Opinion: Shape of Future Government of Moldova Depends on the Situation in Ukraine

The formation of power in Moldova is hampered by the events in Ukraine. The outcome of the presidential race can seriously affect the position of the West on the situation in Eastern Europe. Political morass of Moldova Moldova has not been able to form a government for a month and a half, and in recent days negotiations between the political forces resemble thinly disguised farce. None of the parties is ready to take responsibility for formation of the parliamentary majority and the government, and in general for the further development of the country. The current ‘fuss’ – a protracted positional bargaining, where not so much the result is important as the process. The distribution of power and the ability to determine country’s policy do not seem to be of much interest to competitors and have given way to the struggle for the media ratings and attempts to confuse the voter, to look good for the external public and to denigrate competitors. However, what is happening seems to be a dead end only at first glance. Real and quite feasible coalition scenarios exist, but all the parties that have passed to the Parliament of Moldova are reluctant to enact them. On the contrary, the leaders of the Democratic Party, PSRM and ACUM seem to be deliberately marking time: instead of effective negotiations on specific parameters of the future coalition government, there is an endless ping-pong of unenforceable conditions, raising stakes and mutual accusations in the media. Half of statements of already elected deputies is outright verbal spam, which is truly boring to keep track of. The reasons for the political dragging of the feet on this is absence of a clear position of external players on the ‘correct’ configuration of power in Chisinau. We are talking primarily about the US and the European Union. Although, such an important opinion for the Moldovan authorities that determines the political support and financial resources of the EU is not in fact ‘withheld’ from Chisinau, the fact is that the West cares not about Moldova now. Ukraine’s above all To date, Ukraine remains the main field of geopolitical, information, military confrontation. The second round of the presidential elections and the inevitable election scandals attracted all the attention of Washington and Brussels. Despite the significant dominance of Volodymyr Zelensky, Petro Poroshenko’s administrative resource can still influence the outcome of the vote. All the more difficult it is to predict the hypothetical voter turnout after only two candidates left: the high turnout of the first round is largely due to the huge number of people on the ballot, and therefore the opportunity to vote for a voter with the most sophisticated political taste. This waiting for an outcome in Kyiv seems to hinder formation of a ruling coalition in Chisinau. Active partnership between Moldova and Ukraine clearly meets the interests of both Europe and the United States. The Western capitals especially appreciate the Moldovan-Ukrainian unity in the struggle against Russian influence in Eastern Ukraine and Transdniestria. The US and the EU are interested in maintaining this cooperation as a barrier to Russian expansion on the south-eastern borders of the European Union: and, as you know, such cooperation is hardly possible in post-Soviet countries without adequate personal relations at the level of political leaders. In this sense, Petro Poroshenko’s victory in the second round of the presidential elections in Ukraine will immediately make the coalition of the Dodon’s Party of Socialists and Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party a deadlock for Ukrainian-Moldovan relations. Igor Dodon, who avoids publicly recognizing Crimea as Ukrainian and Russia as an aggressor, is hardly welcome for Petro Poroshenko. In 2017-2018, the presidents of Ukraine and Moldova did not hold any meetings, although contacts at the government level were regular. At the same time, the coming to power in Ukraine of Volodymyr Zelensky may have a negative impact on the prospects of any coalition in Parliament involving Vlad Plahotniuc. Zelensky’s election campaign has a strong popular anti-oligarchic message. Although Zelensky is unlikely to avoid oligarchic influence in domestic politics, he will have to carefully choose foreign partners in his external contacts. Cooperation with Plahotniuc can quickly undermine the reputation of a fighter for the interests of people. Largely because of waiting for the outcome in Kyiv, neither Washington nor Brussels hurries Moldovan politicians and forces the creation of a coalition, because their own attitude in this matter is absolutely pragmatic and will depend on the future power structure in Ukraine. It looks pretty fun, because many have called the parliamentary election of February 24 life-changing. In fact, the Moldovan fate depends not so much on the votes of specific voters, but on who will be elected in the neighboring country. Moldova has desperately tried to escape from geopolitics, but cannot – however, there is nothing strange. Long-term financing of Moldova from the EU and gradual entry of the country into the NATO orbit initially pursued geopolitical goals. In 2019, Chisinau’s foreign partners are also interested to safeguard their investments in Moldova: this will largely depend on the immediate environment of the country and the situation in neighboring Ukraine.