Transdniestrian Settlement – Election Trump Card of Igor Dodon?

RTA regular expert Dorin Mocanu is sure that ‘Transdniestrian dossier’ can become the main election asset of the President of Moldova On July 12, the international participants in the Transdniestrian settlement process, united in an ad hoc coalition in the 3+2 format, visited Chisinau and Tiraspol on a working visit. The diplomatic mission planned to assess the prospects of the negotiation process on the issue of unrecognized Transdniestria for the next six months. In Chisinau, the delegation met with President Igor Dodon, Prime Minister Maia Sandu and Deputy Prime Minister for Reintegration Vasile Sova, and in Tiraspol – with Vadim Krasnoselsky and Transdniestrian negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev. Negotiations on Transdniestria this year are actually going through, though not the worst ever, but not the best period. The international multilateral 5+2 format met in May last year, the negotiators of the parties have not seen each other since October 2018, and the expert work at the level of technical specialists is almost at zero. The mediators and observers are always wary of such deadlocks, as the lack of dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol has repeatedly led to scandals and aggravation of the situation on the Dniester. After the trip, it was reported that the negotiators from Chisinau and Tiraspol Sova and Ignatiev will hold the first meeting in the near future, and the next official meeting in the 5+2 format may be held in October in Bratislava. Tiraspol is likely to go to negotiations with the same position and will demand specific solutions, as they say in Transdniestria, “for the benefit of the people”. Meanwhile, it was important for the international participants and the majority of experts involved to understand what approaches the new government of Moldova has adopted towards Transdniestria. In this sense, the position of the cabinet of Maia Sandu was quite far-seeing and pragmatic: the Moldovan Prime Minister appealed to the mediators to persuade Tiraspol to remove restrictions on entry to Transdniestria for Moldovan officials and grant access to the left bank of the Dniester, as well as to add to the 5+2 format issues of combating corruption and smuggling. Much more interesting is the position of Igor Dodon, who clearly decided to take the Transdniestrian dossier under his personal supervision through the chief Moldovan negotiator and his former adviser Vasile Sova. According to the presidential administration, the main directions of the negotiation process this year should be: — democratization of Transdniestria, ensuring the free movement of people, goods and services throughout the territory of the Republic of Moldova, ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, humanitarian issues, including guaranteeing the right to education; — solving trade and economic problems in terms of creating a common economic space; — promoting confidence-building measures in the field of law enforcement and defence; — creating environment for the resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive and sustainable settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict in 2020. It is interesting that the Moldovan authorities, including Igor Dodon himself, regularly shrug off any political agenda in the context of the Transdniestrian settlement that, allegedly, should be postponed until better times. However, the President of Moldova apparently does not lose hope to unpack the ‘political basket’ of negotiations and take on its contents. At the same time, in 2019, Igor Dodon, most likely, pursues quite specific goals that are related not only and not so much to the settlement of the Transdniestrian issue. After 2016, Transdniestria became one of the priorities of Igor Dodon, who then did not yet have real powers and had to look for sources of strengthening his authority in Moscow and on the left bank of the Dniester. A noticeable zeal in 2019 to find a formula for the final settlement of relations with Tiraspol can now be explained by election plans and Igor Dodon’s desire to achieve the second presidential cadence in 2020. In terms of the filling of the election campaign, unprecedented progress in the Transdniestrian issue is becoming a key motive that can once again encourage voters to vote for the incumbent President. Given the markedly limited resource base of both Dodon’s main partner, Moscow, and himself, the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict and the unification of the country becomes a ‘golden share’ that will allow Russia to maintain its position in Moldova. Thus, it can be assumed that in 2020, with the assistance and influence of the Kremlin, the parties will begin to discuss parameters of further coexistence with the conclusion of a specific draft document which Igor Dodon will take to the next presidential election. The appropriate response from international partners and their willingness to finance the reintegration process will only strengthen the position of the incumbent President, who will gladly devote the next 4 years to the unification of the country. However, in order to implement this idea, in the near future Igor Dodon needs not to lose the initiative in the process of reintegration, which will obviously be immediately picked up by partners from ACUM. At least, Prime Minister Sandu has already clearly hinted that she is quite competent in the Transdniestrian issue and can always become not the last player in this matter.