What the Pause in the Negotiations on Transdniestria Means

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Dorin Mocanu The RTA expert points out that for the first time in many years, not obedient performers from the ruling power, but people of the old school with their own ambitions went to the talks from Moldova. Moreover, this was compounded by divisions within the current ruling coalition. Last week, after a pause of almost two years, Bratislava hosted a new round of talks on the Transdniestrian settlement in the so-called 5+2 format, with the participation of Chisinau and Tiraspol, as well as the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the EU and the United States. This regular meeting was preceded by active information campaign in the Moldovan media. The heightened interest in the round of negotiations showed that people from the coalition treat the Transdniestrian issue very differently. The leak to the media of the draft international Declaration on Transdniestria, prepared by the Moldovan negotiator Vasile Sova, further aggravated the situation. The scandalous document launched a series of speculations about the imminent federalization of the country, for which the democrats who went into opposition fiercely criticized the government. Also the ACUM bloc and personally the Prime Minister, Maia Sandu, were outraged. The incident with a ‘shadow’ Declaration of Sova clearly showed that there is no single approach to the left bank in the coalition of socialists and pro-Europeans. Later, this was directly confirmed by Sandu herself, when she added that there is no external or internal environment for resolving the conflict now. However, Igor Dodon, who persistently forces the settlement process through his former adviser and current Deputy Prime Minister for reintegration, obviously does not agree with this. Taking into account that administratively Sova is subordinated to the Prime Minister, it turns out that the Moldovan negotiator left to Slovakia with a very specific mandate to negotiate, literally in the status of servant of two masters. We know the outcome: after a day and a half of discussions in the Slovak capital, the parties did not agree on the final protocol of the meeting, breaking the tradition of the previous three years. At first glance, a large number of problems that have accumulated since the last meeting in Rome, as well as political changes in Chisinau, is the reason. It seems that the parties simply did not have enough time to discuss all the issues and determine the mechanisms to address them. Such a legend was told by the Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova Claus Neukirch at the end of the round. However, it was the first time he held the final press conference himself, not allowing the negotiators to give their own assessment of the meeting. Already now there is an opinion that Chisinau and Tiraspol had opposing assessments of the results of the round, and the OSCE simply decided not to wash their dirty linen in public. Public comments by Vasile Sova and Transdniestrian negotiator Vitaly Ignatiev, apparently, would have turned the whole conflict of the negotiations inside out. For the first time since the resumption in Berlin in 2016, the Transdniestrian settlement process faced insurmountable contradictions. As you know, then in the German capital, the participants of the negotiations in the 5+2 format agreed to focus on practical results in the dialogue. This continued in the final protocols in Vienna and Rome, where the parties committed themselves to addressing tangible problems within a set time frame. Experience has shown that this prompted Chisinau and Tiraspol to seek compromises, including on long-term ‘historic’ contradictions. Strictly speaking, such an approach of international partners was more in line with the interests of Tiraspol, which since 2012 has been promoting the idea of small-step tactics – that is, solving non-political social and humanitarian issues. As a result, graduates of the left bank university now can use their diplomas around the world, and Pridnestrovian drivers are allowed to international road traffic. Chisinau, in turn, has also solved several practical problems for itself, without particularly forcing a political settlement directly. However, the changes in Moldova in June this year led to a revision of past approaches. As a result, Vasile Sova and Igor Dodon are increasingly calling to discuss the political status of Transdniestria. It cannot be ruled out that in Slovakia Moldova rebelled against the established practice in recent years and the current ‘non-political’ negotiating agenda. This is what prevented from completing the round with a signed document, as in previous years. As a result, the parties did not close the Bratislava meeting and took time for extra consultations. The current state of affairs is an extremely alarming signal for the Transdniestrian settlement, where positive changes have been observed in recent years. Chisinau and Tiraspol were somehow moving forward on the socio-economic agenda, and after its implementation they were to finally begin to agree on the status of the left bank. Now, the Moldovan negotiators expect to skip several steps at once, immediately approaching a political settlement. They can be understood: the new government wants to show something fundamentally different from the approaches of predecessors (and in particular Plahotniuc). The problem is that in the absence of consensus on Transdniestria, even within the ruling Moldovan coalition, any such attempt is doomed to failure as seen in the experience of the Bratislava meeting. Do not forget about the favorite topic of Igor Dodon, who regularly appeals to international partners to support his “big package” in the framework of the settlement. Now Chisinau faces a real dilemma after October 10: either to sign the protocol of the 5+2 meeting and agree to fulfill the commitments made by the previous government, or to jeopardize the support of Moldova from the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship due to the failure of the Bratislava round. The first for many in Chisinau will look like a concession to Tiraspol, and the second threatens to cool relations with European partners. Once again, Chisinau needs to make a choice, and there is no margin for error, apparently.