In everyday problematic, but peaceful life on both banks of the Dniester, a common man almost does not recall the Transnistrian issue. Nevertheless, conflicts that often develop into an armed confrontation, as a rule, always happen unexpectedly: no one waits for a war and no one believes in it to the last. Could we imagine such a massive bloodshed in the Balkans in the 90s? Did anyone believe in the diplomatically named 08.08.08 in South Ossetia? And did we know that the once prosperous Ukraine would become the bleeding wound of war?
I doubt that. Only professional experts and analysts are aware of the causes and prerequisites for aggravation of conflicts, although they do not always seriously believe in the coming war. Nevertheless, there are several factors that in any, even the most stable conditions can lead first to the emergence, and then to the proliferation of conflicts. Chief among them is the struggle for power. In regional politics, it is usually generously ‘seasoned’ with artificially heated national and linguistic contradictions, ‘hurray-patriotism’, rhetoric about an ‘external threat’, speculation on the topics of statehood and sovereignty. All these sensitive issues are well known to political technologists of different kinds, which obviously are most active at the time of the fierce struggle for power. They – those who bring the elite into high offices – clearly understand that the main bases to believe in the authorities are confidence, security and prosperity.
Elites are not interested in realizing and fulfilling aspirations of the people in general. For them, elections are only an instrument, and in order to make this tool work they use those seasonings that take the public’s attention from really pressing problems to ephemeral external threats and hastily constructed ‘enemies’. That is why, on the eve of the elections to the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the thought that the Transnistrian card can be played as an instrument of political struggle, including post-election, seems at least to make sense, but at the maximum fully justified.
The Transnistrian problem is recognized as such by all countries of the world, and some of them participate in its resolution. From time to time more or less actively the actors in the settlement process make it look like the problem is being solved. It seems to many that all participants in the 5+2 format are interested in resolving the frozen Transnistrian conflict. However, those who for a long time and constantly follow the Transnistrian issue all the more clearly see how all the players in the 5+2 combination benefit from this situation practically, where (once again I will remind) Moldova and Transnistria are the parties to the conflict; Russia, Ukraine, OSCE are mediators, the European Union and the United States – observers. All listed participants play out the Transnistrian card one way or another. The most negative game end for obvious reasons can be provoked from within the regional space because of the growing struggle for power, expressed through the parliamentary elections in Moldova in the coming year. The situation in the country is tense with the change in the electoral system, and the demonstrative invalidation of the elections of the Chisinau mayor, and the growing discontent of power among political and civil opposition. What can we say about the fundamental reason for the general negative tone of public sentiment in the country, which is a low level of welfare with unclear prospects to remedy the situation.
Constant opinion polls largely show results whereby the current ruling majority will not retain its status quo. Theoretically and technologically, as one of the most radical options, the introduction of a state of emergency will help the ruling elite to retain power, the basis for this could just become an aggravation of the situation on the Dniester – especially as rhetoric about the Russian threat of interference in Moldova’s elections is supported at the highest level. Can the escalation of tension around Transnistria become a technology of retaining power for the Moldovan political elite?
All analysts, political scientists, experts, leaders of public opinion are inclined to evaluate the outlook and the essence of forthcoming events in different ways. I’ll start with the opinion of Transnistrian colleagues.
One of the most well-known Transnistrian political scientists, Andrei Safonov, believes that the so-called Westerners have a maximum program to bring people to power without their money, their own authority and political baggage. According to Andrei Safonov, such people are most obedient and manageable. The expert suggests that now they, the Westerners, can play such a card, that they need not just a pro-Western leadership, but one that will unquestioningly execute any order. Therefore, we cannot exclude, Safonov says, that Washington, Bucharest and perhaps Brussels will try to arrange internal disturbances in Moldova in the coming months and even weeks.
There is another opinion in Chisinau. Elena Lewicka-Pahomova has experience working on Transnistrian state television and knows the Transnistrian issue better than many. She is well-known and has a good reputation in the media space, is a member of the Public Council under the President of the Republic of Moldova. According to Elena, to decide to unfreeze the Transnistrian conflict, one must be either an idiot or a daredevil. Noting that “the first we have a lot, the second is in short supply and it pleases as it’s unlikely to go further than the slogans”, Elena, in the spirit of the pre-election theme, noted that the Transnistrian card in the elections is rather voices of the electorate, but in this time they will be “smeared” along the polling stations. “A tougher line after the Syrian ‘defile’ of Russians is impossible. They define their own and do not leave their own behind. Shoigu appears first, then Lavrov sits at the negotiating table. I’m sure that despite all the NATO shenanigans of the Moldovan Defense Ministry they do not want to meet with Sergei Kuzhugetovich outside their office,” believes Lewicka-Pahomova.
Another interviewed expert is Maria Levchenko, a well-known TV host of the author’s program and an IPIS media expert. In her opinion, after the unending war in neighboring Ukraine, world actors are more interested in the stability of the region. Complementing my reasoning that everyone has interests in the Transnistrian issue, Ms. Levchenko noted that Russia’s interest in resolving the Transnistrian conflict is that Moldova should remain in the ‘gray zone’ that is neither with the West nor with the East. The personnel reshuffle that Moscow had the last month hints that Russia will soon return to the Transnistrian dossier at a higher level. The new Russian ambassador to Moldova has a reputation for being a ‘shark’, and Dmitry Kozak has a direct access to Putin. In general, the idea of returning to the Transnistrian dossier is seen but this time with the consent of international players. Perhaps the West itself is tired of the situation in Ukraine and is waiting for a precedent, a model for the peaceful conflict resolution.
Thus, the opinions of experts clearly diverge, and the prospect of using the Transnistrian issue in achieving political goals ‘here and now’ remains the subject of discussions. One thing is clear: the upcoming electoral battles, which are of vital importance to all participants and especially to the ruling authorities, will increasingly generate waves of instability that cover the Moldovan political field. Attempts to play the Transnistrian card for the sake of momentary political bonuses under such unfavorable conditions can have far-reaching and deplorable consequences. Let’s hope that all political players understand this.