How Will Staff Reshuffle in Russia Affect Dodon?

Despite the rumors, it is premature to talk about problems for the Moldovan President amid internal political processes in Russia. Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his message to the Federal Assembly, triggered actually the transit of powers, long awaited by experts, and the large-scale transformation of the country’s entire political system. It will include redistribution of powers between various state bodies, the adjustment of president’s functions, as well as a significant strengthening of the State Council, which will coordinate the entire state system functioning. In fact, all these changes conceivably should better reflect the principle of checks and balances and to some extent move away from the manual control of the country’s entire political life from a single decision-making center. The scale of the planned reforms is so large that it will require amendments to the Constitution and, as a result, a nation-wide referendum. Another important point of Putin’s message which took most of the time during his speech is the emphasis on the social and especially demographic agenda. A number of socio-economic measures to increase real incomes of the population and overcome the demographic crisis were announced. It is logical that the government of Dmitry Medvedev retired on the same day – for such ambitious tasks and changes in socio-political life fundamentally different executives are required. There is no doubt that Moldova is closely monitoring current changes. It is clear that Russia will inevitably be “self-absorbed” for some time, since the reforms announced by Putin will require the utmost attention and efforts from the Russian government institutions. This has already given rise to rumors in Moldova about problems for the Moldovan president, who obviously expects to use the Russian resource in his election campaign. It’s true that the announced visit of the Russian prime minister to Moldova is still hanging in mid-air (there is no guarantee that Medvedev’s successor will follow his agreements with Ion Chicu); questions remain as to the Russian credit line for Chisinau, especially considering the need for huge expenses to implement the announced social projects. Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Kozak, Russian President’s Special Representative for the development of trade and economic relations with Moldova, also leaves the Russian government together with Medvedev. According to rumors, Kozak moves to the Presidential Administration, where he will be responsible for relations with the CIS countries and Eurasian integration processes as deputy head. Apparently, there are plans to place Dmitry Kozak, as one of the most effective political crisis managers in the Russian Federation, into the Belarusian direction. As you know, Russia has recently accelerated integration within the Union State, which Minsk actively opposes. This has already led to a series of minor and more-than-minor economic conflicts between the neighboring states, including the current oil war (Russia has stopped supplying black fuel). Given Lukashenko’s attempts to “flirt” with Western partners, it is obvious that the conflict line between the two countries will continue at least in the near future. Belarus is the zone of primary strategic interests of Kremlin who considers it one of its basic influence domains. Moscow will never allow such a loss, since image losses will be too great, both inside the country and abroad. In these conditions, one should not exclude a decrease in Kozak’s focus on Moldovan affairs, which, in the context of internal transformations and Belarusian battles, may fade in the background. If Kozak is replaced, it is likely that his successor will not have the same influence and resources in order to single-handedly solve the problems of restoring Russian-Moldovan economic ties in an effective way. However, it is too early to draw final conclusions – who will be assigned to the Moldovan direction (and whether they will be at all) is yet to be seen. Information about Mikhail Babich as a potential Kozak’s successor is circulating now. It is likely that as a result of all reshuffles, Dodon’s position will not weaken, but rather become stronger. Many experts consider the resignation of Russia’s Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika a personal major “loss” for the Moldovan president. Having been in this position for almost 15 years, Chaika actually built a wide network of prosecutors loyal to him personally. The huge influence in the country’s leadership helped to organize solid business for his sons and firstly for Igor Chaika. The latter, for example, owns profitable enterprises in the field of waste collection and disposal in Moscow and some regions of the Russian Federation, and a number of other companies in various fields. The general prosecutor’s son is known in Moldova as a close friend of Igor Dodon and his family. Since recently, they have been united not only by friendly but also business ties. Thus, in September President’s brother Alexander Dodon, together with Igor Chaika, became co-owners of Industrial Ecological Operator, a company that collects and processes industrial waste, including radioactive waste. Even earlier, Chaika and his business partner Alexander Ponomarev established the Arhplay Development LLC construction company, which later was joined by Alexander Dodon. He is also in charge of the Russian-Moldovan Economic Council, and is the business ambassador of the Delovaia Rossia (Business Russia) association in Moldova and Transdniestria. At the end of December, he also became the majority owner of the Media Invest Service company, which owns two socialists-run TV channels in Moldova – Perviy v Moldove (First in Moldova) and Accent TV. Prior to that, he also planned to invest in cryptocurrency farms in Transdniestria. Given the Russian realities, Yuri Chaika’s resignation from the general prosecutor’s post implies a possible cessation of his sons’ business patronage and increased attention from the Russian supervisory authorities. On the other hand, there is no information on this matter so far, and the senior Chaika was placed not to the retired list, but to the post of plenipotentiary envoy in the North Caucasus Federal District. Therefore, speculations about Dodon losing a serious ally in Russian highest bureaucratic echelons are an empty shell. No secret that the Russian political system is largely tied to a rather complex structure of interpersonal relations. Therefore, the current personnel perturbations may indeed at first glance seem like a “catastrophe” for the Moldovan president, which spoils his game. But it is much more likely that the Kremlin will keep in full its stake on Igor Dodon, and the principled support for the Moldovan leader will not be ceased. The only question is whether resignation of former officials responsible for Moldova together with domestic policy concerns will affect the level and quality of this support.