Will Transnistria Demand from Moldova ‘Penance’ and Compensation?

Pristina and Tiraspol recalled the military conflicts on their territories in the 1990s On May16, members of the Kosovo Parliament unanimously voted for a resolution condemning the “genocide” that Pristina believes the Serbian authorities committed on their land in 1998 and 1999. Kosovo legislators demanded in the resolution that Belgrade pay reparations for the damage caused during the hostilities. At the same time, the parliamentarians proposed to declare January 15 a “Day of Genocide in Kosovo”. The speaker of the Kosovo legislature, Kadri Veseli, who initiated the resolution, stressed that the Albanian community “risks losing evidence of the suffering of the late 90s”, so it is urgent to form a commission that would collect evidence of “crimes of the Serbian state”. “The main mission of the state commission is to collect data on what Serbia has done in Kosovo. It is essential that it is held responsible for these crimes before our and the international court of truth. The commission has unlimited powers. Soon a law will be drafted and adopted that will regulate its work. The ultimate goal is the arrest and punishment of criminals on the basis of its report,” the speaker said. The speaker particularly stressed that the punishment of criminals implies establishment of an international tribunal. At the same time, he noted that in the very near future the Kosovo authorities will start establishing the genocide museum and memorial center. Pristina’s bringing up the topic of reparations and war crimes in public coincided with the actual suspension of the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. As you know, this conflict has recently had the contours of a possible final settlement, which is actively promoted by international actors. However, the closer the outcome is the more intensified disputes get inside the Serbian elites and the Kosovan politicians. The starting point of the proposed comprehensive agreement model is the exchange of disputed territories between Belgrade and Pristina, which should allow for a concluding chord of settlement – mutual recognition. As the Berlin summit showed, the parties took absolutely extreme positions on the issue of territorial exchange, thereby postponing the prospect of signing the final bilateral agreement. In this context, Belgrade more often portrays a victim, hinting at pressure from all sides, and its unreadiness to recognize Kosovo without receiving anything in return from Pristina. The reaction of the Kosovars was not long in coming, and in anticipation of the fateful decisions they decided to put additional pressure on Serbia. Pristina, for its part, loudly declares that it was the victim of the conflict, so to demand from Kosovo any territorial concessions “is real sacrilege”. Such a storyline in the Serbian-Kosovo relations on some grounds may have quite similar development in the case of the Transdniestrian settlement. Moreover, there are much more established elements related to the memorialization of the events of the early 1990s on the banks of the Dniester river. Thus, in contrast to Pristina, back in 1993 Tiraspol organized “Public Tribunal on the Moldovan aggression against Transdniestria” in Moscow. Then unrecognized ‘TMR’ called on the international community to recognize the genocide of the Transdniestrian people. If the Kosovars are now considering an exhibition dedicated to the genocide, Bendery has long had a similar museum of the 1992 tragedy. In recent years, Transdniestria more and more often remembers the military clash with Moldova, ‘pushing’ its interpretation of the causes and content of the conflict in the socio-political discourse. The proof that the current Transdniestrian authorities will not leave the issue of the events of 1992 so easily is the decision on a new commemorative day on March 2 – “Day of the beginning of repulsing of the large-scale aggression by the Republic of Moldova against the Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic”. This spring, as part of the distance debate with Moldovan politicians about the prospects of the Transdniestrian settlement, the leader of Transdniestria Vadim Krasnoselsky addressed Igor Dodon. He ‘asked’ the President of Moldova whether Chisinau was ready to give a legal, political and historical assessment to the events of 1992 and to punish those who “killed civilians in Transdniestria”. It is interesting that, as in the case of Serbia and Kosovo, the discussion initiated by Tiraspol on the topic of responsibility for the ‘conflict past’ coincided with the slowdown in the Moldovan-Transdniestrian negotiation process, which recently seemed to have gained a good progress. While the dialogue is not conducted, the parties are trying in some way to wound each other after receiving more arguments before the resumption of negotiations. Most likely, the success of Tiraspol’s actions to place the blame for the conflict of the early 1990s on Chisinau will largely depend on whether it will be able to attract major international players, primarily Russia, to its side in this issue.