RTA author Alex Gorak commented for the RTA’s editorial board on the influence of the Ukrainian aggravation on European policy in the region. The expert is confident that the incident in the Kerch Strait demonstrates how vulnerable the situation is in Moldova and Ukraine and the lack of ways for Europe to influence it.
What does the conflict in the Azov Sea mean
A week ago, Ukraine was not interesting for experts and journalists, and now everyone is talking about it. It took Kyiv 5 days to return to prime time on TV and editorials. The conflict of ships in the Azov Sea led to a tough diplomatic conflict and martial law in 10 regions of Ukraine. Events show that each confrontation has its own logic, which develops independently of wishes and declarations. Brussels, Moscow and Washington spoke a lot about the “inadmissibility of aggravation”, but could not prevent it. It turns out that the actors in the Ukrainian crisis do not have effective leverage.
Ukraine has almost been forgotten since the active hostilities ceased in the Donbas and people stopped dying en masse. The main news stories in those years were about Syria and relations between Moscow and Washington. Ukrainian politicians have repeatedly tried to return the focus of world media attention: they threatened to terminate the railway communication with Russia and tore up the friendship and cooperation agreement. The provocation in Kerch from the media perspective was the best of all because it had specific prerequisites.
The current relations between Ukraine and Russia are an example of complete mistrust and total mutual enmity. Kyiv and Moscow severely clashed on Azov largely because of internal political situation in both countries. The authorities of Ukraine and Russia are faced with problems in the economy and cannot effectively meet the demands of society for a decent level of welfare. The Ukrainian situation is also complicated by the pre-election context. The country will have presidential and parliamentary elections, and therefore 2019 will determine the further parameters and course of development of Ukraine. The stakes are high, and Ukrainian politicians are seriously nervous.
Until the elections it is pointless to expect stability in Ukraine. Competition among candidates is constantly growing, and the non-public opposition between influence groups and individual oligarchs is intensifying. All this is forced by the specific political culture of Ukraine, which exploits elements of show politics and accepts an uncontrolled, de-ideologized street protest.
During 2019, Ukraine will provoke tensions with its neighbors and threaten all European security. It is not only a conflict with Russia over the Crimea, Donbas, gas transit and the division of waters. Ukraine has extremely complicated, including in territorial terms, relations at the western borders – with Romania, Hungary and Poland. The weaker the central authority in Kyiv is, the more intensively these European countries will influence the fate of the western regions of Ukraine historically close to them. This will only increase the tension.
The European Union not only prevented a new Ukrainian crisis, but also through some member countries invades the territory of Ukraine. To ensure strategic stability and security in Eastern Europe by such contradictory actions is impossible.
Challenges in Moldova
Moldova is another headache of the European Union. Unlike Ukraine there was no war and a coup d’etat in the last five years, but there were many political crises. In February, Moldova will again hold parliamentary elections.
The main Moldavian oligarch, Vladimir Plahotniuc and his Democratic Party, go to any tricks to retain power. The Democrats’ favorite method is to harshly discredit competitors, and in 2018 the pro-European opposition is the target: its leaders are accused of treason and trying to prevent elections. The atmosphere in Moldova is heating up with waves of criticism and dirt throwing, which is only aggravating the split of the country on political grounds.
No one will guarantee that after the parliamentary elections there will be stability in the Republic of Moldova. On the contrary, more experts predict new early elections. This largely explains prompt and joint reaction of the Moldovan authorities to the episode in the Kerch Strait. Uniting in front of a common threat is an excellent excuse to justify violations of citizens’ electoral rights and other symptoms of the degradation of democracy.
But violations always lead to new violations, and Moldova is well over its limit – the European Union froze macro-financial assistance at least until February 2019. Given all the factors, Moldova already does not look like a stable society and state either now or in the near future. Since the emergence of a stable coalition after the elections seems unlikely, not having European money the country risks facing a new round of social instability.
Waiting in this case will not work either for the European Union. Chisinau will not survive without European money, and Brussels will not risk endlessly delaying financing and risking a European Moldova geopolitical project.
Time for tough decisions
The European Union is in dire need of new approaches to politics in Ukraine and Moldova. Kyiv and Chisinau are trapped in the logic of domestic and foreign political confrontation and lose their ability to soberly assess the consequences of their steps.
Paradoxically, the only thing that deters the Moldovan-Ukrainian region from total crisis and armed conflict is a factor of Transdniestria. The unrecognized “TMR” is in a state of conflict with Moldova and has lived all its years like on a volcano. The Transdniestrian population and local politicians have something to lose. As a result, Transdniestria for Europe remains the only predictable entity in the region, which explains close attention by various development agencies and diplomatic missions of EU members, as well as that local businesses have the opportunity to trade freely with European countries.
Certainly, the EU will not escape criticism for letting the situation in the zone of direct European interests get out of control and is again slipping into unpredictable hysteria of 2014-2015. However, the situation can still be corrected.
Brussels should take into account the origins of the ruling elite of Moldova and Ukraine. In a general sense, these people found themselves in power due to coincidence of circumstances, and the political power for them was only a means of protecting capital made up in the 90s and 2000s. Moldova and Ukraine do not have state managers who share the logic of a consistent foreign and domestic policy. Therefore, the European Union has no partners in the leadership of Moldova and Ukraine capable of speaking the same language with Brussels, namely, to consider democracy and stability as a real value. The main motive of the current elites is the preservation of power, so the European Union is almost unable to influence them.
It seems that in the future the European Union needs to build a new policy in relation to Kyiv and Chisinau in order to form the necessary respect for European interests and recommendations. It is obvious that after new power structures in Moldova and Ukraine are formed, Brussels should set clear, enforceable, but strict requirements to local authorities, failure of which will lead to an instantaneous suspension of financing by the European structures.
In particular, the European Union should work out mechanisms for incorporating European recommendations into the domestic and foreign policy programs of Ukraine and Moldova in order to avoid internal and external crises that impede the building of stability in the region.
In a general sense, Europe, guided by the lessons of the Kerch incident, should realize its responsibility for bringing up political elites of a new format in the associated countries of Eastern Europe, which pursue predictable policies and relate to democracy as a real value. Otherwise, the region will remain a hotbed of conflict for the years ahead. 
