Vysehrad’s ‘Solidarity’: Between Putin and Trump

Alex Horak Last Tuesday, significant and meaningful meetings for Central Europe took place. President of the United States Donald Trump visited the capital of the northernmost state of the so-called Visegrad Four – Poland. There he held a warm meeting with his Polish colleague, Andrzej Duda. On the same day, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban paid a working visit to Moscow, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Hungary, like Poland, is an active player in the Visegrad Group and is fighting for informal leadership in the quartet. The meeting between Trump and Duda confirmed the allied relations between Washington and Warsaw, which seeks to receive special security guarantees from the United States and become the main partner and conduit for their interests in the region. The meeting was literally full of protocol signs of respect and a demonstration of adoration of the president by the Polish leader, which, combined with the fueled mutual populism, ensured a sufficiently noticeable outcome of the visit. On the one hand, Donald Trump said that the US is not ready to impose sanctions on companies sponsoring Nord Stream 2, while simultaneously addressing several venomous statements to Germany, which objectively plays into the hands of Andrzej Duda in his conflict with the leadership of the EU and Berlin. German-Polish relations traditionally consist of a complex intricacies of historical mistrust, ideological and territorial rivalry, as well as large-scale cooperation in the economy. If in this unique kind of interaction Warsaw cannot rely on Brussels, experiencing a crisis in relations in recent years, then privileged ties with Washington are becoming even more valuable. On the other hand, the US President seriously promised to think about creating a permanent military base of the United States in Poland. The project is expected to be implemented at the expense of Poland itself (2 billion USD) and named “Fort Trump”. It is obvious that this initiative of the Polish leader, despite the vivid populist nature, is quite real and has two targets. The first is to balance, including in the eyes of the voters, the failures in relations with the European Union through strengthening ties with the US: the States enjoy a serious trust among the population of Poland and the diaspora. The appearance of the US military base in Poland, together with the planned phasedown of Washington’s participation in NATO projects, will significantly strengthen Warsaw’s independent role and political influence on the landscapes in Central Europe. The second target concerns Warsaw’s traditional ardor in containing the Russian threat. Poland dreams of becoming the vanguard of the struggle against Moscow’s expansionist plans, and the appearance of the US military base in the country perfectly suits these plans. Berlin may not like such movements, which automatically comes back to the target number 1. So, the Andrzej Duda initiative in some sense is a safe domestic and foreign policy move for him. Thus, Hungary – the southernmost member-state of the Visegrad Group – is becoming almost the main partner of Moscow in the European Union. This is recognized by Vladimir Putin himself, who after the talks with Viktor Orban said that “Hungary is an important and reliable partner of Russia in Europe”. The Hungarian prime minister feels comfortable in this role, declaring at the meeting: “Meeting with you is of great significance for Hungarian policy, because we are important partners. Hungary needs good partners. I am very glad that we have had a balanced and predictable relationship for several years. It cannot be said that a favorable climate is always provided for our cooperation, I mean the international climate. But all the unpleasant things exist so that we can together fight them. I think we are doing it.” It is obvious that Victor Orban intends to make maximum use of the current difficulties in the relations between Moscow and Brussels in the interests of Hungary, becoming Russia’s main partner from the NATO and EU countries. At the same time, cooperation between the two states is not only rhetorical: mutual trade is growing, joint financial and banking projects are being strengthened, Russia occupies a dominant position in the Hungarian energy market (agreements were reached on gas supplies in 2020 and on the launch of two new power units at Paks NPP). At the same time, Vladimir Putin and Viktor Orban like each other, because they have similar political careers, management methods and internal political positioning – both left and returned, both stand for traditional conservative values and do not avoid authoritarian manifestations. The paradox is that the north of the Visegrad Group continues its devoted struggle with Russia even when it does not really threaten anyone. At the same time, the south of the Visegrad Four is trying to build partner friendly relations with Moscow and serves as the main route of Moscow’s penetration into the Atlantic community. Meanwhile, there is also the Czech Republic – the country with the most anti-Russian population in the European Union, according to sociological polls, and re-elected in January 2018 President Milos Zeman, who is an ardent supporter of rapprochement with Russia. There is Slovakia, which in 2019 will manage the affairs of the OSCE, as it acquires the right to chair the organization. The Polish-Hungarian landscape is getting more dramatic due to the fact that, in general, Budapest and Warsaw are on friendly terms, especially in recent times. In both countries, extreme right-wing populists, Eurosceptics, who have opposed the whole establishment of the European Union, are in power today. Hungary and Poland are equally concerned with the issue of migrants flooding the EU territory, they stand for conservative religious values, they are trying to isolate themselves from the increased influence of transnational capital. And, of course, “make friends against” the European Union and are in the bad graces of the European Commission. Moreover, Hungary has become a subject of an unprecedented scandal with the first restrictions by the European Union on its member, albeit for show. At the same time, the EU cannot apply more serious sanctions against Budapest, for example, restricting the right to vote. To do that they need the consensus of the remaining 27 participants, but exactly Poland stood up for Hungary on this issue, feeling that if Budapest was not protected now, then Warsaw itself could be next. The countries have already formally agreed to vote together and cover each other. Thus, the palette of mutual interests, projects and plans in Central Europe is absolutely eclectic and mobile, which means that the configuration of relations both within the EU and in its contacts with the ‘outside world’ can at any moment change to an absolutely unrecognizable state. Geopolitical turbulence on the continent is in full swing.