Moldova Upsets EU’s Plans on Transdniestria

Chisinau is sabotaging plans to solve the Transdniestrian conflict on the European model. The OSCE ‘bothers’ Chisinau on the Transdniestrian settlement On April 16, the OSCE Chairman-in-office, Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák made a statement on the Transdniestrian conflict. There were no formal reasons for this: so far, nothing is happening on the Dniester, and the Head of the OSCE had no apparent reason to devote a separate statement to the situation in the region. Moreover, on March 7, Lajčák reported ritually on his January trip to Moldova and on the situation in the settlement at a meeting of the UN Security Council in New York. This separate statement by the OSCE CiO clearly indicates that the situation in the negotiations on Transdniestria is not developing according to plan. It is easy to notice that the Lajčák’s statement has obvious, though well-hidden, discontent with another impasse in the dialogue between Chisinau and the Left Bank. “Thanks to their commitment, leadership and political will, both Sides last year have implemented five agreements bringing concrete benefits for the people such as neutral license plates or Latin script schools.  This gave new impetus to the Transdniestrian settlement process.  To keep this momentum, Chisinau and Tiraspol have now to intensify their dialogue, work towards the finalization of the “Berlin-plus package” and identify new areas of joint work,” the statement reads. In the same statement, Lajčák expressed hope for “the swift formation of a stable Government in Chisinau, ready to further engage constructively on the Transdniestrian settlement process on all its levels”. On the one hand, the OSCE and the European Union have long called on Chisinau and Tiraspol to close the Berlin package of agreements of 2016. Experts believe that the solution of the issues specified therein will allow Brussels to declare a breakthrough in the negotiations, building ‘confidence’, and move on to discussion of political issues. It is noteworthy that this position of the European Union coincides with the opinion of Moscow, which through officials from the Foreign Ministry regularly complains about another recession in the Transdniestrian settlement process. At the same time, Russia has recently avoided past strong statements that it’s premature to discuss political issues. Earlier the RTA already shared assumptions that Brussels and Moscow apply hidden from the public common approaches to the format of the future neighboring of Moldova and Transdniestria, which is directly related to the upcoming decision on Kosovo. Some exchange is planned in Serbia and on the Dniester, and the parties to the transaction will try to achieve specific goals: Romania will strengthen its presence in Moldova, NATO will finally formalize its presence between the Prut and the Dniester, and Russia will be able to transform the long-term status quo around Transdniestria to its advantage. The OSCE statement is a signal to Plahotniuc In 2017, the unspoken leader of Moldova Vlad Plahotniuc in an attempt to enlist the support of the EU and the United States demonstrated to international partners that he was able to move forward the Transdniestrian settlement. Chisinau took a step towards Tiraspol, and it instantly gave the result. Decades-unsolvable problems of license plates and higher education certificates of Transdniestria, a closed bridge near the village of Gura-Bicului and functioning of the Romanian schools in the eastern parts of the country were cleared up just over six months. Many foreign politicians and diplomats appreciated the oligarch’s grand gesture, but this did not bring more international legitimacy to Plahotniuc. Moreover, the puppeteer and the methods of his struggle with the right opposition supported by Brussels began to openly irritate European officials. Through the efforts of experienced Italian diplomat Franco Frattini, who personally met with Plahotniuc, 2018 was positive for negotiations on Transdniestria. But after the start of the election campaign in the country and the ‘black spot’ from both Brussels and Moscow, Plahotniuc pulled the emergency brake in the negotiation process. For six months, there has been a complete lull on the Transdniestrian track, and implementation of all projects under the package agreements has been frozen since the end of last year. The expectations of Europeans and ambitious Miroslav Lajčák of the rapid formation of the Moldovan Government after the elections have not been met. The oligarch, who has prepared a solid backup in advance, is in no hurry, since foreign leaders no longer want to see him as a partner. In fact, Moldova still has a fully functional and oligarch-controlled government, but it has taken a break in key areas of work, including the Transdniestrian settlement. The Deputy PM for Reintegration, Cristina Lesnic, who has not been elected to Parliament, as well as other officials, does not hold meetings with representatives of Tiraspol in the same format and does not give interviews to the media. At the same time, the obvious nervousness around the border village of Varnita, which is demonstrated by Moldovan officials responsible for the dialogue with the Left Bank, clearly signals the growing concerns of Chisinau about the future format of the Transdniestrian settlement. Chisinau is blatantly ignoring the calls by Miroslav Lajčák to solve the remaining issues from the Berlin+ package, making it clear that this state of affairs can last long. At the same time, the prospect of early elections is not at all frightening for the Democrats. Both they and the deputies from affiliated Sor Party are actually already started the new campaign, actively engaging in social programs. For example, deputies from the Sor Party are implementing a project for the reconstruction of street lighting in the constituencies where the Sor members won. If it still comes to early elections, the suspended situation in Moldova will continue throughout the year. This state of affairs absolutely does not suit either the European Union or Russia, which have formed a common position on the future of the region. Moreover, the presence of such a wayward and out of control mentee as Moldova seriously affects the image of the EU in contrast to predictable Tiraspol. The plan, according to which Chisinau and Tiraspol with the support of the EU and Moscow could settle the most pressing issues in the next year or two and finally delineate the spheres of responsibility and administrative control, is stalled because of Moldova’s position. Lajčak’s statement is a clear and unambiguous message addressed both to the Moldovan authorities and specifically to Vlad Plahotniuc. Europeans warn Chisinau against deliberate sabotage of work on the Transdniestrian track. So far, Plahotniuc has enough resources, and, most importantly, time, which the EU does not have. In the struggle for power, the leader of the Democrats can seriously upset the plans for the emerging consensus on the solution of the long-lasting Transdniestrian issue.