Kocharian’s Case: Consequences for the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The decision to arrest the second Armenian President Robert Kocharian, without any exaggeration, will be one of the key events in the recent history of this country. Firstly, because for all the time of independence that came after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenian leaders, even if they were retired, were not subject to criminal prosecution. A precedent is born before our very eyes. Secondly, in the Kocharian case it is not about corruption or misappropriation of property, but about unconstitutional actions during the March 1, 2008 events. Ten years ago, the transfer of power from one president to another was overshadowed not just by clashes between protesters and security forces, but by human victims. So far, there have been heated debates about this tragedy in Armenian society. What has that to do with Karabakh? At first glance, this story has no direct relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The ex-president is not accused of that his policy in the process of settling this confrontation contradicted the national interests of the country and would violate its security. However, there is no escaping this story, when studying the intricacies around the ex-president of Armenia. First of all, Robert Kocharian, no matter whoever assesses his actions today, is a significant figure for Nagorno-Karabakh. Even in the late Soviet period, he was one of the prominent participants in the “movement” (so the campaign for the struggle for ‘miatsum’ – unification with Armenia – is still called in Stepanakert). In August 1992, perhaps, at the most difficult time for the NKR, when its very existence was in question, he became the head of the State Defense Committee of the unrecognized republic, and then became its first president. In this position he was called out to Yerevan, where he received the post of prime minister, and then was elected president of Armenia. It is no coincidence that on the eve of the court decision on the arrest R. Kocharian stated that his criminal prosecution would become “a gift for Azerbaijan”. And indeed, it is hard to doubt that Baku sooner or later actualizes the argument about the unenviable fate of someone who for years has been called an “aggressive separatist”. For sure, R. Kocharian’s participation in the creation of the NKR infrastructure and the Karabakh-Armenia common defense and security system will not become an indulgence for him. During his ten years in power, he created many situations, which today cause ambiguous and even sharply negative assessments, for example, behavior of the ex-president during the 2003 and 2008 elections.  So far, disputes and speculations about Kocharian’s personal shared responsibility in the tragedy of October 27, 1999 continue. Then, as a result of the terrorist attack in the National Assembly, the speaker of the parliament (ex-first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia) Karen Demirchian and Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan were killed. Nevertheless, the decision to arrest R. Kocharian inevitably actualized the issue of the responsibility of his long-standing rival Levon Ter-Petrosyan. At one time, it was the first president of Armenia that brought the Karabakh leader to Yerevan and contributed to his career at the national level. However, in many respects, on the basis of disagreements over the prospects for the conflict settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh, their paths diverged. In 1997 L. Ter-Petrosyan called for the need for a compromise in the settlement of the Karabakh problem and agreed to a phased resolution of the conflict, where the liberation of the occupied regions around the NKR precedes the solution of the problem of its status. “Patriotic Arguments” in the internal Armenian dispute Then and after many opponents accused Ter-Petrosyan of compromising policy and almost betrayal of the country’s national interests. All this led to his resignation under the pressure of then-Prime Minister Robert Kocharian and security bodies (Serzh Sargsyan was the head of the republic’s Ministry of Internal Affairs at the time). But if we deviate from loud words and do not accept maximalist demands as the only possible formula for resolving the ethnopolitical confrontation, the idea of the first president of Armenia was to estimate resources and opportunities for his country in its geopolitical competition with Azerbaijan. This position was later clearly expressed once again during his presidential election campaign in 2008, the very one that led to the massive internal political crisis and the bloody events of March 1. During those elections, two frontrunners (Serzh Sargsyan, as the successor of R. Kocharyan, and L. Ter-Petrosyan, as the ex-president, trying to return to the chair of the head of state) used “patriotic” Karabakh card against each other. Supporters of the first leader of Armenia spoke of Ter-Petrosyan’s readiness to “surrender Artsakh”, and their opponents appealed to the fact that R. Kocharian himself in 1999 was close to accepting the plan for the “exchange of territories” (the Meghri district of Armenia in exchange for Karabakh). Those who supported L. Ter-Petrosyan also reproached R. Kocharian and S. Sargsyan that they lost a separate representation of the NKR at the talks. 10 years have passed since then. But today, when the decision was made to arrest R. Kocharian, these arguments suddenly revived and played out in fresh colours in the comments of bloggers and social networks. Nikol Pashinyan, who for many years tried to gain distance from L. Ter-Petrosyan, against his desire was in tandem with the first leader of independent Armenia. He began to be considered as a successor of his work. The situation is particularly acute due to the fact that neither L. Ter-Petrosyan nor N. Pashinyan are from the Nagorno-Karabakh people. Although the first president of Armenia was one of the founding fathers of the Karabakh committee, N. Pashinyan, having come to power, toughened the position of Yerevan, stating the need for participation in the negotiations of representatives of Stepanakert. Cost of concessions Be that as it may, but the information field is filled with the narratives that in different years the state leaders were ready for betrayal of national interests, “surrender of Artsakh” (which in emotional discussions mean not only the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, but also the areas adjacent to it). And it’s not a conspiracy or a coordinated policy. Rather, it’s the absence of such. But the accusation of a key figure of the Karabakh movement inevitably actualizes the problem of the responsibility of its opponents, who, in their turn, are trying to show that the ex-president R. Kocharian is not an icon, he was ready for concessions in negotiations with Baku. A fundamentally important point is overlooked. All the leaders of Armenia, not only past, present, but also the future, could not and will not be able to get away from the discussion of the “cost of concessions”. It may be more or less, but on the table today there is the “updated Madrid principles”, the main meaning of which is unpacked and is not a secret. There is a consensus of leading world powers around this project. Yes, Azerbaijan will not be able to return to the situation of 1988 (this would require the USSR’s restoration) and even of the early 1990s. But the Armenian side does not have the opportunity to take “the entire bank”. At the same time, S. Sargsyan recognized “basic principles”, and N. Pashinyan has not rejected it yet. Meanwhile, attempts of a “trial over the era”, as a result of which in fact all the activities of governmental structures are put into question, as well as the country’s foreign policy and the ability of its leaders to ensure security, are toxic. First of all, they are fraught with unjustified and overestimated expectations of the “Karabakh miracle”, which the former “weak and failed” leaders allegedly did not create, and secondly, the growing chaos within the country that is the environment that itself provokes harsh actions by Baku, and Ankara. At least to test the position of Moscow, which is also concerned about some, let’s say cautiously, substandard steps of Yerevan in domestic policy. Sergey Markedonov, Associate Professor, Department of Regional Studies and Foreign Policy, Russian State University for the Humanities Source: Eurasia Expert