November 2018 turned out to be hot for world politics and ends with a clash between Ukraine and Russia in the Sea of Azov. This month included events in the world geopolitics which were sometimes not directly related to each other, but common in their origin. For example, talks between Vladimir Putin and Kosovo’s leader Hashim Thaci in Paris and a joint meeting of the Romanian and Moldovan governments in Bucharest. Both events confirm that the positional game of the two centres of power in Europeis in full swing.
Pavel Filip and Unirea
On November 22, Bucharest hosted joint meetings of the Moldovan and Romanian governments resulted in agreements of ministers to cancel roaming, form a Moldovan-Romanian military unit and establish joint control on the common border. Since 2012, it is the fourth round of the collegial work between the executive authorities of the two states. All of them ended with the signing of particular documents on deepening cooperation in various fields – from infrastructure to the armed forces. The content of these agreements confirms that the countries are moving practically towards mutual integration. And the politicians are open to this end.
“This is how we see the unirea. Implementation of specific integration projects. We have one blood. Thanks to these interconnection projects, we want to make our two hearts beat in unison,”the Prime Minister of Moldova Pavel Filip said at a press conference following the general meeting.
Moldovan politicians usually play the “unirea” safe, and the ruling Democrats are no exception. Parliament Speaker Adrian Candu called for “being careful” with the Unirea and even declared the union with Romania as impossible. Therefore, the directness of Pavel Filip should be associated with the electoral implications – the Democratic Party of Moldova shows no sign of letting up. By proclaiming the “pro-Moldavian” paradigm, the PDM seeks to attract both pro-European powers and supporters of the Unirea. Democrats intercept the agenda from all their competitors: the last meeting of ministers was a kind of flank attack of the current government on the positions of the Moldovan unionist parties. The unionists can oppose the practical projects of the Democratic government only with slogans and symbolic actions.
Integration initiatives speak louder than words, including previous statements by Adrian Candu. Moldova and Romania are getting closer, but a practical discussion regarding the union automatically affects the interests of NATO, the European Union and Russia having troops in the unrecognized Transnistria. On the path to uniting, the Transnistrian issue arises anyway “by default”. Bucharest loses nothing from such conversation, since the goal in the form of the territory of Moldova justifies the means. But for Chisinau, the topic of absorption by Romania is extremely inconvenient – therefore it cannot be excluded that Bucharest persistently asked Pavel Filip to be eloquent and appreciate the benefits of bringing the Prut banks closer together.
If this assumption is true, then politically, the Moldovan authorities demonstrate their complete dependence on their Western partners. At the same time, the idea of “unirea” can devalue the undivided rule of the Democrats, and anyone else in Moldova, since the powers of the current authorities in “big Romania” remain in question. For the Euro-Atlantic allies, Moldova is only a resource in the big game and is almost unable to change its status.
Currently, Romania records a rise in regional instability due to the upcoming elections in Moldova and Ukraine and recalls its “sovereign” claims for unlimited influence in Moldova. At the same time, Romanian interests should be understood more broadly and it has to be taken into account that the country is a member of the EU, NATO and the closest military-political ally of the United States in south-eastern Europe. By updating the Unirea issue, Bucharest outlined the claims of a whole group of players.
Putin and Hashim Thaci
On November 12, the President of Kosovo Hashim Thaci tweeted a photo of his conversation with Vladimir Putin while marking the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I. The Kremlin did not publish official reports on the meeting, but it was reported later that such communication took place “on the run”.
Officially, Russia does not recognize independence of Kosovo and considers the Kosovo case a dangerous precedent. Moscow is convinced that the US intervention in the Balkan crisis led to a systemic error throughout the world order, which in fact destroyed the existing rules of the game. It was the support of Kosovo by Washington that allowed Pristina to declare independence from Serbia and achieve its international recognition. The Kremlin believes that Kosovo is a precedent for other disputed territories, so the approach to them should be consistent and uniform.
Putin’s meeting with Hashim Thaci in Paris is a retaliatory move that demonstrates the Kremlin’s flexibility on disputed, unrecognized or partially recognized territories. Moscow makes it clear that the Kosovo precedent can be the key, if not to a new world order, but to the mechanics of resolving territorial conflicts. The principle of an individual approach based on historical, political, ethnic, economic conditions can be the basis for finding the optimal solution, taking into account all stakeholders. Moreover, Russia appeals with similar arguments when it comes to the Crimea, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
It is significant that Russian President Vladimir Putin at meetings with the President of Serbia every time confirms that Russia will support any solution to the conflict between Belgrade and Pristina, if it is adopted peacefully and by mutual agreement. The conversation of the Russian president with the leader of Kosovo directly testifies that the Kremlin can contribute to the project of “delimiting” Kosovo and Serbia on the terms of a similar approach to other conflict areas. Here we are talking about the sovereign interests of Russia, which at the current time are clearly traced in the Crimea, Ukraine, Transnistria and the Caucasusrepublics.
Moldova and the Kosovo precedent are among the cases where key players on the European continent took two positional steps. As often happens, the interests of Moscow and the United Statesin direct “contact”concurred in the Moldovan direction, where the struggle between two vectors of power has been going on for more than a decade. New steps and counter-steps in this direction will not keep waiting, and Moldova risks to be unconsciously drawn into a game from which it can hardly emerge as a winner. 
