The 2020 Main Trends. What Awaits Moldova, Ukraine and the Others

RTA editorial New Year's Eve is a traditional time to take stocks. What will the outgoing year be remembered for? What do we expect from the coming year? In this article, we tried to identify key 2019-2020 trends in our region. Presidential elections in Moldova The most important event in Moldova’s policy for the next year is, of course, the presidential election, which will surely set the tone for the whole life of the country. As expected, the main contenders for the head of state post will be Igor Dodon and Maya Sandu. Igor Dodon and the Socialist Party, have received almost all the power in 2019 and assumed responsibility for the socio-economic situation in the country, political results including. That means that the President and the Government of socialists are required to demonstrate concrete successes within remaining time. For example, in 2020, the Government plans to increase salaries, pensions, implement major infrastructure projects, in particular, to build 1,400 km of new roads for the amount of 1.4 billion euros. The implementation of such ambitious plans requires significant external financial assistance, and therefore, Igor Dodon and the "technocratic" government will need to evince all the disingenuity and political flexibility in order to "please" both Russia and the West. Another way to raise the rating of the current government may be a breakthrough in solving the Transdniestrian problem. But here everything is complicated so far, we will talk about below. It should also be noted that in 2020 early parliamentary elections can be held in Moldova. According to Igor Dodon, this will happen if the pro-European parties dismiss the Ion Chicugovernment. This intention was recently announced by Maya Sandu. However, it is much likely that the current government will work as a minimum until the presidential election, and maybe even longer. At least, the same Democrats with their current scanty rating do not need an early voting. Anyway, the presidential election of 2020 will be a great test both for its participants and for Moldova itself. The main thing is that the electoral processes do not make another “lost” year for the country - but there is a feeling that this is exactly what will happen. Moldova between the West and East Since November current year, the socialists and their informal leader, Dodon have finally gained the almost individual rule in the country. Given the conditionally pro-Russian status of the PSRM and Dodon, this changed the already fragile balance in the geopolitical triangle of the USA-EU-Russia. Obviously, the resignation of the Maya Sandu government was negatively perceived both in the European Union and in the United States. The new Moldovan authorities sought to smooth over the displeasure of their Western partners, showing full readiness to follow the previous course. The rhetoric of Igor Dodon has reversed. The President and his Government proclaimed a course towards a balanced foreign policy. The implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU, as well as cooperation with NATO continued. By now, Dodon does not succeed to “catch the West fancy”. Apparently, the current alignment of political forces in Moldova does not suit either Brussels or Washington. According to experts, the United States are already considering the possibility of creating a new pro-European coalition in Moldova, to which the PSRM, of course, does not belong. Indirectly, this version was confirmed by the visit to Chisinau of the Deputy State Assistant Secretary George Kent. Chisinau feels a cooling of relations with the European Union. This particularly indicates the intention of the EU, with the submission of Romania, to monitor the work of the Moldovan authorities in the implementation of the Association Agreement with the EU. According to European officials, the provision of financial assistance will depend on the successful fight against corruption and the depoliticization of state institutions. In addition, the European Union determines the resumption of macroeconomic assistance to Moldova within reforms implementation, including in the problematic sphere of justice. A relatively successful for Chisinau can be considered the situation on the "eastern front". Despite the President’s sometimes overly “flexible” foreign policy, Moscow is likely to continue to support Dodon. It has almost been agreed to give Moldova a large loan of several hundred million dollars, and next year they will also include “heavy artillery” as the visit of Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev to Chisinau. And he, will obviously not come empty-handed. Transdniestrian settlement In 2019, negotiations between Moldova and Transdniestria finally came to a standstill. The negotiators of the parties met much less often than last year, which resulted in near-zero results in the settlement and a noticeable cooling in relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol. The only meeting this year in the “5 + 2” format ended in failure, the final protocol of which was never signed. The appointed in November new deputy prime minister for reintegration Alexander Flenchea has not yet changed the trend for a worsening situation in the negotiation process. It can be predicted that next year in the Moldovan-Transdniestrian settlement will also be difficult, since it will again be under the negative influence of the electoral processes in Moldova. It is likely that Chisinau will continue to put pressure on Tiraspol in order to get the reintegration of the country, which is so needed by the socialists and personally by Igor Dodon. At the same time, the “compromise mood” of the Moldovan negotiators will be zero, and even international partners are unlikely to affect it - the president will be forced to conform to the image of a strong leader who does not make concessions to the separatists. Thus, the prerequisites for improving the situation in the negotiation process are not yet visible, and there is a reason to believe that there will be no significant progress in this direction. Ukraine and the Donbass In April 2019, Ukraine elected a new president, representative of the Servant of the People Party Volodymyr Zelensky, who confidently defeated Petro Poroshenko. In many ways, the voting was of a protest nature: against the deterioration of the socio-economic situation, corruption and the war in the Donbass. Great hopes were pinned on Vladimir Zelensky. But he has not yet been able to radically change the socio-economic situation in the country and advance in the eastern Ukraine conflict settlement. After the presidential election, a redistribution of influence spheres began, which continues to this day. Political opponents of Vladimir Zelensky continue to maintain their economic, political and media influence in Ukraine. Immediately after being elected president, Zelensky initiated early parliamentary elections in July 2019. As a result, the pro-presidential party “Servant of the People” won by a significant margin and received a constitutional majority in parliament. But rivalry of factions began inside the party, so the Verkhovna Rada sometimes failed even pro-presidential initiatives. In fact, Zelensky failed to gain full control over the Verkhovna Rada. Therefore, it is possible that in 2020 early parliamentary elections will again be held in Ukraine. A breakthrough in Russian-Ukrainian relations also did not happen, but some positive signals nevertheless appeared. So, in September 2019, between Ukraine and Russia, a “big exchange” of retained persons took place according to the “35 by 35” formula. Ukraine was given 24 Ukrainian sailors detained by Russia while trying to pass the Kerch Strait. The withdrawal of the armed forces in the Lugansk and the Donbass directions also took place, even if Ukrainian nationalists actively prevented this. After guard relief, it became possible to hold the "Norman Four" meeting of the leaders in Paris, which, however, ended without visible results. Next year, the situation is unlikely to radically change. So far, Russia and Ukraine are only groping for a possible compromise complicated by the opposition of patriotic forces from both countries. Therefore, the exchange of prisoners and the breeding of forces remain the only "magic wands" designed to demonstrate progress in the Donbass. The implementation of the really key points of the Minsk agreements, such as elections holding and the return of the state border to Kiev, is still very far in the future.