Fleeing the ‘Red Menace’: the West Can Destroy the Ruling Coalition in Moldova

Dorin Mocanu The fate of the ruling coalition in Moldova hangs in the balance Soon the alliance of the ACUM bloc and the Party of Socialists will overcome the 100-day mark. The love of the public for beautiful dates pushes to sum up the interim results of the activities of the new government, to analyze its mistakes and achievements. This is also a good reason to make a prediction about the future of pro-European and pro-Russian forces within a common political shell. Recent three months have highlighted the main tasks of the alliance after the Democratic Party retreated to the opposition: redistribution of political resources, state institutions and financial schemes. Coalition partners were clearly dizzy with success, which led to chaotic steps in both domestic and foreign policy. At the same time, attempts to establish etiquette lines apparently failed. When they need to bite off the largest possible piece of the ‘Moldovan pie’, members of the coalition have less desire to play by the rules. By September, despite the fundamental rejection of geopolitics, the split in the ACUM-PSRM camp on some pressing problems became obvious. Moldovan politicians and officials view them through the prism of foreign policy objectives more often. The anti-oligarchic alliance switches fast to the simulation, and the level of mutual trust is rapidly declining. The situation becomes common when in the morning Foreign Minister Nicu Popescu speaks in Kyiv about Moldova’s strong desire to continue the path to the European Union and NATO, and in the afternoon President Igor Dodon at a meeting with the leadership of the North Atlantic Alliance in Brussels insists on maintaining the neutral status of the republic. Such regular discord in the camp of the coalition is an indicator of the extremely difficult relationship between the forced allies. It is unlikely that Moldovan politicians are able to overcome the accumulated contradictions on their own. Of course, external players may again hold a session of ‘geopolitical sterilization’ of the alliance. Until then, however, the dividing lines between the key political players in Moldova are steadily turning into barricades and trenches – and the active phase of local elections, let alone presidential ones, has not even begun yet. Therefore, the main question after the first one hundred days is how long the ‘deoligarchization colossus’ will stand and when will be the next half-life period. So far, the list of goals not achieved keeps the existing tactical alliance afloat. For Igor Dodon, this is re-election for a second term, for Maya Sandu – the longest stay in office, so as not to go into oblivion, like the government of Strelet or Gaburici. The ultimate dream of Andrei Nastase is position of mayor of Chisinau, from which he hopes to ‘jump’ into the highest echelon of Moldovan politics and stand there on a par with Dodon and Sandu. The failure of any of these goals will trigger another domestic political crisis. In this sense, the fight for the Chisinau Olympus will be the first serious test, since it was not possible to agree on the delimitation of interests at this strategic height. If the socialists win, Chisinau will become another important source of ‘repainting’ the country. And the unrealized ambition of Nastase and his political marginalization against the background of strengthening pro-Russian socialists, most likely, will get a corresponding response and serious adjustments in the ACUM position. There is no doubt that the pro-Western part of the coalition will be guided by the signal of external partners who are closely watching the gradual strengthening of the PSRM in power. This process can not last long, because at some stage the position of the socialists will threaten not only their pro-European counterparts, but also the interests of the US and the EU. Washington and Brussels already have experience in ‘resetting’ Moldova and saving it from the ‘red menace’. Such scenario enables the most unpredictable coalition combinations which includes involvement of oppositional forces. In these circumstances, do not write off the PDM factor, which being persecuted remains quite popular political unit. For example, Western politicians and diplomats accredited in Moldova willingly maintain contacts with the party. The hope was vain that after summer events Democrats will go deep in the underground. The partial rebranding of the party and the renunciation of Plahotniuc breathed new life into the Democrats, who are on the starting blocks and are ready at any moment to participate in the destruction of the ‘anti-Moldovan coalition named after Kozak’, as it is called by experts from the PDM environment. Most likely, the fate of the notorious agreement between the ACUM and the PSRM will be the basis for judging the further development of the situation. If it cannot be signed before the local elections, there is every reason to believe that the coalition has finally turned into a fiction. Then the world powers will take up the matter again and this time the outcome for Moldova can be much less prosperous.