Test No. 1. Kyiv Expects a Clear Position on Crimea from Maia Sandu

On July 7, Prime Minister of Moldova Maia Sandu announced her visit to Kyiv, thanking the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky for the invitation and readiness to meet in the near future. The Moldovan Prime Minister also noted that Moldova and Ukraine have similar political experience, especially in the fight against corruption, as well as the construction of democratic and functional states focused on solving the problems of citizens. It is significant that the head of the Moldovan government is invited specifically by Volodymyr Zelensky, who is definitely in a similar situation with Ms. Sandu. They both overthrew the main oligarchs in their countries and are gradually gaining the necessary control over the government system in real time. In this sense, the forthcoming visit of Sandu to Ukraine in the public spotlight will also have a pronounced ‘anti-oligarchic’ accent, which the participants of the meeting will certainly make for journalists. Zelensky’s team most likely understands that in the current power system in Moldova they need to build a dialogue with Maia Sandu, with whom there is a chance to form a common vision of bilateral relations. It is more likely that the visit of the Moldovan delegation will be a show tour of the Prime Minister of winning justice. Maia Sandu, shaking hands with Zelensky, will symbolize the message to the Ukrainian people not to be afraid and continue fighting against the criminal regime that has occupied Ukraine. And, of course, personally Zelensky and his party “Servant of the People” will benefit from it. It is interesting that Igor Dodon is not invited to Kyiv because any contact with the Moldovan President is potentially dangerous for the image of any Ukrainian politician. Volodymyr Zelensky has already faced problems due to the ambiguous attitude to the Moldovan President, and after a telephone conversation with Dodon had to justify himself to the Ukrainian patriots for communicating with the leading pro-Russian politician in Moldova. From the information in the media, it is difficult to understand whether Maia Sandu has other official meetings scheduled in Kyiv, first of all with her counterpart Volodymyr Groysman. In the current circumstances, it is difficult to imagine a dialogue with the Groysman cabinet, which was closely linked and very friendly with the government of the Plahotniuc’s Democratic Party. Personal relations between the leaders at the level of Groysman-Filip and Poroshenko-Plahotniuc enabled an unprecedented rapprochement between Moldova and Ukraine in almost all areas, from the fight against the Russian threat to the joint control of the common border in the last five years. No matter what, even one meeting with Zelensky will be enough to understand the course of new relations between Kyiv and Chisinau. During the visit, the new Ukrainian President is likely to speak out on the Transdniestrian settlement, which Volodymyr Zelensky has not talked about before. Zelensky’s attitude will mostly define the position of Ukraine in the negotiations between Tiraspol and Chisinau, as well as the fate of the special representative on the Transdniestrian issue Viktor Kryzhanovsky, an experienced diplomat close to Petro Poroshenko. In recent years, he was one of the key figures determining Kiev’s approaches to the Transdniestrian issue. It should also be noted that Viktor Kryzhanovsky was the only foreign representative who paid a visit to Moldova in the midst of ‘dual power’ and actually supported the government of the Democratic Party, which a few days later fell to the US, EU and Russia. Meanwhile, the main test for Maia Sandu – and apparently the entire ruling coalition in Moldova – in Kyiv will be communication on the most painful and fundamentally important topics for modern Ukraine. Sandu is likely to be expected to have a clear political position on many issues which impact on the prospects for Moldovan-Ukrainian relations. In this sense, the Moldovan Prime Minister will probably have to speak specifically and unambiguously for the first time on the status of Crimea, as well as on the readiness to continue supporting Ukraine in the fight against Russia’s aggressive policy towards the former post-Soviet countries in Europe. The results of the Moldovan government’s next contacts will clarify how much the ‘anti-oligarchic spring’ in Kyiv and Chisinau influenced Moscow’s position in the region. A success indicator for the Kremlin could be Zelensky’s compromise position on Donbas and the softening of anti-Russian rhetoric on the part of the official Chisinau. The further support of Moscow for the good initiatives of the victorious fighters against the oligarchs will largely depend on how restrained the new authorities of Moldova can be with regard to the fundamental geopolitical problems of recent years.