script. Abkhazia and South Ossetia recognized by Russia in 2008 increasingly raise the concern about the catastrophic drop in Russian financial support, and it might seem impudent if only Moscow did not consider it necessary to arrange support for Tskhinval and Sukhum exclusively on the same principles of direct injections, as with the other (former) allies. The Russian Federation persistently tries to preserve the illusion of a well-thought out plan in Moldova, supporting the leader of local socialists, President Igor Dodon – who is openly accused in the country itself of “vassal” relations with local oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, who controls everything in Moldova and exacerbated relations with Moscow through the puppet government beyond what could have been imagined. As for neighboring Transdniestria, Russia seems to have chosen to conserve its influence at the level of Buddhist contemplation for the future, while reserving the right to express dissatisfaction with the actions of local authorities. The decline in Moscow’s interest in situation in Transdniestria is also proved by the appointment of Dmitry Kozak as the President’s Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova, simultaneously with the abolition of a position of the Special Representative for the PMR. The bottom line is: Russia’s position on the development of relations with Europe is marked by three main features: inconsistency, readiness to defend exclusively fundamental interests and disposition toward certain tactical projects, which have mainly image significance. Crimea, actually, was one of such projects and its accession was more symbolic than strategic and particularly economic deal. The basic interests include such fundamental aspects as military presence or trade in energy resources. For instance, the presence of the Russian military in the unrecognized republic is the only topic which Moscow is ready to react decisively and consistently. As for energy resources, the already mentioned Belarus example is indicative – as for gas prices, the Kremlin seems to be ready to drive a hard bargain today with anyone and without hesitation about the future consequences of such a stance. Thus, neither in Moscow, nor in its surroundings, anyone can hardly answer the question why Russia is doing something on the international arena. Nobody has a real understanding of what the Russian Federation can offer its allies – or just partners – in foreseeable future, how Moscow is presenting itself and what it is trying to become. The Kremlin’s foreign policy of recent years is a set of hard-to-explain steps, reactions and show projects, presented by the Russian propaganda machine as some kind of a well-thought out plan that is not understandable to the man in the street. Taking into consideration this circumstance, let’s return to the beginning – a “big deal” is impossible, if only because the subject of any global bargaining in the US-Russian dialogue is absent since one of its parties simply cannot reasonably articulate its demands in view of their absence. Instead of a “big deal”, there may be a certain set of specific tactical agreements on acute problem – and only if there will be a common interest. Most probably, Moscow and Washington can find a common ground in fundamental security issues to protect themselves from the unnecessary risk of direct military confrontation, which just recently almost happened in Syria. Otherwise, the communication of modern centers of power can hardly be complementary – Russia is still searching for self, which, sooner or later, will either lead to seclusion or force a radical rethinking of its essence. Ironically, history shows that both options will not happen without new upheavals for the entire Russian world – although the essence of this concept has not been so far disclosed by anyone.