Is Territorial Integrity No Longer Important? Serbia Prepares to Recognize Kosovo’s Independence

Dorin Mocanu, RTA: On February 23, some Serbian and Kosovo media published a draft treaty of friendship and good-neighbourly relations between Serbia and Kosovo, allegedly agreed upon through the United States, France and Russia. The document consists of 22 items and includes a number of provisions, including on the exchange of territories and border modifications. It makes no sense to elaborate on the specific aspects of this high-profile document or the reasons that led journalists to determine the public opinion in Belgrade and Pristina. It is obvious that the ‘leak’ of the draft treaty occurred by mutual agreement of Kosovo and Serbia, which, apparently, are close to the end of the long-term conflict. For the sophisticated public, especially experts from Moldova, it is important to understand the approaches of the international community to the settlement of modern separatist conflicts. For many years, the importance of the territorial integrity of States was considered an unshakable position of the international community when it came to conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. It is interesting to see how firm and unshakable it remained in 2019, when many of these countries are still unable to regain control of their rebellious regions. We will draw parallels with the problem of the Transdniestrian settlement that is close to us. The unrecognized Transdniestria has existed for almost 30 years, and the position of the world community on the future of this entity does not change. The international political position of all OSCE countries on Transdniestria is expressed in the joint statement by the Foreign Ministers of Europe. Every year since 2012, the Foreign Ministers declare in this document “their strong resolve to attain a comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders with a special status for Transdniestria that fully guarantees the human, political, economic and social rights of its population”. It would seem that the contours of the settlement are drawn in bold, and Chisinau, which expects to reintegrate the Left Bank of the Dniester, should not worry about the integrity of the state. With international support the government of Moldova can make every effort to systematically integrate the Transdniestrian region into its common political, economic, social and cultural space. However, decades pass and everyone will agree that the ‘reintegration’ of Transdniestria has systemic failures. It is clear from the example of the very Kosovo settlement that the international consensus is a very relative conditionality with a specific policy and time context. In the case of Serbia and Kosovo, universal adherence to the principle of territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders serves as a ‘painkiller’ to relax vigilance while a political solution to the Kosovo problem is being prepared in the form of recognition of Pristina’s independence. Contrary to many traditional assurances of the inviolability of borders. It is appropriate here to recall UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, which contains specific and clear provisions on the territorial integrity of Serbia: ....Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2; ...A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA. Nine years after the resolution-in 2008-there were events that completely crossed out the principle of territorial integrity. As a result, today we are witnessing the preparation of an interstate treaty on the establishment of two States – Serbia and Kosovo. Moreover, Belgrade almost agree with the separation of its territory, which until recently firmly resisted. Projecting the situation on the Moldovan realities raises a reasonable question to the authorities in Chisinau: how do they have such confidence that over time Moldova will not welcome its ‘Martti Ahtisaari’, who will make the same conclusions as on Kosovo. I note that high-ranking UN officials in the person of Thomas Hammarberg have long been eyeing the situation. “The time has come to resolve Kosovo’s status. Upon careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the realities of Kosovo today and taking into account the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and dignified existence”, the report by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General for the future status process for Kosovo Martti Ahtisaari, 2007. Official Chisinau has less time to offer its clear and realistic model to settle the Transdniestrian conflict. International mediators need tangible progress in the political dialogue between the Dniester banks in the coming years, as geopolitical instability in the Moldovan-Ukrainian region is protracted and aggravated due to hostilities in the Donbas. To accomplish this geopolitical task, external actors are likely to be ready to sacrifice the phrase “territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova”, which in fact has not existed for almost 30 years. Such a scenario will become more realistic if the situation around separation of Kosovo is finally resolved successfully, creating a powerful wave of detente in the Balkans. The new ‘Kosovo model’ can become quite viable and attractive, since there will be no losers – all concerned parties will receive their particular benefit. In this scenario the international community is unlikely to take seriously the inertial approach to the Transdniestrian problem of the current Moldovan authorities, called in Europe ‘capturers of the state”, steeped in the internal political agreed schemes and completely embrangled in attempts to keep a foot in both worlds as long as possible, manipulating Brussels, and Moscow. So this means that quite soon we will become participants in new interesting processes around our regional space.