Expert: Russia’s Testing the Ruling Coalition in Moldova

In a comment for RTA, the regular author Sergey Cheban explained that it is important for the Kremlin to understand the true intentions of Brussels and Washington in Moldova In Chisinau, another political (and a bit diplomatic) scandal erupts. After the invitation from the Moldovan Defense Minister Voicu to the country, Sergei Shoigu, the head of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation and, undoubtedly, one of the key figures in Putin’s Russia, is getting ready for a trip. The Russian Minister, together with a delegation of the Russian Defense Ministry, is most likely to visit not only Chisinau, but also Cobasna – a huge ammunition depot that Moscow has not removed from unrecognized Transdniestria. The idea entirely belongs to the socialists of Igor Dodon – the Russian direction is considered his tacit territory, where the leader of the PSRM has achieved the most significant success, literally making friends with Vladimir Putin himself. The day before it turned out that the official visit of the Russian delegation headed by the Minister of Defense has been agreed neither with the MFAEI nor with coalition partners in the person of Prime Minister Maia Sandu. Sandu took note of this unfortunate circumstance just three days before the arrival of Shoigu. According to the Prime Minister, such an uncoordinated visit can be considered only informal, and recommended the MFAEI to call the Ambassador from Moscow to discuss the problem. On the same day, Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu held a meeting with Russian Ambassador Oleg Vasnetsov, where he literally pointed out to the Russian side the unchanged position of Moldova on the early withdrawal of troops from the Left Bank. It is naive to think that the Moldovan government did not know about Sergei Shoigu’s visit: both Maia Sandu, and Nicu Popescu certainly was aware of the content of the Moscow talks of Moldovan Minister of Defense Pavel Voicu, where he invited Shoigu to Moldova. Apparently, we are dealing with an attempt of the ACUM bloc to ostentatiously take the wind out of the sails of the PSRM and Igor Dodon himself: in September, Maia Sandu is going to visit Moscow, and it is absolutely important for her not to take a backseat behind Dodon. Another thing is that the ‘presidential’ camp of the coalition, apparently, was shortsighted to neglect the official procedures for arranging visits and to a certain extent set itself up. However, we cannot exclude that the buttons are pushed by President deliberately and not without the approval in Moscow. It is no coincidence that on the same day when Sandu was outraged by the visit of the delegation of the Russian Defense Ministry, the President of Moldova was invited to Moscow to celebrate the 75th anniversary of Victory Day. Russian Ambassador Vasnetsov handed him an invitation from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Moscow has pointedly expressed its approval of Dodon’s actions, while not commenting on the attacks by the pro-European bloc. Experts point out that this week can be a serious test of strength for the Dodon-Sandu coalition. We can assume that this is part of the ‘medical’ experiment – Moscow is checking how the current ruling alliance is actually ready to abandon geopolitical rhetoric. It is crucial for the Kremlin to know the true intentions of the pro-European bloc: whether Maia Sandu is ready to continue to be in power in conjunction with Dodon, or their union was originally conceived as a tactical, with a pre-limited period of validity. For the Kremlin, the answer to this question will be directly linked to the further development of events around the arrival of Shoigu. In general, no one is interested in this militant rhetoric: it is important for Moscow to follow how the current undertaking with the ‘uncoordinated’ trip of the Defense Minister will affect the actions of the government of Sandu. Most likely, Chisinau will not dare to limit and even more to block the visit, however, there may be certain consequences during the Sandu visit in Moscow – of course, if it ever takes place. It is important that the Russian leadership, obviously, do not have illusions about the independence of the ACUM bloc. The reaction of the Sandu government is not least a demonstration of the position of the EU and the US, which in June concluded an informal agreement with Moscow on some joint positions on Moldova. First of all, to abandon the tough geopolitical rhetoric. If Shoigu’s visit does not provoke a ‘reflex response’ in Brussels and Washington and does not result in other statements about the ‘Russian threat’, the informal trilateral contract is still in force, and the approaches to Moldova can be considered ‘approved’ at least in the near future. And already on this basis, Moscow can negotiate with partners on more important and problematic issues: including, on overdue settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict and disposal of outdated arms and ammunition from the Left Bank.