Brussels won a tactical victory over the Plahotniuc regime in Moldova: the autocratic oligarch is still on top, but the PDM has already entered the path of the Communist Party. 26 mandates of the ACUM bloc is a springboard for EU to begin destroying the power structure of democrats.
Source of ACUM’s pride – Brussels’ blueprint
On the eve and immediately after the elections to the Parliament of Moldova, experts, social activists and anonymous authors in social networks vied to predict, describe and advise the situational ‘sham’ coalition of the Dodon’s Party of Socialists and ACUM bloc of Maia Sandu and Andrei Nastase. The idea is that such a merger would give the opposition a majority in Parliament and the opportunity to conduct a ‘deoligarchisation’ of the country with subsequent re-elections. However, on the eve of February 24, ACUM swore not to enter into an alliance with the “criminal groups” of democrats and socialists, which was slightly out of the rosy forecasts of the soon alliance ‘for the salvation of the country’. And although skeptics doubted the swears of Sandu and Nastase, the latter demonstratively rejected both Plahotniuc’s proposal to create a joint pro-European coalition, and the idea of ‘punishing’ oligarchs in tandem with the socialists.
It seems that the ACUM’s adherence to principles is not related to the natural political integrity or personal pride of Nastase and Sandu. Rumor says that there is a misunderstanding and mutual dislike in the camp of the pro-European bloc, which could well provoke the desire of some pro-Europeans to desert to the Democratic Party. There is a feeling that some outside force dictates the tactics in the post-election period to the pro-Europeans of Moldova, which at the same time serves as a cementing factor in the relations between Nastase and Sandu. This force is the EU itself, as the main investor of ACUM and major beneficiary of the bloc’s success in the elections.
Apparently, Brussels does not even think of blurring the intermediate victory of ACUM even with hypothetical hints at an alliance with pro-Russian socialists or Plahotniuc’s corrupt cartel. 26 mandates of Sandu and Nastase is a symbol of the renaissance of the European course of Moldova, so ACUM easily allow themselves to wear snow-white gloves and go into the strong opposition, where from they can castigate vices of the current government. In this capacity, the parliamentary pro-European opposition is becoming a powerful element for blackmail of the Plahotniuc regime by the European Union that will stand up for its offspring. Moreover, it will be more difficult for the structures of the Democratic Party to discredit the whole parliamentary faction than the past ‘street daydreamers’ PAS and DA.
Voronin’s path
One cannot but notice how restrained the European Union responded to the vote on February 24 and without much criticism recognized the results of the elections, although before many times threatened to extend the moratorium on macro-financial assistance until the vote is fair. The EU’s moderation says only one thing – Brussels is satisfied with the result, which means that initially it did not set ambitious goals such as ‘deoligarchization’ of Moldova and the overthrow of Plahotniuc in 2019. After all, not only the PDM office knows the meaning of the term “real politics”.
Today a large, and, apparently, last reset begins in relations between Europe and Plahotniuc. Having received the ACUM faction in the parliament comparable to other parties, Brussels has a good ‘asset’ for bargaining with Plahotniuc about the conditions for further support, primarily financial. The fact that such a bargaining is underway is also clear from the principled unwillingness of Brussels to appoint new advisers to the Moldovan public authorities since the mandate of the previous 25 EU representatives expired on December 31, and new ones will appear only after the Cabinet of Ministers is approved. Obviously, European structures will have a direct impact on its composition.
Getting the approval of the European Union after the elections, Vlad Plahotniuc won, at the first glance. However, the strategic goal of Brussels has not changed – to reformat the image of power in Moldova, getting rid of too toxic elements, where Plahotniuc still leads. In the coming years, the EU is likely to increase pressure on the Moldovan authorities and extend the list of claims and yellow cards to the ruling regime. Ultimately, the PDM will face the fate of the Communist Party: by the next election, the position of Plahotniuc will be weakened so much that only legends will tell about the former unity of the democrats. Like any ‘party of one leader’, the PDM will experience a mass outflow of common members and widespread betrayal of former Plahotniuc’s associates, who will choose a political future to the loyalty. As you can imagine, the ACUM bloc is to absorb those who ‘saw the light’.
It is also noteworthy that the refusal of the Moldovan right-wing to a coalition with the PDM and the PSRM does not at all accidentally push the socialists and democrats towards each other. A possible “pro-Moldovan” union of the latter automatically adds a bold minus to handshakeable status of the democrats in Europe, and most importantly adds the betrayal of the European vector of Moldova to the list of EU claims against Plahotniuc. Ultimately, the current reset of the EU-Plahotniuc relationship clearly looks the last as the system of power of the main oligarch of Moldova has accumulated too many ‘fatal errors’. So much that Europe, without doubting the inevitability of the final, allows itself to calmly observe its slow political death. 
