Will There Be a Sandu-2 Government in Moldova?

Sergiu CEBAN Although many believe that the Chicu government's resignation is almost inevitable, the situation is not as definite as it seems at first glance Last week has become one of the most eventful in terms of extraordinary developments that will determine the future course of Moldovan domestic political life in the near future. The decision of Moldova's Constitutional Court on the non-compliance of the Russian-Moldovan loan agreement with the republic's basic law was certainly the focal news story. According to experts, this incident was a tangible political blow to Igor Dodon and his partners in Moscow. Unexpectedly many realized that certain shifts took place in the country's supreme judicial body and clearly not in favor of the current government, whose positions on a number of significant issues may now be in jeopardy. Among other things, the atmosphere in the coalition itself has significantly worsened. The chances of keeping its current composition are diminishing every day. The decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova only reinforced the PDM's disintegration trend, and as a result several more deputies left the ranks of the Democratic fraction (54 deputies remained in the coalition). The situation is still not “fatal”, but the crisis in the Democratic Party will certainly divert resources and keep the ruling alliance in tension, which can now turn from the majority into a minority at any moment. The opposition, of course, will not resist the temptation to build on its success, while inciting discord inside the coalition. Andrian Candu, the ex-speaker of the parliament, has become the leader of this anti-government campaign.  Over the past weekend, he generated a lot of original initiatives hoping to become the center of opposition efforts to make the Chicu government resign. It is worth saying that Mr. Candu’s excessive zeal and desire to be a greater “anti-Dodonist” than everyone else was clearly not appreciated by his opposition colleagues. Therefore, the ex-speaker’s call to form a single bloc to confront the president and the ruling coalition has not been supported by the pro-European forces so far. Igor Dodon's personal response to the events was quite emotional as he fairly suggested that, in case the ruling coalition collapses, the only right decision should be not to form a “government of dissident MPs,” but to hold early parliamentary elections on the same day as the presidential. However, as mentioned earlier, such a maneuver is almost impossible under the current legal framework. The only opportunity for this year's parliamentary elections will appear only if the president resigns, as Maia Sandu has already pointed out. It is clear that to talk about current Moldovan cabinet's dismissal is too early, because, in one way or another, the ruling majority still remains in parliament. Moreover, even the mathematically required number of opposition deputies does not guarantee that a vote of no confidence in the government will easily secure the necessary votes. There is reason to believe that deputy groups associated with the names of Shor and Candu have much more far-reaching claims than the banal resignation of Chicu’s cabinet. In addition to their financial and political interests, it's highly likely that they also expect to be incorporated into the new government to strengthen, among other things, electoral positions ahead of possible parliamentary elections. Due to the fact that the functionality of the existing PSRM-PDM union is becoming less and less stable, the pro-Western opposition, primarily  in the person of Maia Sandu and Andrei Nastase, is facing the prospect of a difficult choice. On the one hand, they need the resignation of the current Cabinet, which, in their opinion, has proved to be extremely ineffective in the fight against Covid-19. On the other hand, to form a new government is possible only by the votes of a very diverse parliamentary audience, the interaction with which was previously considered unacceptable personally by the ACUM leaders, and can lead to the most unpredictable consequences in the future. Contrary to popular belief, opposition leaders M. Sandu and A. Nastase do not need to enter into a formal coalition with the dubious PDM party-switchers and the Shor party in the current circumstances. It is unlikely that the opposition has forgotten its recent experience with specific “coalitions”. Therefore, a tactical functional partnership without long-term obligations may be the best option for them. It is enough to act synchronously, exerting constant consolidated pressure on the ruling team, weakening it over and over again and chastising. It will be extremely difficult for the current coalition government to work under constant pressure (amid problems with the pandemic and the economy), balancing on the brink every day, without a clear and stable perspective, fearing at any moment to lose a majority in the parliament, with a subsequent vote of no confidence. There is no doubt that even a short period between the opposition “hammer” and “anvil” of crisis management of the country will lead to the divergence of many political “seams” that connected not only democrats and socialists but also various intraspecific groups within these formations. Much will depend on whether such a strategy will be backed by "external" forces which, as Moldovan reality shows, often have a decisive influence on the country's policy. Some development partners do not hide their interest in forcing events, pushing the opposition to decisive actions already today. If an external green light is obtained, the opposition will not be in a hurry to start a “major battle” with the authorities, taking the entire burden of post-quarantine side-effects and a large-scale crisis in the economy upon themselves, if successful. More reliable is the tactic when the authorities are methodically weakened through consolidated blows, escalating tensions, provoking opponents' mistakes, with the goal to undermine the Igor Dodon's position as the main rival in the presidential race.