Success Factors for Kosovo Settlement. Why a Compromise Between Belgrade and Pristina Is Inevitable

The end of September was marked by a short-term exacerbation of the situation in relations between Serbia and Kosovo. The formal reason for the swift exchange of attacks was the visit by the President of Kosovo Hashim Thaçi to the Gazivoda Dam and the hydroelectric power station. Despite the facilities are located in the north of Kosovo, they are important for the power supply of Serbia. Since Hashim Thaçi arrived there accompanied by the Kosovo police and special forces, Belgrade regarded such a visit as a provocation and violation of the regime established on the demarcation line between Serbia and Kosovo, controlled by KFOR – international paramilitary units under NATO leadership responsible for stability in Kosovo. Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic convened a security meeting in connection with the incident, and also held consultations with Russian President Vladimir Putin (joint Russian-Serb military exercises will begin in the coming days). However, the experts agree that the current “joint aggravation” does not reflect insurmountable problems in relations between Belgrade and Pristina, but, on the contrary, indicates that the settlement is approaching. Of course, on both sides there are those who want to actively prevent a compromise and create pressure on political leaders who started a truce. It seems that Hashim Thaçi just succumbed to such pressure and therefore made an attack on a strategic object for Serbia, demonstrating his willingness to defend the interests of Kosovo in a dialogue with Belgrade. Anyway, the Serbian leadership has substantially changed its approaches to the Kosovo settlement in recent years, making them as realistic and complementary as possible to the international situation. Thanks to the pragmatic view of Belgrade, a cautious bargaining was launched on the exchange of territories: return of areas with a high concentration of ethnic Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija under Serbian jurisdiction, and transfer of areas mostly populated by ethnic Albanians to Pristina. Such an exchange will mark the final stage of the Kosovo settlement through creation of two sovereign states that mutually recognize each other. Although there is no unity of approaches in general to the case of Kosovo even within the European Union, which today plays a major role in the administration of the Kosovo crisis. Several EU states that have potential centers of separatism on their territory (Romania) or have already faced independence movements (Spain) refuse to recognize Kosovo. The same approach is applied by Ukraine, Russia, Moldova and Georgia, who are familiar with territorial conflicts firsthand. Nevertheless, progress in resolving the Kosovo problem is steady and irreversible, unlike other conflicts, where the negotiations on the settlement are hampered or are at a standstill, despite international efforts. Success in Kosovo seems to have been made possible by a variety of factors. Adequate settlement model The secession of Kosovo from Serbia was force-based, coupled with military actions, international humanitarian intervention and multiple war crimes. Such a tough disintegration could not have taken place painlessly, leaving significant traces on the national pride of Serbian citizens, and also generated dozens and hundreds of potential revanchists, both among politicians and ordinary citizens of both sides.   However, all these people now live in a relatively homogeneous environment and hardly come into contact with the opposing side. As a result, the risk of tensions and conflicts over the past years has decreased significantly. Due to this, international efforts are focused not on artificially creating a place for co-existence of two ethnically, religiously and identically different nations – ultimately intolerable even in everyday life. On the contrary, the settlement process is the separation of the parties and step-by-step elimination of actual causes of the crisis. It is important that at the same time such a settlement fits into the international legal logic reflected in the basic UN and the OSCE documents. A distinct people receives the right to self-determination through secession and creation of their own state, thereby completing the disintegration process of the former Yugoslavia. This settlement model makes it possible to achieve in the future a stable and sustainable resolution of the conflict, excluding recurrences of confrontation. Time A quarter of a century has passed since the actual separation of Serbia and Kosovo. In 2008, 53 states recognized Kosovo, and today there are 111 such countries. While remaining de facto independent, Pristina has structured all state institutions during this period that adequately meet generally accepted criteria in the field of public administration. At the same time, at the mental level, the population got used to living separately, and the once-existing cultural, economic, and production ties were destroyed. The economy, production and national economy of Kosovo were reorganized for interaction with Albania, the US and the EU, and practically do not depend on Belgrade. Over time, understanding of the existing differences between Serbia and Kosovo anchored in politicians’ and the public’s minds, and the motivation to continue the struggle to restore the once existing, but now mythical territorial integrity has decreased. The strategies of politicians, including Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, directly reflect the changes that have occurred in public’s minds. Anyway, personal qualities of decision-makers and their readiness for tough decisions in the interests of further conflict-free development play an important role. Here the role of the personality of Alexander Vucic cannot be underestimated – in the end, he is destined to go down in history as a leader who has found the courage to rise above stereotypes and prejudices to achieve long-term goals. European perspective Rapprochement with the European Union with a tangible prospect of subsequent membership is a key to Belgrade’s accommodating attitude. This is paradoxical, but the common foreign policy goals of Serbia and Kosovo are a huge resource for resolving the conflict. In a pan-European home quarrels and all the more conflicts are excluded. This understanding is a kind of driver of mutual concessions and the desire of Belgrade and Pristina to compromise. It also allows the European Union to effectively play the moderator role in the dialogue, since the EU has serious tools for encouraging and authorizing both parties, where the main ‘whip’ can be a cut in funding from the European Commission, and ‘carrot’ – EU membership. In such conditions, even the hardest compromises become possible and desirable for a significant part of the population, since they assume as a prize access to the benefits of the European Union, including the labor market, capital, etc. At the same time, politicians in Serbia and Kosovo have a unique opportunity to justify certain victims and “compromises with conscience” with higher and better goals. *** The coincidence of several fundamentally important factors has led to that today the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by Belgrade does not seem so incredible as it has been recently, and can become quite a routine everyday act, a legal consolidation of the reality that has developed over many years. At the same time, there is every reason to suppose that key actors will consistently deny the possibility of repeating the Kosovo scenario in other regions and will do everything possible to make Kosovo’s case seem unique and unrepeatable, since centers of separatism as we remember exist even in the EU, tabooed for domestic conflicts. However, experience of resolving the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo can be significant. The Kosovo scenario may further inspire separatist sentiments in the European Union itself (in Spain, Great Britain, Italy and Romania), and also on its periphery in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Moreover, this will strengthen international legal positions and arguments of precisely secessionist movements and formations in Transdniestria, Abkhazia and in the east of Ukraine. As if the law of energy conservation was applicable to geopolitics – the resolution of one territorial conflict actualizes several new ones.