Moldova’s New Government at a Crossroads: West or East?

Semen Albu Igor Dodon has long gained the image of a pro-Russian politician. But the recent actions and statements of the President and the new Moldovan government closely affiliated with him make significant adjustments to this view During a long time Igor Dodon was considered a great friend of the Kremlin both in Moldova and abroad. In 2014, pro-Russian slogans helped the Party of Socialists led by him to win the parliamentary elections. In November 2016, Dodon was elected President of Moldova. After the inauguration he immediately made a number of symbolic gestures: he ordered the removal of the EU flag from his residence, and made his first official visit to Moscow. At a press conference following the meeting with Vladimir Putin, Igor Dodon said that the Association Agreement between Moldova and the EU did not give his country anything, and assumed that in the future it will be canceled. In addition, the head of state positioned himself as a staunch opponent of Moldova’s cooperation with NATO. He criticized the opening of the NATO Liaison Office in Chisinau and participation of the Moldovan military in the exercises held under the auspices of NATO. He also insisted on the international formalization of Moldova’s status as a neutral state. As you know, these steps were hampered by the lack of real powers of the Moldovan President and dependence on political allies who ran the government. Democrats ruled the country during many years. But in June 2019, with the consensus of international partners, Moldova rebooted the political system. Vlad Plahotniuc fled the country and the socialists formed a coalition with the ACUM bloc. However, five months later, the PSRM played back, forming a new “technocratic government” with the assistance of the Democratic Party, consisting mainly of former advisers to the President. By such a ‘special op’ the Party of Socialists and Igor Dodon gained almost complete power in the country. It would seem that the moment has come when the President will finally be able to fulfill his promises. But the reality is still somewhat different. It is already clear that Dodon and his team are not going to take any drastic steps at this stage. For example, the Speaker of the Parliament Zinaida Greceanii, when asked whether it is possible to expect in the near future the legislative confirmation of the Russian language as a language of international communication, said that the Parliament will first address economic issues. There is no longer any talk of Moldova renouncing the agreement with the European Union. Both Dodon and Chicu, and Greceanii at meetings with foreign ambassadors, representatives of international organizations now declare that relations with the European Union and the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU remain the main priorities for the country. The anti-NATO rhetoric is also clearly suppressed. In an interview with Free Europe, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Aureliu Ciocoi (by the way, a former foreign policy adviser to President Dodon) said that Moldova will continue to cooperate with NATO. “We have an individual cooperation program with NATO, the so-called IPAP, nothing changes, everything remains in force. We continue to cooperate, we remain a reliable partner of the North Atlantic Alliance,” Ciocoi said. Cooperation with NATO is indeed continuing. For example, during 11-29 November 2019, the Joint Combined Exchange Training-2019.3 took place at the military base in Bulboaca where the Moldovan special forces were trained under the leadership of a group of U.S. army soldiers. It is symptomatic that in addition to maintaining military-technical cooperation with NATO, the new government also continued the policy of pressure on Russian peacekeepers and the task force of Russian troops in Transdniestria. Previously, the socialists tried not to raise this topic,  everyone remembers the scandal when Dodon forgot to mention the Russian troops in his speech at the UN General Assembly. However, on December 5, at a meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council in Bratislava, the Moldovan Foreign Minister said that Moldova still supports the withdrawal of foreign troops from its territory: “We stress the need for the withdrawal of foreign troops and their ammunition from the territory of Moldova in accordance with the Istanbul Document”. Ciocoi also assumed that the format of the peacekeeping mission in Transdniestria may change in the near future. Thus, the first steps and statements of the nominally ‘pro-Russian authorities’ in Chisinau are in the wake of the policy of their former ‘pro-European’ colleagues. On the one hand, flywheel effect is understandable. For a long time Moldova has been on the path of strengthening cooperation with the EU and NATO. Relevant decisions were taken, agreements were signed, in particular the already mentioned Association Agreement with the EU. This movement stop at once that Dodon perfectly understands. Moreover, presidential elections are expected in Moldova in 2020, and preparations for them are already in full swing. Having gained full power, Dodon assumed obvious political risks and responsibility for the socio-economic situation in the country. To win the elections, he needs to demonstrate concrete results in a short time, and obviously it will be extremely difficult to do without the help of the US and the EU. Active work is already underway to attract external financing for the implementation of infrastructure projects. The European Union and the IMF will provide assistance only when the government of Ion Chicu implements started earlier reforms in the framework of the Association Agreement with the EU, as well as stays loyal on other issues such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from the territory of Moldova. Perhaps, given the long-established system of Western influence on the poor little post-Soviet republic, which annually loses hundreds of thousands of its citizens, leaving in search of a better life, the President understands the danger of a dramatic change in the development vector. However, the recent history of Moldova remembers the sad political outcome of the Moldovan leaders, who came to power on the wave of pro-Russian sentiments, but failed to fulfill their promises to voters. Stressing his principled position as ‘President for all Moldovans’ Igor Dodon cannot but understand that the public desperately needs a balanced foreign policy of the country. Moreover, this need has been never addressed by anyone. Taking into account the obvious pro-Western bias of Moldova, it is clear to everyone that once it must be corrected. Moldova can be considered a reference world example of protracted political crises with unpredictable combinations and an encyclopedia of contradictory interpretations of the laws of the country. Reality shows that to continue waiting for some stable favorable conditions to start correction is not the most successful tactic, especially against the impending pre-election storm. Especially when the ‘helm’ and professional ‘technocratic’ team are in your hands. I think, soon we will understand whether Igor Dodon will repeat the tortuous, but quite predictable path of his predecessors or will still be able to move from words to deeds.