Opinion: Negotiations with Tiraspol Is a Minefield for the New Government of Moldova

The new leadership of the Republic of Moldova seeks to calm the situation around Transdniestria, which flared up during the internal political crisis in the country. Sergey Isaenko, RTA: The issue of Transdniestria has played a role in the Moldovan ‘anti-oligarchic coup’, although the region was not directly involved in the confrontation between the Democratic Party and Party of Socialists and the ACUM bloc. First of all, the ‘Transdniestrian factor’ is associated with the vigorous promotion of the topic of federalization, which in the shortest possible time has become almost the main scarecrow for the local population and international partners. Both camps turned this issue into an analogue of the ‘hot potato’, which they tried to throw to their opponents with the ‘treason’ label. The topic of the hypothetical change in the territorial structure of the country – and hence the Constitution – has got so heated that even now, after the flight of Plahotniuc and the transition of the PDM to the opposition, Dodon and Sandu have to regularly justify themselves and make categorical statements that no federalization will happen during their governing. Along with this, Tiraspol has got a good share of accusations from the opposition leaders of the tacit support of the Vlad Plahotniuc regime. The Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova Andrei Nastase even admits that the overthrown oligarch fled from Moldova through the territory of the unrecognized region, although with a reservation that it must be clarified with the Ukrainian border guards. In this environment many experts rightly predicted a sharp deterioration in relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol. It was believed that having superseded the Democrats, the Moldovan authorities somehow want to get back at Transdniestria and give the region a scathing rebuke. This logic consorted with the appointment of Vasile Sova as Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration, who has not only a reputation as a competent and tough negotiator, but also many years of experience with the Tiraspol leadership. However, after the political battles Igor Dodon, who will oversee the Transdniestrian issue, has softened his language. In an interview with Europa Liberă, the leader of Moldova called the status of the region a ‘delicate issue’, and said “we should not rush into” its resolution. Talking to the Russian media, Dodon didn’t announce any strong moves, despite the banal accusations of Tiraspol of playing in hands of Plahotniuc. Rather, on the contrary, among the main tasks that are now put before Sova in dialogue with Tiraspol, Dodon called the avoidance of “destabilization and provocations”, as well as implementation of agreements in the 5+2 format. This means a whole set of decisions that have been signed by the negotiators of the parties over the past year and a half, since the autumn of 2017. It is important to understand that the statement of Igor Dodon had a clear target and cannot be considered in this case a banal excuse for the Transdniestrian problem like “we must conduct a dialogue”. The President, who received the Transdniestrian track in the new configuration of power, deliberately cools the rhetoric around Transdniestria. In fact, Igor Dodon marked his intention to return the dialogue with the authorities of the unrecognized republic in the clear framework of recent years, when economic and humanitarian issues such as telephone communication and car number plates were gradually resolved. It is interesting that Tiraspol’s passivity during the political crisis in Moldova eventually came in handy. The leadership of the unrecognized republic emphatically kept silent on the events on the other bank of the Dniester, and thus, apparently, facilitated Igor Dodon’s mission. The position of the Moldovan President is a vivid reflection of the moment. It is obvious that the negotiation process with unrecognized Transdniestria is a minefield for the whole new government of Moldova. Negotiations with Tiraspol have evolved over the years according to their specific logic and react extremely painfully to political interference. Chisinau understands that the rejection of past approaches, i.e. the agenda of social and humanitarian issues “without politics”, can bury all the ambitions of the new government to achieve success in addressing the Transdniestrian problem. In past years, Igor Dodon, who today is in charge of the Transdniestrian direction, failed to establish relations with Tiraspol, and now he has every chance to take revenge. In addition, the Moldovan leader cannot show results worse than the achievements of Plahotniuc’s negotiators. Chisinau, as can be seen, acts logically: nothing better has been proposed in terms of approach to the settlement of the Transdniestrian issue. “Solving problems for the benefit of people” is a perfect formula that gives both sides of the conflict room for maneuver. Besides, now it is important for the new government to keep the situation around the Transdniestrian settlement calm against the background of the events in neighboring Ukraine, where fundamental changes in the political climate around Donbas are possible in the near future. It is crucial for Chisinau that international and political transformation on the issue of the conflict in the East of Ukraine does not intervene in the Transdniestrian context. It’s hard not to notice that a relaunch (reset is yet impossible) is long overdue in the dialogue between Moscow and Kyiv. Donbas is the most sensitive and explosive problem of modern Europe, which is not even really ‘frozen’, in contrast to Transdniestria. The situation in Eastern Ukraine needs to change, and all geopolitical players are well aware of this. Zelensky’s presidency, which happened with the clear support of the European Union, can be considered the first ‘ball’ of the West to Russia. It is now important for Moscow to respond in the right way, and the stronger the bullying in the Russian media over the figure of the ‘comic president’, the closer the new round in relations between Ukraine and Russia. It is obvious that the ‘adjustment’ of Kyiv and Moscow will be extremely painful in conditions of mutual distrust and a constant raising of stakes, which is confirmed by a new data from the investigation of the Boeing shot down in the conflict zone. That is why it is important for Moldova that the contexts of Donbas and Transdniestria do not overlap to the extent possible. In 2014, the conflict between Moscow and Kyiv spoiled the players’ game in the Transdniestrian issue. Anti-Russian sanctions of the Ukrainian government automatically covered unrecognized Transdniestria which is reasonably considered a ‘mentee’ of Moscow. Now when Chisinau has a chance to return to a consistent settlement of the Transdniestrian problem, the Moldovan leadership needs the least influence of the unpredictable Ukrainian factor. Probably not only it – after all, the ‘deoligarchization’ of Moldova and the new Sandu-Dodon authorities in the country is considered the fruit of consensus of Moscow, Washington and Brussels. So, a crisis situation around Transdniestria is exactly what can really threaten both the external consensus and the unity of power within the Republic of Moldova itself.