The Price of Trust: Why Moldova Should Not Rely on European Money

On November 14, 2018, the European Parliament voted on the report on situation in Moldova. The document is full of negative assessments of the situation in the country: besides already traditional ‘complaints’, parliamentarians speak for the first time about concrete restrictive measures against Moldova. In particular, the report mentions a visa-free regime and possible sanctions on those involved in stealing a billion. Apparently, the EU claims against Moldova have reached such a level that they will leave its mark under any outcome of the February elections. Why Brussels criticizes Moldova Today we can hardly remember that once the Republic of Moldova was the ‘champion’ of European integration and achieved a visa-free regime sooner than other participants in the Eastern Partnership program. Everything worsened in 2015, when the Democratic Party of Moldova gained leverage over all authorities. EU representatives increasingly talked about unsatisfactory results of the fight against corruption and demanded a comprehensive investigation into the theft of a billion, pointing to the low level of media freedom and independence of the judiciary. In 2015, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, Thorbjørn Jagland, in his article for the New York Times, called Moldova a “captured state”. Assessment of the reform process by the European Union has become harsher every year. An opaque electoral system, invalidation of elections results for mayor of Chisinau, expulsion of Turkish teachers from Moldova and dubious tax reform gave more grounds for claims. One of the few successes of the former ‘champion’ remains implementation of the Agreement on Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with the EU (DCFTA). But this is hardly enough. On November 20, in the framework of the annual forum on European integration, the Head of the European Union Delegation to the Republic of Moldova, Peter Michalko, reiterated that in order to receive macro-financial assistance from Europe, parliamentary elections in Moldova must be conducted correctly. Is it possible? To violate or not to violate The mixed system mechanism, which is still criticized by the European Union, provides the Moldovan authorities with a broad field for manipulation. This includes blurry constituencies, which unite several districts of Moldova with different political preferences, absence of a voter turnout, and the right to be an independent and party candidate at the same time. Moreover, such requirements as reducing the time of the election campaign, the need for personal presence of a candidate in elections and a ban on running for those politicians who have previously been revoked a mandate, create pretexts for removing unwanted candidates from the elections. In addition, composition of the election commission and the courts of Moldova will remain controlled by the PDM. What this means is no need to explain. Another dangerous trend is important. The closer the elections, the less Chisinau reacts to the comments of European partners. This is evidenced by the recent parliamentary vote on abolition of pre-election silence: you can change the electoral legislation a year before the elections, but the PDM ignored this provision and made it clear in advance that it would change the legal norms if it wanted to a few days before the vote. It must be admitted: violations during the election campaign, elections and even after them are inevitable. The European Union, unfortunately, is restricted to make condemning statements in order to avoid allegations of interference with the elections. No one cares about the threats of Brussels in Moldova, as the preservation of power is at stake, and the rest goes into the background. What to expect? The European Union will not risk allocating money to Moldova until a stable government is established in the country. Before that, the EU should agree with the election results, and then it will wait for their recognition, the official approval of the mandates of each deputy. The parliament should have a stable coalition, which will announce the further government policy. In addition, the European Union will need to analyze public sentiment in the country after the parliamentary elections with a view to protest sentiment and possibility of early elections. All this means that Moldova will not receive the long-awaited 100 million euros in the first half of 2019. A lot of “buts” come into play. On the one hand, the complete cessation of financial assistance to Moldova is unlikely. The European Union has spent impressive resources to incorporate Moldova into its orbit of influence, and somehow or other, the authorities of the Republic of Moldova nevertheless did work to bring the country’s legislation closer to the European. The point of no return has long been passed. Moreover, European officials take into account the geopolitical factor and fear that without European money Moldova immediately falls under the influence of Russia. Vlad Plahotniuc showed that at any time he can ‘deepen’ the Pro-Moldova policy and reduce European rhetoric proportionally with reduction of European funding. The Democratic Party can also threaten the European Union to support Igor Dodon in normalizing the dialogue with Russia. A more realistic option – reduction in the amount of assistance. Taking into account the current election landscape, there will be two key alliances in the future composition of the Moldovan parliament: Pro-Moldova situational coalition, the core of which will be Democrats and Socialists, or the new pro-European coalition of the PDM, PAS and DA. Under any of these scenarios, the Democrats remain part of the power structure. So, since under their rule the Republic of Moldova has already earned itself the reputation of an unreliable partner, the EU’s position is unlikely to change fundamentally. Most likely, Brussels will demand unconditional fulfillment of the preliminary conditions in exchange for defrosting funding, knowing that any coalition with the Democrats is subject to decay and discredit. Therefore, at the initial stage, the European Union will try to ‘test the ground’, allocating funding with small targeted tranches with an eye to Moldova’s fulfilling of the set conditions. The most negative scenario is the failure of coalition attempts that could lead to early elections in the summer of 2019. In this case, it is difficult to speak of any specific forecast. Any options are possible here, from the complete victory of the socialists to, on the contrary, the next ‘transformation’ of the democrats from a toxic oligarchic structure into a unifier of all the pro-European forces of Moldova. One thing is for sure: the credibility of Chisinau is undermined, and in any case the European Union will watch Moldova for a long time, and whatever political forces would come to power, Europe doesn’t wait for them with open arms.